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An examination is made of the historical antecedents of
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Union. The continuity of principal characteristics is
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis develops the distinctive philosophy and
dominant characteristics cf the Soviet command and control
system by examining the unique factors which have influenced
its development. These factors are primarily ideological
and historical.
It will he shown that Soviet command and control has
developed in accordance with the ideology of Marxism-
Leninism. The control system is rationalized to conform to
the ideology, which legitimizes and validates it. The
system has been tempered and snaped by the Soviet experience
in World War II. Wartime experimentation resulted in
practical forms of command and ccntrcl which not only
functioned effectively, but could also be reconciled with
political dogma.
To understand contemporary Soviet concerns in command
and control, a historical and ideological context is
necessary .
A. SCOPE
A study of the means of command and control exercised by
the Soviets must cover much wider-ranging considerations
than a comparable study of Western systems. 3ecause their
political-economic system is itself a failure, the Soviet

Armed Forces (and security apparatus) are the primary means
of political control over the non-Russian peoples of the
Soviet Union and over those nations which have fallen within
the sphere of Soviet influence. The military officers thus
serve both internal and external political ends cf the state
leadership. While the U.S. has applied rigorous strictures
to insure civilian control of the military, and have placed
severe constraints upcn the political role which military
leadership may legally play, the Soviets have done the
reverse. Military leaders have been forced to act as
political executives and to promote political activity
within the military. In turn the military wields
exceptional influence in the internal affairs and economy of
the USSR. As Holloway [Ref. 1: pp. 1] points cut,
The Polish sociologist J.J. Viatr has written that 'in
place of the legal subordination of an Army by the civil
power which is a distinct, isolated environment, we have
to do [sic] with the conscious striving for organic
union of the civil and military sphere of social life.'
This organic union is based, morever, not on the
militarization of civilian life, but on the
politicization of the Armed Forces.
The Soviet Armed Forces, integrated much more fully into
the internal and external political schema of the country
than our own, must serve simultaneously as the means to
achieve both political and military ends. Indeed, to the
Marxist- Leninist ideology there is no real distinction
between the armed forces and the state in a socialist

systerr. as put by a basic Soviet military text [Ref. 2
pp. 160] :
The organization and development of the Soviet Armed
Forces is directly bound up with the nature of the
socialist state... The ideological and theoretical
foundations of the development of the Soviet Armed
Forces is Marxism-Leninism and its teaching en war and
the army, and the communist ideology, which is the only
ideology in the country.
It fellows that the command and control system used by
the Soviets is shaped as much by political, ideological, and
sociological considerations as by purely military ones. To
that end it is necessary to consider the sociological and
political factors which influence the structure and
functions of the Soviet command and control system. How
totally different that system may be is implied by the
following quotation from Oleg Penkovskiy, which might be
apocryphal but would still be accurate [Ref. 3: pp. 252]:
One thing must be clearly understood. If some
to hand to an American general, and English ge
a Soviet general the same set of objective fac
scientific data, with instructions that these
data must be accepted as unimpeachable, and an
made and conclusions drawn on the basis of the
possible that the American and the Englishman
reach similar conclusions — I don't know. Bu
Soviet general would arrive at conclusions whi
be radically different from the other two. Th
because, first of all, he begins from a comple
different set of premises and preconceived ide
namely, the Marxian concepts of the structure
and the course of history. Second, the logica
in his mind is totally unlike that of his West
counterparts, because he uses Marxist dialecti
whereas they will use some form of deductive r





















restricts the behaviour of the Soviet. Fourth, the
Soviet general's aims will be radically different from
those of the American and the Englishmen.
E. SOURCES
The intent of this thesis is to rely most heavily on the
use of openly published Soviet military publications. A
voluminous amount of military doctrinal writing exists,
including a variety of military journals, newspapers, and
books. These materials typically avoid discussion cf
technological developments and orders of battle, but they
do give a framework: of ideologically-derived military
doctrine and strategy, to which the Forces must adhere.
Soviet writings can not always be accepted at face
value. The publication of differing points of view is
carefully orchestrated to give the appearance of debate,
while in reality the issues have been settled before
publication starts. But once established, the doctrine is
openly published as such. It can be accepted as genuinely
reflecting Soviet intentions, and wide dissemination tc
their own forces is of course necessary. They can not
afford to delude potential enemies at the cost of misleading
themselves .
It is conceivable, but verging on the fanciful, to
believe that all open Soviet military literature is
published with an intent to deceive the West. Barnett wrote
[Ref . 4: p. vii] :
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But millions of officers and other cerso
knew the substance of such ratters I Sov
doctrine and strategy] , if they are tc f
effectively, and the only feasible means
therr in most instances is through the op
is there any serious doubt as tc tne ess
reliability of these publications. It w
inconceivable that the Moscow regirre wou
its own military personnel on such a vas
in order to confound the Vest. In any c
material is independently verifiable —
observation of the weapon systems develo
Soviet military, which necessarily bear
















Western observations cr historical record will be used
to validate and confirm the accuracy of Soviet doctrinal
writings. It is this writer's contention that an effective
study of doctrine, principles, and influential factors
relating tc Soviet C2 is a necessary prerequisite to the
study of specific communications systems, control means, and
command practices. The details of implementation will
certainly change as new technology supercedes old. But
ideology changes little, and doctrine does not change
quickly. When changes do occur they are openly discussed,
often over a period of years, in the literature. As William
F. Scott notes [Ref. 5: p. 65] :
There is no excuse today for mere speculation... We have
readily available a vast amount of Soviet military and
political- military writings... There is a strange
reluctance in the West to examine these Soviet writings
in their totality. It is mucn easier to sit en the
fence and speculate about what course the Soviets might
take. A thorough analysis of Soviet publications on
military matters, combined with known facts about Soviet
weaponry, will present explanations of Soviet behaviour
12

that would be uncomfortable to study. Thus, in the
market place, the myths still have a ready sale.
One note of caution must be mentioned regarding the use
of Soviet sources. In analyzing Soviet writing, the reader
must always be conscious of the author's terget audience.
Thus, journals intended for high military officers can
logically be expected to reflect more accurately the
statement of accepted doctrine than would similar writing
for a scldier oriented magazine. In a similar way, Soviet
writings which are published only in foreign language
editions — such as "Soviet Military Review" for example —
should be regarded with some degree of suspicion.
C. EISTORY
There are three main reasons why it is especially
important to the Soviets, and thus also to the purpose cf
this thesis, to study and apply military history. The first
is ideological, the second is theoretical, and the third is
simply practical.
Marxism asserts that the historical process is the
source of all true human knowledge. Marx and Engels wrcte
that "...we know only one single science, the science of
history." It follows that to a Communist, history is the
key to understanding all forms of social phenomena,
including the art cf war [Ref . 6: p. 3?].
13

Soviet military theorists drew heavily on the events of
World War II in developing modern strategy and tactics.
Erickson has noted that the war is used as a vast data case,
providing source material for operations research and
statistical analysis [Ref. 7: p. 134]. As Zhilin asserts
[Ref . 6: p. 17]
,
The main thing in it is not only the reliable facts, but
also the generalizations, conclusions, and lessons...
making it possible to improve military affairs, to
foresee the ways of its further development...
Nor are the lessons of the last war blindly applied to
current military affairs. As Pavlovskiy notes [Ref. £] the
events of the past have significance for today, only if
interpreted in a creative way which assimilates the
evolution of technology.
The Soviets believe that the next waY will be a swiftly
concluded one. Major staffs include a historical section
specifically to analyze 'lessons learned' immediately after
an operation has taken place. Today, as in World War II,
critiques of the battle will be performed quickly and the
conclusions, if new, will be disseminated to the entire
front. [Refs. 9, 12]
As Srickson points out [Ref. 11], the strategic
leadership of the USSR is composed of veterans of the World
War. The lessons of the last war are still vivid in the
corporate memory. The men who fought that war have
14

successfully managed the evolution of the Red Army into the
Soviet Arrred Forces of today. Constant reference to the
war, and the rcle played in it by those who are still
active, enhances the credibility of the leaders and
inculcates naticnal pride and patriotism.
Since history is used as a tool of policy, it is
manipulated by successive regimes to suit specific purposes.
The primary source of distortion is simple omission. As the
years brought change witnin the leadership of the country,
history tended to be re-written as well. This is helpful,
as a historical event can be seen from several perspectives.





Examination of Soviet command ana control procedures
must te made in the context of Marxist-Leninist ideology and
Soviet political traditions. The Soviets have always
integrated political control of military operations and
organizations to a degree unprecedented in the West. This
follows directly from the Soviet view, that the armed forces
are an extension of the state and the people, and that the
same processes which apply to society as a whole are also
applicable to the army. Their doctrine explicitly states
[Ref. 10: p. 45]: "The troop control system is therefore a
social system by nature."
A body of Marxist-Leninist dogma has been created in
support of the Soviet organizational relationships and
military hierarchical command structure. While most Western
states accept without question the organizational patterns
common to all modern military organizations, the Soviets are
discomfitted by its inherent contradictions to the Communist
ideal. Of specific concern is the need to vest sole
authority over formations of troops in battle in the hands
of individuals rather than collective bodies. The ideology
calls for Soviets, but their cwn experience with such
leadership means was not effective and quickly led in
wartime to the return of the individual commander, albeit
16

not as he is known elsewhere. The implicit sense of class
distinction "between an officer and his men may be
theoretically avoidable, but net practically so. It is
perhaps inevitable that apologetics on 'one man command'
appear so frequently in the Soviet military literature,
often in juxtaposition with contradictory principles.
Colonel General Gcrnyy wrcte [Ref. 12]:
The organs of Soviet military control are structured and
function on principles of strict centralization and
unity of command which have been confirmed in military
legislation. This is caused by the specific nature of
the Armed Forces and the necessity to insure unity cf
will and action by all personnel... at the same time,
those requirements of the principle of democratic
centralism which are confirmed in the constitution are
also extended to the armed forces in full measure: the
obligatory nature of decisions by higher organs for
lower ones, the combination of unity cf command with
initiative and creative activity locally, and its
combination with the responsibility of each state organ
and official for the assigned matter.
Soviet literature devotes much attention to the
requirements of ideologically sound theories, even in
apolitical subjects. In the area cf command and control,
which has political ramifications if only because the army
is the most powerful element of society, the Soviet
political leaders nave exhibited concern that, as the
officers become more technical and quantitative in their
training, they neither neglect nor denigrate the role of
ideology. Engineers and scientists have shown less patience
with ideological considerations than the party finds
17

acceptable, and as rigid enf orcement of the ideology is the
glue that holds Soviet society together, this represents a
threat .
Part of the answer to this threat was to develop a
scientific approach to leadership which would be couched in
terms of the dialectic, forcing the engineer-commander to
deal with technical subjects in a party-directed manner.
The Main Political Administration saw that the advancement
of cybernetics and sociology were inevitably to supersede
the traditional 'party- political' approach to leadership.
It made a determined effort to expand the scope of
dialectical materialism as a general methodology in military
affairs and thereby to legitimize cybernetics with Marxist-
Leninist interpretation. As will be seen, the MPA had
reason to embrace the new technology with more enthusiasm as
its potential for control became clearer. The traditional
Soviet belief in a 'correct' solution to an operational
problem, the belief that there is an optimal way to make
every decision, lends impetus to the implementation of
automated means of command and control.
For a number of reasons, not least of which is its own
perpetuation, the CPSU is pervasive in its control over the
military at all levels and in Horizontal as well as vertical
ways. It is evident that the revolutionary and
conspiratorial birth of the 'Bolshevik' revolution still has
meaning for the Party today, as it evidences an acute
13

sensitivity to matters of secrecy and the potential threat
posed by the armed forces. Thus the redundant lines of
control which extend to the very lowest levels of the
military, and the independent means available to monitor the
forces in peacetime and in war. All of these factors, which
are more or less peculiar to the Soviet military system,
will he examined in terms of their effects and consequences
on the command and control system.
A. CENTRALISM
One of the basic tenets of Soviet ideology is
'democratic centralism.' This is the Leninist principle
legitimizing absolute dictatorial power for the supreme
control organization or executive. Theoretically, the will
of all the people is expressed in the decisions and
directives of the supreme commander. The relationships
between CPSU and government entities at the highest levels
of Soviet society are deliberately ambiguous, especially
since there is a great deal of overlapping membership among
the ruling oligarchy. Soviet and Western views of these
relationships are presented by Gcrnyy [Ref. 12] and the
Scotts [Ref. 13]
.
Unlike the carefully prescribed separation observed in
other social systems, the Soviets take a holistic view.
Zemskov noted [Ref. 14]:
19

The experience in military-strategic direction of a war,
accumulated by our party during the armed defense of our
socialist homeland, enables us to separate cut and tc
emphasize the main principles operating in this
particular area. First of all there is the principle cf
unity cf political and military leadership. It embodies
the requirments of one of the principal laws of a war —
its complete dependence upon politics.
The exact nature of the supreme command element is not
specified anywhere in Soviet writings, but there is a strong
inference that it will resemble the State Defense Committee
established during the Second World War. Whether the
ultimate authority will be a single individual or a small
group, it will wield absolute power and authority within the
USSR. No activity of any state organization or party
apparatus is legitimate unless sanctioned by the legitimate
delegation of authority and responsibility from this prime
source. An indoctrination -study guide by Fedchenko [Ref.
15] describes the deductive legitimacy of the military
hierarchy
:
Our Armed Forces are organized according to the
principle of centralism. This means that all troops are
strictly subordinated to central military entities and
to a single supreme command. All lower entities execute
orders and instructions of superior military entities
precisely and en time, and they are accountable tc them
for troop combat and political training. Strict
monitoring of execution from top to bottom is an
inalienable feature of centralism."
The extreme centralization of the Soviet system is
symptomatic not only cf their ideology, but also cf the fear
of losing control and the lack of trust within the system.
22

The statement attributed to Stalin "Trust is good, but
control is better," is operative today. Soviet leaders fear
any loss of positive control of the forces, to even a minor
degree. The blind obedience expectec. of the Soviet soldier
is a consequence of the most rigid discipline. Independent
action by subordinates is forbidden, as discussed below. If
it were possible, even the most trivial tactical decisions
would be made in Moscow. The whole thrust of Soviet command
and control, at strategic, operational, and tactical levels,
is to eliminate the freedom of choice of the commanders.
Brown has characterized the Soviet leadership as being
"thoroughly fearful of spontaneity," [Ref. 16: p. 12?],
both because it could represent a threat to them and because
spontaneity will inevitably perturb the rigid plan
promulgated from the top.
1 . Theater-Level Commands
One of the apparent consequences of centralization
has been the traditional Soviet reluctance to allow
intermediate headquarters to exist between the fronts and
the high command. The number of subordinate elements
supervised by any high headquarters tends to be much higher
than in corresponding Western organizations. Sckolovskiy
[Ref. 1?: pp. 489-490] discusses the relationship between
the Stavka and the fronts in World War II and concludes that
the use of intermediate theater level headquarters was a
hindrance. Thus, during the Byelorussian campaigns the
21

Stavka was controlling over a dozen fronts, with only roving
representatives as intervening echelons.
More recently, however, there has been some
indication that intermediate echelons are "being established.
Woff reported [Ref. IS: pp. 79-82] that the Soviets
established a Far last Theater of Operations in December
1976. This theater is believed to include the Far Eastern,
Transbaikal, and Siberian Military Districts, encompassing
some thirty divisions in all. Woff's analysis is especially
convincing in view of the article by Vyrodov [Ref. 19: p.
24] which appeared in April the following year, end is as
definite a statement of policy as might be expected from the
Soviets :
The experience of World Wars showed that it became
practically impossible for a supreme high command to
exercise direction of military operations of major
groupings of armed forces without an intermediate
echelon and that bcth an overall system cf strategic
leadership and its echelons must be set up ahead of
time, before the beginning of a war, and their structure
must correspond strictly to the character and scope cf
the upcoming military operations.
Woff also noted that the Warsaw Pact exercises which
took place in 1979 reflected that the five western most
military districts are being organized as two additional
groups of forces to supplement the four Soviet groups
already in place in Eastern Europe. The Leningrad, Baltic,
and Eelorussian Districts compose one group (Northwestern?;
while the Carpathian and Kiev Districts compose the other
22

(Southwestern?). It is possible that the new Warsaw Fact
headquarters at Lvov is being established to control not
only the Soviet Groups and the various national forces but
also the five military districts. There is historical
precedent for the theaters and for the groups of forces as
well
.
2. Nuclear Weapons Control
The absolute control of the forces by the strategic
leadership of the country is still a characteristic of the
Soviets. The need for such control is seer as being more
imperative when nuclear weapons are employed. As Zav'yalov
sees it [Ref. 20], the advent of nuclear weapons allows the
strategic leadership to 'steer the ship' from the Kremlin:
The limits of the tactical, operational, and strategic
zones of combat actions have become considerably wider,
the depth of the modern combined- arms battle and
operation is greater, the scale of war is broader, the
process of destroying any of the enemy's targets is ten
times quicker, and the dynamism of combat action is
greater, all of which predetermine abrupt and marked
changes in the combat situation... Nuclear weapons make
possible the simultaneous accomplishment of tactical,
operational, and strategic tasks. There has been a
significant increase in the opportunities for the
strategic leadership to influence the tactical actions
of the troops. Furthermore, the employment of strategic
nuclear weapons can have a direct, decisive effect on
the nature of the tactical actions of the troors.
The events which took place during the massive Ckean
70 and 75 naval exercises, which included coordinated
attacks occurring simultaneously on opposite sides of the
world, demonstrated ability to direct tactical operations
23

from Moscow. Despite the intermediate echelons of command in
place and operating in the theaters, the central authority
was able to control events at the lowest levels. [Hef . 21:
p. 39] .
One example of the practical effect of the policy of
centralization on the organization of the forces is evident
in the way that nuclear weapons delivery units are
structured within the force. In the United States Army,
nuclear capabilities were integrated down to the lowest
level possible within the existing force structure. Any
heavy tube artillery unit is theoretically a nuclear threat
to the Soviets. This presents them with an identification
problem, to the extent that they need to detect the subtle
signs of a nuclear-capable unit in order to differentiate
between it and the conventionally equipped one. The Soviets
did. not integrate nuclear weapons into existing force
structures, but created entirely new ones which are kept
distinct. These units have their own integral control and
communications equipment which make them completely
independent of the rest of the force. They are self-
sufficient units under the personal control of the
commander. Since Soviet doctrine recognizes nuclear fires
as maneuver elements in their own right, which may operate
without supporting ground troops in some cases, the nuclear
fire elements now represent the commanders own swift and
devastating means to personally destroy the enemy
24

formations. In contrast to conventional artillery, which
serves as a support element to maneuver elements, nuclear
artillery is now supported by the maneuver forces.
There is reason to believe that the Soviets kept
their nuclear units separate in order tc avoid certain
control problems. All nuclear delivery means are farther to
the rear in the Soviet plan than ours. It is expected that
the Soviets will rely extensively on the Strategic Rocket
Forces and Long Range Aviation to deliver the bulk of the
pre- emptive attack in the theater. This will allow the
field commanders to preserve their nuclear capability for
use after the initial nuclear detonations have severed the
lines of communication with Moscow. 7ield commanders may
not te able to call for strategic forces and hence will have
to rely on their own inherent reconnaissance, target
acquisition, and delivery resources for targets of
opportunity.
Should the Soviets elect to deploy an army without
any nuclear capability, they can easily strip away the
nuclear delivery units from the force and concentrate that
capability in another theater — without disrupting any
ether of the elements cf the parent unit. The unique




3 . Exceptions to Centralization
The Soviets' strict adherence to the rrost
centralized control systems has in recent years teen
reversed in at least one and possibly other areas.
Andersen, Drozhzhin, and Lozik [Rsf. 22: p. 20] note that
there are certain occasions when decentralized control is
necessary, due to the limitations and vulnerabilities of
transmission means and the time delays experienced in
relying completely upon centralized control. They
characterized the two systems as fellows:
The level of detail in the decision also depends upon
the command and control method adopted: with centralized
control, the decision is mere detailed, with
decentralized control, the lower level commanders make
the decisions on their own and report to higher
headquarters based on preliminary, general instructions J
with mixed command and control, both methods are
combined.
The specific operations they described were air
defense operations, which based upon their interpretation of
events in the Middle East and Vietnam wars, may necessarily
function in the decentralized mode. The reasons for this
willingness to decentralize may lie in the high degree of
automation and rather advanced algorithms which have been
developed for air defense. It can be supposed that as mere
of the force elements acquire validated automatic command
and control systems, decentralization may be more common in
the army as a whole.
26

The extremely brief critical time within which the
air defease forces must respond demands decentralization.
Even during World War II, PVO forces operated autonomously.
They shared a district alert and warning network hut engaged
aircraft on their own initiative as prescribed by standing
operating procedures.
B. INITIATIVE
One of the inevitable consequences of the highly
centralized nature of the Soviet system is the premium it
puts upon conformity to the letter of the laws, orders, and
directives disseminated downward through the system.
Spontaneous action is not likely to be approved by a
superior unless it is absolutely successful, and perhaps not
even then. One of the concerns evidenced most frequently in
the Soviet military literature is the need for greater
initiative on the part of the commanders and the soldiers
during exercises and in combat. While recognizing that to
take advantage of favorable opportunities which can not be
planned for in battle it will be necessary to rely upon the
ability and motivation of subordinate commanders, there is a
reluctance to loose the restraints completely.
The need for initiative was the subject of an entire
book [Ref. 23] but the meaning of the word, and the Soviet
intent, must be clarified. "By initiative in battle we mean
striving by our servicemen to find the best means for
2?

executing their assigned Fission and for implementing the
plan of the superior commander. . ." and again, "...using his
intelligence and initiative, he will execute the order
precisely and on time..." Sukhcrukov makes the meaning even
clearer [Ref. 24]: "For initiative is rot necessary for
initiative's sake, but to fulfill assigned tasks in the best
way
."
The Soviets also use the term 'operational independence'
in a way which can mislead Western readers, to whom it might
imply a great degree of discretion and authority vested in a
commander in a remote or restricted theater of operations.
According to Gordiyenko and Khoroshcho [Ref. 23]
:
By the operational independence cf commanders, and of
the subunits and individual servicemen under them, we
mean their ability to successfully execute their
assigned combat missions under difficult combat
conditions, without the assistance of superior
corrmanders or neighboring troops, by effectively using
the weapons, combat equipment, and maneuvering
capability of the subunits.
The more senior and politically av»are a Soviet decision
maker is, the more sensitive he is to the uncertain
consequences which can arise frorr seemingly innocuous
decisions. There is also a greater personal stake riding on
the decision, and greater opportunities for failure, since
every decision will be judged not only in military terms but
also in ideological ones. The danger of making an error in
judgement is much greater in the Soviet system both because
28

the decision will be judged by more criteria and because of
the severity cf punishment for failure. Sins of ommission
are by nature less severe than sins of commission? hence
there is a tendency to equivocate at all levels. The higher
the level, the more likely the decision maker will be to
hesitate. This tendency is further motivated by the many
sources of criticism which the Soviet commander may face in
official ways. Mistakes are openly discussed and attributed
to individuals by name after the conclusion cf every
exercise. The political officer, often placed in an
ambiguous position relative to the commander, adds an
additional measure of uncertainty in a particularly danger
prone area. There also are the military councils, which
meet specifically to critique individual and unit
performance. How great the temptation to put away common
sense and follow blindly the directives cf one's superiors,
where culpability for faulty execution can be evaded by the
"following of orders."
Current Soviet literature carries frequent articles
addressing the need for developing initiative in NCOs and
junior officers. Perhaps because of the rigidity of the
command system and the severe consequences of failure to
cbey orders, lower level leaders are apparently reluctant to
deviate from the specific instructions of their superiors
even when corrmon sense would indicate such deviation. The
use of the word "initiative" applies only to the ^eans at
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hand for implement ing the commands of the superior officer
— never dees it imply a new undertaking cf the
subordinate's own devising, nor a change or deviation no
ratter hov slight in the substance of the superior's plan.
Weiner and Lewis shed some light en the limits of personal
initiative [Ref. 25: p. 115]:
The logical result of this rigid attitude is a strict
adherence to the old Soviet command tactics. Since the
end cf World War II, there has been a slight relaxation
of this rigidity among middle- and high- levels in the
Soviet Army. The lower leaders, however, are not given
this degree cf latitude; for them 'initiative' means
carrying out the orders as expeditiously as possible...
one of the most notable attributes of the Soviet soldier
is his unquestioning obedience te his superior... the
lower level leaders must not only grasp the schematic
and mechanical concepts but insure that the unit
commanders apply this theory with complete understanding
in practical applications.
An appreciation of the Soviet use of 'initiative' can be
gained by examining an article recently appearing in Red
Star [Ref. 26: p. 41]. It describes an incident which
occurred while a lieutenant was leading a read march along a
route prescribed by his commander. Although his commsnder
had specifically told him to act as the circumstances might
require should the road become impassable due to heavy
rains, the lieutenant had refused to allow his drivers to
bypass a beggy area in the road, and had gotten his cenvey
stuck. At the same time, vehicles from other units were





On beginning the descent into the low area, Maksimov
could not help but see that fresh automobile tracks went
off from it to the left. That meant there was a detour
here. And the driver believed that he should turn to
the left, but the lieutenant did not dare take that
step: "it's not our job to complicate matters. We'll
take the road given us."
In discussing the incident further, the author condemns the
lieutenant for not displaying initiative.
In my opinion, this incident is a rather convincing
illustration that the practical value of execution which
is not reinforcea by independence or initiative is
degraded substantially.
Although it seems a trivial case, the significance of the
article lies in the fact that it was written at all. Even
the rawest of recruits in the Vest, we would like to
believe, would see the common sense of bypassing a mired
road
.
The young lieutenant's failure to do the obvious can be
attributed to a number of factors. First, he was given an
order which, although it left room for his own judgement, he
felt safer in following blindly. Second, to deviate from
the original route would be an act of independence which he
might feel should not be taken without conferring with
ethers. Ee feels insecure without the collegial
accountability and collective decsion making which, he has
been brought up to believe, is the socialist way. Third,
his departure from the exact route which his commander had
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expected him tc take would violate the paramount rule of
'operational precision', a principle discussed below.
That articles such as the one described appear
frequently in the Soviet military literature is indicative
that the problem does exist. Yet it seems that the need for
some elementary, common sense independent action is a
sensitive issue, for the very article described above 6*oes
on to temper the neec. for initiative with the necessity of
clearing actions with one's superiors. An incident is
described where a junior lieutenant suggests a new training
methodology to his commander, but is told to "Work a bit
more" on it before discussing it again [Ref. 26: p. 44]:
The lieutenant was offended and decided to test the new
methodology on his own. Ee wrote one thing in his
lessen plans, but conducted the classes in his own way.
It stands to reason that net everything went well for
him... It would appear to be clear that to trust someone
is one thing, but to leave subordinates on their own is
quite a different matter.
The entire issue of independent action and initiative is
cne of tremendous importance to the Soviets, as they try and
balance the needs of the party and state for tight control
against the military necessity of freedom to 'manuever'.
There is perhaps a reason why the literature stresses
the importance of cultivating 'initiative' at the lower
levels. The middle and upper level decision makers, while
given somewhat more latitude and wielding greater authority
and responsibility, are also much more visible tc the
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central control organs of the Army. The more circumscribed
actions open to the srall unit commanders — of squads,
platoons, companies, and even battalions — dc not readily
lend themselves to control from the highest levels. Also,
initiative actions on the part of a platoon leader are
unlikely to be of interest to or to effect in any
substantive way the plans of the central authorities.
Initiative at higher levels of command is not being
noticeably encouraged in the literature — whether because
higher commanders already feel comfortable with it or
because they are discouraged from substantive personal
initiatives is hard to say. There is a sensitivity to the
necessity of exercising greater control over the individual
comnend personality within the Soviet Army. As an officer
rises through the ranks it is not obviously desireable that
he 'make it' on his own initiative, although a certain
measure of that character trait can be useful in seme cases,
but rather he should rise through the selection efforts of
his military and political superiors — he must be 'vetted'
in every way. Given the rigidity and doctrine bound nature
cf the Soviet Army, it is hazardous to make mistakes. As
the old expression goes, 'The only people who don't make
mistakes are the people who don't dc anything,' which leads
to inevitable consequences when mistake-free records are
used as a promotion requisite. Gifted leaders with
charismatic personalities who are capable of independent

action may be useful in rany armies, but these are not
always safe traits to have in the Soviet Army. The inspired
leadership of a regimental or divisional commander "on the
rise" can be considered a threat — a military coup can
easily develop from personal loyalties. Soviet leaders have
always been sensitive tc tne power of the military and the
potential threat that it poses to their own authority.
The powers that be are left in somewhat of a dilemma.
As Brown described in the political milieu, but equally
applicable in the military [Ref. 16: p. 31]:
The great problem facing ell of the regimes with regard
tc the growing technical and economic intelligentsia,
however, is how to invest them with responsibility
without, at the same time, giving them reel power. It
presumeably can be done as long as the political
leadership remains united and self confident.
An interesting case which sheds some light on the
independence issue because of its uniqueness — an instance
where a great degree of authority and autonomy was granted
to a field commander — is described by Robinson [Ref. 27:
p. 29]:
An Austrian correspondent's account of a trip through
Soviet Central Asia during 1967 ccnveys seme interesting
information... in September 1966, Moscow was said to
have delegated responsibility and authority for handling
border incidents to the local commanders. That
arrangement was said to hold two advantages for Moscow:
it could repudiate the local commander if he failed tc




we know froir one source that the Soviet border
commanders had what would seem tc be a great deal of
latitude, delegated to then or. the theory that in an
emergency they would not have the time to cable Moscow
for instructions and the possibility that they cculd
exceed their authority would be balanced by their having
to answer to the center for all actions. This is not an
unreasonable administrative device for policing a very
long border at a great distance from the high level
decision makers. [Ref. 27: p. 42]
Several observations must be made. First, the
threat at the time was a purely conventional one. There
was also substantial evidence that the clashes were
being provoked by local 'Red Guard' elements of the
Chinese cultural revolution, possibly on their own
initiative. Second, the spontaneously developing nature
of the clashes, and the rather restricted scope of the
perceived intentions [i.e., the riverine islands, which
the USSR had allowed the Chinese to use, anyway] implied
low risk to the leadership. Third, the communications
links between the border patrols which were being
'ambushed' and the Kremlin were likely to be tenuous and
not time-responsive. Four, the Soviets could have
perceived that a physical conflict, or the threat of
one, on her eastern borders cculd be useful in pressing
the Warsaw Pact nations into widening the scope of
committment attendant under the treaty, to include
conflict outside of the Eastern European area. It
should be noted that the Commander of the Far East
Military District, Favlovskiy, was appointed in 1969 to
35

the newly recreated position of Commander, Soviet Ground
Forces. Clearly the Kremlin had every reason tc suppose
that the commander on the scene was capable and
trustworthy.
The border incident is significant in its
uniqueness. The customary rigid centralization was
relaxed, and trust and confidence was extended to the
local commander. This represented a radical departure
from the strictly responsive role accorded to even the
highest ranking military commanders. They too are bound
by the requirement of blind obedience. As Sokolovskiy
wrote [Hef . 17: p. 498]
:
Generals and officers of the Armed Forces are not
mechanical executors of the plans and wills of their
seniors. While understanding that an order is law,
they execute it with a deep awareness of its purpose
If subordinates are not yet automatons, the Soviet
leadership would like them to act as if they were.
C. COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING
The Soviets have traditionally combined group or
collective discussion with the authority and
responsibility of an individual in the decision-making
process. The importance of such collegial activity is
apparent in the attention given to the subject in Soviet
literature. As with centralism, there is an ideological
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requirement to involve the peoples' will in the
commander 's decision. Within the Armed Forces, this
collective activity is expressed in the form of the
commander's dependence upon his staff, the authority cf
the Military Council in operational matters, the guidance
of the party organizations within the military
organization, and the People's Control Groups. As Marshal
Sokolovskiy wrote [Ref 17: p. 499]:
As [World War II] demonstrated, the operational and
strategic missions were not planned and carried out by
individuals, cut were the result cf collective
creativity. Centralized command does not exclude, hut
rather .presupposes
,
the use of collective creativity.
It is extremely difficult to tell how much use is made
of the collective effort, or how often it may be over-
ruled by the commander. Using the Stavke cf World War II
as a positive example cf the beneficial nature of this
effort, Sokolovskiy indicates [Ref 17: p. 4£9] that all
important decisions were made only after consultation with
the frcnt commands, the commanders in chief cf the
branches of the Armed Forces, the service commanders, and
other 'individuals concerned.'
The destructive power of nuclear weapons and the
highly dynamic nature cf modern warfare are such that no
ore individual can cope with the information flew and the
speed of decision required. As Skirdo noted [Ref. 28]:
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There are twe operationally important collegial
bodies, one being the staff, which prepares the
information it has gathered into specific alternative
ccurses cf action for the commander's decision, and the
other being the Military Council (Soviet). According to
Kczlov and Slavin [Ref . 29: p. 28], the military councils
of districts, fleets, and armies are the "leading bodies
cf military command." Downgraded to consultative bodies
in 1947, their status was again changed in 1950, returning
them to
...full powered collective bodies. They bear complete
responsibility to the CPSU Central Committee, the
government, and the minister of Defense for the state
and combat readiness of the troops... The collective
form of leadership in the form of military councils is
widely used on the superior level cf the socialist
armies and is skillfully combined with one- man
leadership.
The other collective entities found in the Soviet
forces probably play a non-operational role only, serving
mainly as monitoring end policy enforcement agents. The
38

Communist Part/ ana Komsomol organizations are charged
with, bread responsibilities fcr overseeing the entire
unit, with the expected emphasis on training,
indoctrination, ideological hardening, and discipline.
The 24th and 25th Party Congresses resulted in increased
pressure through the part/ channels on insuring that party
policy was carried cut at ail levels. Consequently, much
of the work of the party organizations at the unit level
and "below is now directed toward monitoring performance
and verification of execution of policy. [Hef. 30].
Belya/ev [Ref. 31] stressed the cyclic nature of the
control process in military collectives, and the
importance of insuring continuous feedback.
Monitoring may not be reduced to the final operation
of a managerial cycle alone. It permeates all stages
cf the cycle: the development and making cf the
decision and the organization of its implementation.
Malinovskiy [Ref. 32] indicates that the commander
should rely upon the party apparatus and direct its
activity to strengthening military discipline and to
successful performance of combat missions, if he himself
is a member of the CPSU. If he is not a member, then he
must rely on the party organization to accomplish these
i
missions — but he can not direct them. Malinovskiy also
notes the key role played by the party in transfer cf
information up and down the chain cf command:
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Communists of headquarters and directorates are
expected tc work persistently to instill and maintain
sophistication in work and to insure precise troop
control and operational movenent of accurate, exact
information "both from the tcp down and concerning
affairs in local areas. They must help the cormanders
work out correct plans and carry them out fully at the
proper time.
The role of the party organizations is described by
Ivanov [Ref. 10: p. 62] as extending into operational
matters. The party- political apparatus must work closely
with the commander and staff in preparation for and
conduct cf the tattle, and net only the deputy commanders
of the political units hut also the secretaries of the
party organizations must he present when the commander
gives combat orders and when the interaction Cf the troops
is specified. Ivanov [Ref. 10: p. 202] observes that:
...during collective work tnere is an adjustment in the
commander's psychological state: his recepti veness
,
self criticism, and reaction to the conditions of the
situation are improved, the danger cf subjectivity and
voluntarism is decreased.
Thus, it seers that collective activity may allow
subordinates to question the more arbitrary decisions of a
commander.
After the collective body has made a decision, the
commander assumes the responsibility for implementing it.
The requirement for collective action increases with the
level of command. At the smallest unit level,
collectivization does not apply to operational decisions
4:0

at all. Any decisions will have been male higher up the
chain, and the lever level corrmander is responsible only
for exact implementation.
E. UNITY OF COMMAND
The dominant role played by the Communist Party in
developing and controlling the activities of the Soviet
Arrred Forces has historically caused ideological and
practical problems which have degraded the efficiency of
the military. While the necessity of vesting absolute
military authority in a single individual at any given
echelon is accepted without question in the West, indeed
throughout recorded history, the Soviets have never been
comfortable with that due to their ideology and the
historical development of their forces.
The first difficulty, the ideological one, arises from
the implicit class privilege separating the officer from
his men, and the basically undemocratic authority vested
in the commander. His power is not subject to the will of
the 'military collective' in any positive way, although,
as Timofeyechev noted [Ref. 33: p. 221], the commander is
open to criticism from party members within his command:
"...at party meetings the communists have the right to
criticize any party member or candidate, irrespective of
his position. It is only criticism of the orders and
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instructions of the commanders and chiefs that is
prohibited.
"
The frequent articles and pamphlets published by the
Soviets specifically addressing the ideological legitimacy
of one- man command attest to the importance it has in
their minds. It is referred to as "the most important
organizational principle of the Soviet Armed Forces..."
[Ref. 1£] and "the mcst expedient form of troop control."
[Ref. 33: p. 16] The Soviet espousal of one- man command
is basically for the same cogent operational reasons that
every other army uses it.
However, one's understanding cf the advisability of
applying the principle of one-man command was not
enough. It was also necessary to show that under our
conditions cne- man command based on its political and
class nature does not contradict socialist democracy
and that it is fundamentally different from command
principles in an imperialist army. [Ref. 34: p. 52]
Timofeyechev asserted [Ref. 34] that there were three
reasons why the one- man command did not contradict
'Soviet democracy.' First, the commanders are designated
by Soviets of the people, hence must reflect their
collective will; second, the Soviet obviously must select
the most qualified officers to command; and third, the
commander is always under the direct control of and
responsible to the party organs and Soviet authorities.
It is for these reasons that "...an order of the commander
is a law for subordinates. The order must be carried out
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unquest icningly , accurately, and en time. [Ref . 34:
p. £1]
Lomov [Eef. 35: t. 169] carefully delineates the
complementary roles these principles play. Under the
complex conditions of modern v»ar, "...it is beyond the
capability of a single person to control trccps in combat,
let alone major operations on a strategic scale." Thus,
the commander must rely en 'collectivism in control' while
the responsibility for the final decision and the right of
scle leadership are the commander 's.
The continued emphasis on one-man command may also be
intended to allow a more definitive, objective grounds for
evaluating a commander's performance. Under the redundant
and multiple lines of control which exist within the
Soviet system, it is sometimes impossible tc affix blame
for poor unit performance. With so many organs and
individuals having control in direct and indirect ways
over the commander and his decision, pocr performance is
often unattributed, or can successfully be shifted back
and forth among the commander, the staff above him, the
staff below him, the political deputy, and so forth, until
corrective action is given up in frustration or boredom
with the process. Ey fixing the responsibility firmly on
the commander, his stake in the decision making process is
increased and presumably his motivation to exert his
authority is enhanced es well.
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The second difficulty with unity of command arises
periodically when for some reason, the training and
preparation of the military leaders is not sufficiently
infused with ideological conviction. Periods in the
Soviet history when political commissars were instituted
had in common that the available military commanders
qualified to lead in battle were net ideologically trained
to a degree felt necessary by the party apparatus, or were
considered a potential threat by the state leadership.
In the post-revolutionary period it was necessary to
use ex-czarist officers, as they were the only militarily
experienced individuals available to the new soviet state.
While professionally competent, they were highly suspect
politically since they had owed allegiance to the Czar and
had in many cases been instruments of his repression of
the proletariat. In order to control these officers their
command authority was shared with political commissars who
acted as ideological overseers within the army.
In a certain sense, the scientific-technological
revolution has created a similar situation, in tnat the
new military leaders are more technically qualified and
less prone to accept ideology than previous generations of
Soviet Army officers. They are tending to be 'no
nonsense' engineers and scientists and are a source of
growing concern for the political leadership. In a speech
before the Scientific-Practical Conference of the Armed
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Forces Executive Political Workers, £ - 7 June 1976, the
Chief Of Staff cf the Scviet Army called for an enhanced
role for political officers in increasing party control
and verifying orders and policy [Ref. 36: pp. 138-139]:
Everyone knows... that party work has its cwn
particular features. Party organizations can not
mechanically copy the work techniques of commanders
and chiefs of staff and duplicate their decisions and
orders. The most important duty facing party
organizations is to be persistent, using active means
of persuasion, to insure complete and high quality
fulfillment cf ccmtat and political training tasks.
Using the methods available to them, they must
increase the role of the commander's and chief's
orders and exert an active influence en the work cf
the military collectives of units, ships, and military
training establishments.
The urgency cf re-asserting party and ideclogical
control was given impetus by the mutiny of the Storazhevoy
Krivak Class cruiser in 1976.
When talking about intraparty democracy we should keep
in mind its close association with one- man command as
the principle governing the development and control of
the Armed Forces. Therefore, the political organs
must become more active in instilling a spirit cf
party- mindedness into the work of the military
control organs, be constantly concerned with the
development of one- man command, raise the authority
of commanders, and be implacable toward all
shortcomings in this field. [Ref. 36: p. 136]
The parallel mentioned above between the present era
and the early twenties is apparently viewed by Ustinov as
deriving from the introduction of technically highly
qualified but politically naive officers into positions of
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higher authority. These officers have spent their tire in
study of scientific and engineering principles and nave
more faith in mathematics than the party.
A great deal of work has teen dene in the Soviet Armed
Forces in recent years to improve the selection,
placement and training of cadres. A policy of
promoting promising ycung officers to principal
commands, political, engineering, and technical posts
is being actively pursued. These officers have high
theoretical training but dc net always possess the
necessary practical experience. Party concerns for
shaping and training them is one of the most important
tasks of military councils, commanders, staffs, and
political organs. Our Party makes particularly high
demands on political workers in the Armed Forces. [op
cit]
The message throughout the entire speech is that the
growing technical sophistication of the Soviet soldiers
and officers is increasingly leading to conflict and
contention — lack of proper attitude must be corrected by
strengthening party control at all levels to insure
ideological purity and obedience. Noteworthy is the call
to use 'active means of persuasion' to insure compliance
with orders. The role of the political officers is being
strengthened and the degree of party control over the
military increased. This phenomenon has also been
described by Eollcway [Ref . 1] .
I. MULTIPLE LINES OF CONTROL
One of the most striding characteristics of the Soviet
command and control system is the multiplicity of control
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and monitoring channels. As in the civil sector, Scviet
military ccntrcl is exercised ty means cf four cr more
distinct channels of varying degree of independence [Ref.
37: p. 120].
The first channel is the military chain of command,
similar to that whicn exists in all armies. In the Soviet
case this runs froin the General Staff through the military
districts or groups of forces (which would become fronts
in war time) to the various armies, divisions, regiments,
etc. Command in this hierarchy is typified as 'one man
command' (yedinonachaliye) and is much discussed in Scviet
literature .
The second channel of control is via the Political
Administration channel from the Military Affairs Committee
of the CPSU, to the r"ain Political Administration, to
the political directorates cf successive echelons. This
channel is represented at the unit oj the Deputy Commander
fcr Political Affairs.
The third channel is closely allied with the second
and consists cf the Communist party organizations within
the armed forces. These organizations are closely tied to
the local civil party apparatus of the region or city and
maintain interlocking relationships.
The fourth channel is that of the KGB officers
assigned to eacn level and reporting through their own
exclusive channels to the State Security Committee.
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Inforrrers and undercover agents within the armed forces
can be considered a part of this ^rcup.
The obvious advantage of multiple control lines is
that there is an inherent redundancy in the system, thus
contributing substantially to the durability of the
control apparatus. The disadvantage is that the control
lines may not always support one another — indeed they
may be diametrically opposed.
In the normal course of operations, the party and the
security channels seem designed to function primarily ir
feedback roles, passively reporting through their own
channels en these matters of special interest to their
superiors. It is difficult to predict how passive the
executives of these channels will be in wartime, however.
Experience in the last war demonstrated the dynamic
relationship between tnese channels, and the way in which
the balance of actual command power shifted among them.
The most visible interaction of the Political
Administration of the Army in the last war was the
presence of commissars and political instructors within
the force. They had the authority to sign all operational
orders; in fact, an order was not valid if the commissar
did not co-sign with the commander. It is true that this
arrangement was terminated in 1943, but has persisted
sporadically in the post war years as the political
environment of the USSR changed.
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The interaction of local part} entities similarly car.
net be dismissed, as evidenced in the power of the front
military councils during the last war. Local part/
leaders, some with national standing, served as members of
the councils. Tiiree premiers had such service
Bulganin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev.
The security pclice channel, while patently a
monitoring one, led to conflicts in the war. Intelligence
which was not validated by that channel was dismissed, and
intelligence received by that channel alone was accepted
without corroboration. As Logan has said, "a man with
one watch knows what time it is. A man with two watches
is never sure."
The presence of multiple channels for monitoring the
activities of the commander, and potentially directing
those activities, must contribute substantially to the
anxiety attendant en decision- making in the Soviet Armed
Forces .
The means to independently verify the situation within
subordinate units is deemed important enough to justify
expenditure of considerable resources. Cdom has
contributed a Soviet perspective on the utility of the
party apparatus [Hef. 36: pp. 19-20]:
The party's control apparatus within the military
provides an alternative information channel to the
tcp, and it thus serves tc raise the uncertainty level
of subordinates and to make collusion amor.£ them
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risky. It follows quite logically that the syster of
party control may well enhance rather than reduce
Soviet military power... it is edinonachalye (unity of
command) that allows military subordinates to feed the
high command selective information that distorts the
top's perception and thwarts rational corrective
action.
The more sinister side of the control apparatus is
revealed by General Grigorenko in an interview conducted
after his defection. [Ref . 39: p. 5]. Ee described the
security agent assigned to each battalion, who does not
appear en the battalion roster because he is assigned to
the battalion commander by his 'superiors'. The agent
usually is uniformed as a lieutenant, although he is
actually a member of the KGB. He "is the most feared
person in the battalion because he is the most powerful.
Eis relations [reports], which are secret, can bring the
worst punishment for soldiers and officers." This agent
works for the division counterintelligence section, which
"...can at any moment carry out an incursion, facing the
command with an accomplished fact. Actions of this kind,
carried out with total impunity, often have caused death
or deportation for many youths who opposed the regime."
Grigorenko also describes the network of secret informants
present everywhere within the armed forces. "The fate of
e\ery Soviet soldier is to ask himself constantly if his
words will be reported to the Special Section ty his best
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friend, to fear a report by a malevolent subordinate, tc
no longer trust an/one."
The Soviet command and control system is notable for
its reliance upon multiple independent channels for
feeding back: information to the upper levels. This
indicates an unwillingness to trust subordinates, if not
an outright suspicion of them.
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Ill . COWANS AND CONTROL IN WORLD WAR II
The Scviet Union had nc effective command and control
system prepared to cope with contemporary warfare in 1941.
When the German forces attacked on 22 June, the Soviet armed
forces and strategic leadership had little more than a
peacetime administrative structure, which was wholly
inadequate for operational purposes. The people, hardware,
and procedures nominally composing the command and control
system were, with few exceptions, unsuited to the task.
As the war progressed, changes were rapidly instituted
to correct the mcst crippling shortcomings. By 1944 the
Soviet system had become extremely effective, and the
lessons learned from that wartime experience have played the
dominant role in shaping the Soviet command and control
system of today. Scviet experience in the Great Patriotic
War has assumed almost dogmatic authority. The harshest
lessons are the longest remembered.
A. COMMAND ANT CONTROL CATASTROPEE : 1941
Soviet historians cope in varying degree with the
chaotic response to the German invasion, since the facts do
not reflect favorably upon the wisdom and preparation of the
country's leadership. Pcpel, writing in the mid-seventies,
comments modestly [Ref. 40: p. 7] that "A number of

significant shortcomings was unavc ida Die. . . it became clear
that the theory and practice of controlling units and large
units... had not teen thoroughly tested." He, and other
historians, go on to assure the reader that, despite a few
rinor problems, the military leadership responded
magnificently to the Nazi challenge.
A more vivid and comprehensive account of the martial
catastrophe which actually took place can "be found in the
memoirs of the officers who witnessed it and participated in
the debacle. As part of the de-Stalini zation program of
the early 1960's, official encouragement was given to the
writing of personal memoirs. Politics certainly dictated
which of the officers were so honored, hut during the years
which followed the outpouring cf scores of books has
produced a rich and credible source of historical data.
Erickson [Ref. 41] and kerth [Ref. 42] drew most heavily en
this material in writing their comprehensive and critical
accounts of the early war years.
Marshal Eremenko was the most outspoken critic of the
way Stalin and the High Command conducted the defense of the
USSR. He reported [Ref. 43] that all vestiges of trccp
control were lost during the first weeks of the war. In
some armies, it was never recovered.
Among the shortcomings which crippled the Soviet
response to the invasion were the general inexperience or
incompetence cf many Soviet commanders J the lack cf adequate

communications , commend facilities, and procedures; and the
inhibition or repression of commanders' initiative.
1 . The Commanders
The basis of any command and control system is the
decisive exercise of leeally vested authority by a commander
of forces. The talents and training of an individual
officer, his experience, his familiarity with his troops and
subordinate commanders, and his relationship with his
superior chain of command are critical factors effecting his
ability to command successfully.
Two factors significantly degraded the quality of
the Soviet officer corps on the eve of World War II. The
first of these was the Sreat Purge. The second was the
turbulence in the assignments of the remnant.
a . The Purge
During the period 1935- 1941, Stalin presided
over a literal decapitation of the Red Army. In a brutal
effort to firmly entrench himself and his circle in power,
thousands of the most gifted and productive leaders in the
USSR were summarily executed or imprisoned. Anyone who
through ability or inclination posed a threat to Stalin was
removed. Arrests were arbitrary and there was no appeal.
The military was hit the hardest of all, starting with
f-.arshals and reaching down through the field grades. It has
been estimated that some 11% of the officers in grade of
Regimental Commander and above were taken during the purges.
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The most immediate impact of the purge was e
vacuum, in the higher grades. Biriuzov [Ref. 44] described
the headquarters cf the 30th Division upcn his assignment to
its staff. As all the senior officers had been taken, a
major was acting Division Commander. Promotions came
rapidly to the survivors, who unfortunately were the blander
and less aggressive officers. Prcmcticn did net compensate
for experience and training. By the fall of 1940, a sample
cf £25 Infantry Regiment commanders revealed that net one of
them had completed a full course of instruction at a
military academy. Less than 10^ had received any training
above a junior lieutenant's course. [Ref. 41: p. 20].
The purge resulted in many strange appointments,
where men with proven talents in one area were given
elevated positions in an unrelated area. Cclcnel Starinov,
[Ref. 45: p. 74] a railroads officer and a specialist in
mines, describes how, upcn his return from Spain, he was
offered a posting as Chief of Communications for a Military
District. His eld friend, Brigade Commander Kriukcv (alsc a
railroader) tried to persuade him as follows: "Do you think
it is easy fcr me to be Chief of Red Army Ccmmunicaticns?
Ah, II 'ia! You know I 'm a line officer and don't have any
experience in administering communications... The ranks are
thinning."
Fortunately for some 4,00C higher ranking
officers, it seen became apparent that the 'severe shortage
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of trained commanders ' required the rehabilitation of the
most talented and less irrevocably purged of the officers.
Marshal Rokossovskii , who lost three years and all of his
teeth to the purge, was one cf those rehabilitated. Although
the patriotism of these officers was probably not eliminated
by their mistreatment, there were other undesired
consequences. As Biriuzov noted [Ref. 44]:
We had quite a few victims of Stalin's arbitrariness
among our high ranking officers. They had come to field
formations straight from prison. Some of them later
became remarkable military leaders, commanding troops
with skill. Eut some lost forever the capacities of
full- fledged cormanders. The moral and often serious
physical trauma that they suffered in jails and camps
destroyed the will power, initiative, and decisiveness
so necessary to a military r^an.
b. Command Turbulence
The pre-war years, and the first few years of
the war itself, were characterized by frequent and wholesale
shuffling of assignments of top Red Army commanders.
Kuzretzov [Ref. 46] attributed this turbulence directly tc
Stalin's superficial and capricious approach to military
leadership.
Stalin had surrounded himself with his eld
comrades in arms from the Civil War days, when he had been a
commissar with the First Cavalry Army. Marshals Voroshilov,
Budennyi, Timoshenko, and Zhukov had all served in that
army. This common heritage ensured that they would survive
the purge, while mere competent officers would not.
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The Finnish War revealed, the shortcomings of the
cutmcded doctrine and tactics which had teen re-instated in
the Red Army after the purge of Marshal Tukhachevskiy and
the ether innovative military theoreticians in 1937-38.
Drastic reorganization *i&s ordered to accomodate new
combined arms tactics and to re-establish large armored
format ions .
An extensive shuffle of commanders took place as
incompetent, or simply unsuccessful, commanders were removed
and ne»» ones installed.
Less tnan one year after the Finnisn War, and in
the midst of a frantic reorganization effort throughout the
Red Army, another drastic re-snuffle took place. [Ref. 47:
p. 54] . The occasion was a month-long conference in Moscow,
called to study operational theories and to held staff
exercises. At the conclusion of the conference, many of the
key positions in the General Staff and the leading military
districts were shuffled.
While the conference in Moscow was scing en,
preparations were afoot in Berlin for OTTO, the plans for
the campaign against the USSR. Colonel General Ealder
observed [Ref. 41: p. 46]: 'Die Rote Armee ist fuehrerloes
."
(The Red Army is leaderless.)
Changes in command of fronts, armies, and
divisions cccured in the first month of war all across the
line of engagement as commanders were killed, captured, or
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shot for treason. Erickson [Ref. 41: p. 491] recorded a
partial list of senior commanders ccurt-nartialled In July
1941. At least two division, three corps, cne army, and one
front commander were lest immediately. In most cases the
replacement commander was required to take over in mid-
tattle, with no appreciation for the tactical situation or
the capabilities of his subordinates.
In addition to the turbulence caused by losses,
desperate reorganizations were attempted in the first weeks
of the war. General Yeremenko, summoned from the Far East
to command the Western Front, was replaced three lays later
by the Defense Comrissar, Marshal Timoshenko [Ref. 41: p.
159]. Shtemenko recalled his discomfort with the changes in
the field and in the Headquarters [Ref. 9: p. 25] : "This
top level reshuffle in the first days of the war was
inexplicable... it put us en ed^e."
It frequently happened that senior officers
would be reassigned with no notice. General Tulienev, who
was in command of the Moscow Military District until the day
of the invasion, recalled his astonishment when Stalin
ordered him to assemble a staff from his district personnel
and leave immediately for Vinnitsa. There he was to
establish the Southern Front out of what had been the Odessa
Military District. (The expected pattern for mobilization
would have simply been for the Odessa District commander to

convert his existing headquarters in t c the front
headquarters, under his own command.)
Turbulence in key positions generally declined
as the war progressed, but Shterrenko described another
example indicative of the degree of instability. [Ref. 48]
The Chief of the Operations Directorate was one of the key
advisers to tne Stavka, yet during the period June through
December 1942, it was held by three generals (one of them
held it twice) and, in the periods between their 'permanent'
appointments, was held 'temporarily' by three others.
The decree of instability in the Red Army caused
by the constant turnover of command and key staff personnel
is incalculable. The efficiency of any commander depends to
a large degree upon how well he knows the talents and
shortcomings of his subordinates and staff, and how smoothly
he can orchestrate their efforts. It is difficult to
maintain continuity during transitions in peacetime. In
war, it is costly as well.
c . Felice-State Command and Control
The repressive and fearful relationship between the
strategic leadership and the military forces played a
significant part in degrading Soviet command and control
during the first months of the war. The German Army's
incredible success against the Red Army owed much to the
distrust, secrecy, and terror created in the Soviet forces
by Stalin's own security apparatus.
Z9

a . The Secre t Folice
The military forces nad, since the days of the
twenties been provided with 'Special Sections' of secret
police. The/ were part of a completely separate
organization, independent of trie military chain of command,
which was controlled by the Chief of the secret police, the
NKVD. Charged with supervision of the loyalty of all
military personnel they were assigned at times down to
battalion level, but usually at regiments and above. [Ref.
47: n. 14, p. t66] In addition to these elements, some
111 f 2PZ NKVD personnel were formed into special military
formations for internal and border security.
At the outbreak of hostilities, the border was
guarded almost exclusively by troops of the NKVD. The
regular Red Army formations were held back, typically some
10 km or more. As Nekricn noted [Ref. 16: n. 72, p. 42],
there was no horizontal reporting between the NKVD units on
the border and the army divisions in the vicinity.
Commanders of the army divisions did not always receive
critical information about border activity — reports went
straight to the Main Directorate of Eorder Troops in Moscow,
From there it would be reported to the General Staff, which
would decided who needed to see the information. If
accepted as factual and important, it would then, at least
in theory, be transmitted down to the local division
commander. The horizontal patn for information exchange at
6Z

the levels of Border Security District — Military District
was evidently little used.
Bitter rivalry between the NKVT and the Red Army
literally roused hatred. Not only at the beginning of the
war, tut throughout its course, this served to divide and
vitiate the Soviet forces at critical times. Luring the
German rush towards v csccw, for example, NKVD units detained
a special detachment of demolition experts. They thought it
suspiscious that these Russian officers should be heading
for key bridges with explosives. [Ref. 41: p. 154] 'We
have net the enemy, and he is us!" [Ref. 49].
b. Information and Intelligence Flow
Stalin's regime suffered a chronic failing of
totalitarian regimes regarding intelligence and threat
analysis. When debate is forbidden and the preconceptions
of the despot are unassailable, it takes a very brave or
very foolish man to challenge convictions with mere facts.
Presenting Stalin with information which did not coincide
with his expectations was dangerous — it was tec easily
viewed as a challenge to his authority or his intellect.
There is ample evidence from many independent
sources which attest to the warnings given Stalin on the eve
of the invasion. Jrom England, Switzerland, the U.S., and
other countries, from his own diplomatic corps, from his
excellently placed intelligence agents, and from his
commanders on the border, Stalin was inundated with
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virtually indisputable intelligence about the £2 June 1941
invasion. Eerezhkcv [Ref. 50], Soldin and Fedyuninsky [Ref.
42: pp. 145-150] offer evidence of the detailed
intelligence which was being conveyed to the High Command.
It is likely that the reports were treated contemptuously,
not only by Stalin but also by the subordinates submitting
them to hir.
Subordinates reporting the unexpected were never
believed, whether the news was good or bad. During the
Finnish War, victory was unexpectedly achieved by the 7th
Army under General Meretskov. Voronov, then Chief of Soviet
Artillery, was in his headquarters and recalled the
disbelief with which the Defense Commissar received
Meretskov's good news. Voronov himself finally had to take
the telephone and, after after being asked three times if
the report were really true, was finally believed. [Pef.
51]. Ecldin recalls the first day of the invasion, [Ref.
42: p. 151] when Defense Commissar Timoshenko called the
Western Military District EC every hour or so for reports on
the situation, but clearly did not believe them. Eoldin was
telling him that the troops were in retreat, towns in
flames, and casualties mountin & . Timoshenko was cautioning
Bcldin to "Remember, no action is to be taken against the
Germans without our knowledge... Comrade Stalin has
forbidden to open artillery fire against the Germans."
Similar incidents were recorded in Sebastopol and Murmansk.
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Telegin recalled [Ref. 52] an incident which
illustrates the peculiar risks faced by Soviet commanders.
On 2 October 1941 he received a report of an armored column
twelve niles in length advancing rapidly toward Moscow in a
sector which was believed secure. The reconnaissance flight
had to return to the column for three consecutive sorties
tefcre the intelligence v»as finally accepted by the General
Staff, with "puzzlement and mistrust." Consequently, Stalin
himself called Telegin to question the reliability of the
report. Seria asserted to Stalin that the report was
categorically untrue, as his officers and officials of the
Special Sections would have reported such information if it
were true. Shortly thereafter, the commander of the air
force district (whose pilots had verified the information
three times) was called to NXYD Eeadquarters for
interrogation. [Ref. 41: p. 217] There he was threatened
with court- martial for spreading panic, for cowardice, and
for "damaging the xork of the center establishment." The
report, cf course, had been factual. Unfortunately, the
tank column had already taken its objective and invested
Tukhncv , as the pilots observed in despair on their third
sortie .
c. Secrecy
Soviet operational security vas extremely
succesful, winning grudging praise from the German Generals.
Secrecy can only te achieved at cost, however — information

must be severely restrictei to s select few. Soviet
flexibility, preparedness, and responsiveness was hindered
by depriving key commanders cf the mcst elenentary warnings
end intelligence. Two examples are illustrative of the
degree cf secrecy.
General Yeremenkc was given command of the 1st
Red Banner Army, on the Manchurian border, in January 1941.
While preparing to depart from Moscow tc assume his command,
he visited the General Staff to discuss operational planning
and the mission cf the army. [Ref . 41: p. 55]. The
Operations Section refused to tell him whether he would be
expected to fight offensively or defensively. "Such highly
secret information, he was given to understand, could
scarcely be imparted tc a formation commander."
General Kazakov recalled his ignorance of the
imminent invasion [Ref. 53]. As Commander cf the Central
Asian Military District, he routinely traveled to Moscow to
confer with the General Staff en matters pertaining tc his
district. Flying to Moscow in mid- June 1941, he was
startled tc observe an entire army moving by rail from the
neighboring Transbaikel District towards the west. Upon
arriving at the General Staff, his queries about the
n-ovement and the events whicn may have prompted it were met
with silence. No one would tell this District Commander
that war was about to start, and he did not learn of it




For the leaders of the Red Army, failure had
grave consequences. Stalin was quick to attribute
treasonous crimes to those who failed to perform as he had
directed, whether the/ were actually at fault or not.
Vcrcncv recalled [Sef. 51: p. 211] that in the
early days of the war, reports from the fronts were
extremely late and contained little factual information. As
the front corr.rranders were themselves cut off from their
armies, and the armies in turn had lost all control of the
divisions, this could have been expected. Stalin's
directions were also not unexpected: "Punish the people who
do not wish to inform us about what is happening in their
sectors."
Stalin's heavy- handedness was enforced at the
unit level by the political commissars. At first there was
much of tne 'discipline of the pistcl' reminiscent of the
Civil War years. Popel' was present with his division
comrander after an unsuccessful offensive operation early in
the war [Ref. 47: n. 70, p. 567]. They were starled tc see
a procession of staff cars arrive at their command post —
it was the front commissar and the military tribunal. They
had come to summarily try, and then execute, the division
commander for his failure. After much recrimination, the
division staff was given another chance: "if by evening you
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cccupy Dubno you will receive a deccraticn. If you don't —
we will expel you from the party and shoot you."
General Pavlov did not escape so easily. He had
been nick- named 'the Soviet Guderian' after some minor
success with the Loyalists in Spain, but the Western Front
had crumbled under his command through pure incompetence.
He was executed for treason during the second week of the
war. The effect on the rest of the staff at his
headquarters was numbing. It was like the purge all over
again. "All remembered 193? too well." [Ref. 45]. Starinov
describes a tragi- comic incident which occured shortly
thereafter. Because he was travelling around the border
areas he had been given an escort cf two NKVD officers to
expedite his freedom cf movement. Upon reporting to a very
senior officer, he was amazed to see the man leap to
attention and, sweating profusely, start making excuses for
himself. It took a moment for Starinov to realize that,
because of the NKVD officers escorting him, the general
thought he was about to be arrested,
e. Command Initiative
Eialer [Ref. 4?: p. 38-39] has described the
fearful state of submission which overtook top field
commanders, and their unwillingness to risk Stalin's
displeasure at any cost. It was better to die in battle,
and take your soldiers with you, than act contrary to
cc

orders. Nc -natter hew futile cr idictic the cperaticnal
directives were, they were obeyed without question.
The fresh memory of the Great Purge reinforced by the
fate of frontier commanders executed for alleged treason
at the start of the war contributed to a situation where
not only was sabotage of Stalin's orders considered
unthinkable, but even legitimate questions concerning
the wisdom of operational decisions in the planniing
stage were risked by few generals and pursued after
rejection by almost none.
Thus offensives vere launched willy- nilly in
the face of unknown forces, huge formations held their
ground and watched themselves becoming encircled, and all
along the front men stood and fought in the most
inappropriate of defensive lines.
Kirpcncs [Ref . 41: p. 91] moved seme of his
forces into more favorable positions on his own initiative,
in mid June 1941. He commanded the critical Kiev Military
District, and was himself convinced that attack was
imminent. Unfortunately, the division movements were
observed by NEVD border troops, reported to Beria, and thus
to Stalin. Kirponos was immediately ordered to restore his
forces to their previous positions.
Had decisive orders been forthcoming from the
General Staff, the repression of initiative would not have
had such severe consequences. Initial warnings of a
possible surprise attack were actually transmitted just
prior to invasion. Unfortunately, the warnings bore the
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caveat that no Soviet troops should respond to provocation.
In Sebastopol, when the cclcnel in charge of air defense was
told to open fire on the German planes which were at that
rcment mining the channel, ne obeyed the order reluctantly.
He insisted upon writing it down first in his log, and
warned his ccmmander that he would net be held accountable
for passing on that order.
3. Ideological Impedimentia
When Lenin and Trotsky established the organization
of the Red Army in 1917, it was an instrument of revolution.
It had to be formed "by the working class in alliance with
the peasantry, under the leadership of the Communist Party."
[Ref. 54] As such, it had to reflect fundamental
differences in the forms of control, distinct from those
used by the "bourgeois armies."
As Romanov wrote [Ref. £5]:
The creation of a socialist system of military control,
like the organizational development of the Soviet
State's Armed Forces as a whole, was something new...
there were no practical models in existence upon which
the work could be based. The old military control
system was destroyed in the revolution.
The control systems established in the Red Army were
unique to rrodern armies. Eut the system of commissars,
designed to insure political control ever the decisions of
the commander, and the military councils designed to insure
collective decision making in operational matters, had
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existed in somewhat similar forms in France in 1793 after
the revolution hac establisned a state "cf the people."
These entities legitimize the Soviet form cf ccntrcl by
embodying Lenin's dictates on centralization, collective
control, and political integration.
a . Commissars
«
Commissars, or political overseers, had been
assigned to Red Army units periodically since the days of
the revolution. During the Civil War and the wars cf
intervention, the Bolsheviks had been forced to rely en
"military specialists" — ex-Czarist officers — for
military leadership. There were simply no other Soviet
citizens with the training to effectively command troops.
In order tc provide continuous party supervision cf these
officers, and incidentally to keep them from deserting,
Lenin and Trotsky dictated that trusted and dedicated party
men would share command authority with them [Ref . 56]
.
Eaving recently conspired so successfully in the overthrow
of one repressive regime, and being opportunists themselves,
it was only prudent that they take these precautions.
Initially it was intended that the commissars
would have no influence on the conduct of tactical
operations, other than certifying that no counter-
revolutionary activity was being undertaken. They were
charged with indoctrination, morale building, and
disciplinary functions. In the earliest days they also
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served to protect the military specialists from the troops,
who often resented their return to authority. Eventually,
the commissars came to share the operational decision-
raking authority of the commander, who could not issue an
order without tne signature of the commissar.
The negative effect of the commissar upon the
initiative and freedom of action cf the military commander
can not he overstated As commissars became better educated
aad acquired more military training themselves, they began
to usurp more of the commanders authority. Similarly, as
more officers joined the ranks of the party, the "unity of
command" phenomenon appeared. This occured when an
individual was considered trustworthy enough that he could
simultaneously fill both the commander and the commissar
positions of a unit.
The power of the commissars fluctuated depending
upon the political stability of the USSR and the relative
power of the military and political factions within the Red
Army. Ey 1935 commissars had been removed completely from
the command functions, but with the start of the purges in
193? they were restored to their former powers.
During the Finnish War the commissar system
caused great conflict within the army. Commanders
complained that the commissars were interfering in
operational matters wherein they had no talent or training.
As part of the reforms which were initiated after the Winter
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i*ar, the commissars were relieved of their control functions
and "unity of command" was restored. The official reasons
for this change were summed up by Timofeyechev [Ref. 34: p.
57]: "The harmonious joint work: of commanders and
commissars promoted the growth of command personnel from a
military and political point of view."
Less than one month after the start of the war
with Germany, the duel command system was again instituted.
Due to the reverses of the war, the regime had reason to
fear for its own continued existence. The situation was
unpleasantly reminiscent of 1917.
The commander and tne commissar shared the full
responsibility for the execution of military tasks, the
training and morale of the troops, and their determination
to fight. Timofeyechev explained [Ref. 34]: "The
conditions of war, especially during the initial period,
complicated the^work of commanders and required that they be
helped by political workers not only in political areas but
also in the military area."
The so-called "fighting commissars" were really
charged with two main tasks. The first was conducting
surveillance on the commander, while the second was
instilling fighting spirit and resolve in the troops.
Whether through fear of them, or through successful
agitation, or both, the commissars seem to have been
effective in heroically spurring the men to feats of arms.
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Their adversaries, the German generals, attested to their
zeal [Ref . 57: p. 14-15]
.
The impact cf political considerations upon
operational matters can not be dismissed lightly. Marshal
Bagramian recalled [Ref. 56] an incident which took place
in the first few days of the war, at the headquarters of the
Southwestern front. Front Commander Kirpcnos received an
order from the Defense Commissar (Timoshenko) to launch an
immediate counter- offensive against the invading Germans.
Fe considered the order absolutely suicidal, given the
disarray of his forces and the lack of materiel. He
announced to his staff that they would defend instead.
Commissar Vashugin then read the order, and told Kirponos
that his decision was undoubtedly correct from a military
point of view, but that it was incorrect politically. The
offensive was immediately launched, with subsequent
decimation of the Soviet forces.
The system of commissars was abolished again in
October 1942. One of the reasons was Stalin's realization
that the reverses cf the war were not going to threaten him
personally. By 1942 he had gathered personal power even
more firmly than before. The disastrous retreats had
finally stopped, and the stabilization of the lines in front
of the Volga offered assurance tnat the worst was ever. The
Russian people had shown an incredible willingness to
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sacrifice ail for "Pother Russia;' their collective will
was focused en expelling the Nazis, net on revolution.
The men who had served as commissars were
integrated into the army, either as commanders of units or
as deputies for political affairs. Co- signing orders was
no longer required, except for these command levels where
military councils existed.
b. Military Councils
The Military Councils of the Red Army, like the
commissars, were created in the earliest days of the Civil
War. They were intended to combine military expertise with
political supervision and guidance in the direction of the
strategic operations of the military forces. In March 1918
the Supreme Military Council (Verkhovnyi Voennyi Soviet-
VVS) had been created to assume leadership of all the armed
forces. It was composed of "the military leader" (Trotsky)
and two commissars. The council worked so well that the
idea was extended to include the collective leadership of
the front, which was the Revolutionary Military Council
(RVS).
Gripped with revolutionary fervor, political
workers at the five armies subordinate to the front created
their own army-level RVS's [Ref. 54: p. 15] "This was
carried out in spite of the opinion of the RVS of the front
which considered the RVS of the armies as illegally arisirg
bodies and demanded their abolishment."
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The military councils cf the fronts and the
armies had wide powers delegated to then by the state. They
became, in effect, locally autonomous governing bodies with
absolute authority over all persons and enterprises within
their sectors. Front councils could on their own initiative
remove front commanders, as well as convene ad hoc tribunals
for the swift determination of military justice. Although
the primary purpose of the councils was to provide
collective direction of military operations, they
effectively combined state, party, and military functions so
successfully that they served as the model for subsequent
military organization in the USSR.
Unlike the checkered history of the commissars,
the military councils were never abolished. After the war
began, the councils retained all of their peacetime
authority and also assumed the collective leadership of all
combat activity. While the commander always presided over
the council, he could net issue orders without the signature
of one of the members of the council (one of the commissars)
and the signature of his chief of staff. [Hef. 54: p. 21]
"This corresponded to the line of the Communist Party of
sole responsibility in the Soviet Armed Forces, and at the
same time provided collective leadership in making major
decisions ."
The military council was flexible in
composition, additional members being added as appropriate.
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Kozlcv [Ref. 54] indicates that the commanders of the air
force, the artillery, and the rear services assumed duties
en the council corresponding to their specialties, and that
the work of the council was "precisely allocated" among the
members. Routine planning within a member's area was
usually accepted as offered, hut the council clearly had
veto authority: "The mest important and complex questions
were settled collectively, with the calling in of the
executors ." [Ref. 54]
The councils would respond to mission tasking by
the superior headquarters, prepare a draft plan for the
operation for approval by the tasking authority, and then
implement as approved. Thus, operations plans at each level
were screened and approved at the next higher level.
4. Administrative vs. Operational Preparedness
While the exact date of the impending German attack
ray not have been known ahead of time by the leadership of
the Red Army, there was every indication that such an attack
was inevitable. The certainty of coming war makes the
Soviet lack of preparedness incomprehensible. Despite the
military reforms and reorganizations undertaken in 1940, and
the gradual mobilization of the army and the economy onto a
war footing, the strategic leadership failed to plan for an
operational command and control system.




In analyzing the structure cf the HKKA General Staff in
the prewar years, we cannot avoid noting certain
orissions and shortcomings in its v*ork. In particular,
certain organizational problems as veil as questions cf
personnel, placement, the support apparatus, and
materiel were not fully resolved; command pests were
net prepared ahead cf time in case of war; leadership of
the General Staff changed rather often...
The command and control failure was most devastating
in three critical areas. There was no formal organization
of the strategic leadership to conduct operational control
over the forces! no operational command facilities were
prepared ahead of time? and there was no adequate
preparation for wartime communications among the divisions,
armies, fronts, and the General Staff.
a. Disorganization of the Strategic Leadership
3efore the war, the Soviet Union's tcp defense
organization was simply organized into two commissariats
(ministries), Defense and Navy. The commissariats, similar
to the U.S. departments, were subordinate to the Council of
People's Commissars. Each commissariat included a Main
Military Council as the collective policy-making body, the
General and Main Naval Staffs as operational working
agencies, and the various branch and service directorates
for promulgation of doctrine and procurement of materiel.
The difficulty with the existing organization
arose from the lack of any single controlling body with
authority over both the army (which included the air force)
and the navy. An additional complication was Stalin's de
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facte role* as absolute dictator, which had not as yet teen
legitimized institutionally. Command authority was
nominally with the Defense and Navy Commissars, reporting to
the Chairman of the Council of Commissars. During the war
Bith Finland, Mclotov had been Chairman, and Stalin had
simply been Party General Secretary.
Admiral Kuznetsov, Navy Commissar, was quite
critical of the failure to clarify the strategic leadership
organization during the linnisn War. Major decisions were
made by Stalin in camera with the Defense Commissar end the
Chief of the General Staff. Since the Navy was separate,
they were forgotten players. [Ref. 60]:
There was no organ to coordinate the operations of the
army and the navy... the navy men found themselves in an
awkward position... the Finnish Campaign had shown that
the organization of military leadership at the center
left much to be desired... one had to know in advance
who would be the Supreme Commander in Chief and what
apparatus he would work through: was it to be a
specially created organ or the General Staff as it had
operated in peacetime?
A special 'Headquarters, High Command,' had been
proposed in 1937 as a means of directing all of the armed
forces. According to Romanov ana Pavlov [Ref. 55: p. 3], a
draft plan had been prepared by the General Staff for
creating this headquarters, and exercises had been planned:
It was not possible to conduct these, however. Due to a
number of circumstances planned measures to prepare the
creation of the HqHC and its agencies were also net
77

considered. This matter was accomplished on a practical
basis when the war was already in progress.
Unfortunately, the Soviets did not implement
these plans, even after the harsn lessons of the Winter War.
In Kay 1941 Stalin officially replaced Molotov as Chairman
of the Council of Commissars. The system of leadership did
not, in effect, change, because Stalin was still making all
of the decisions in the Defense Commisariat. Kuznetsov's
position became still more complicated, as Molotov and
Zhdanov were the other members of the Navy council but would
not make any decisions for fear of Stalin. The Navy was
excluded from the councils of war. Institutional roles were
obscure [Kef. 46: p. 346]:
Eefcre the war, neither military institutions nor high
defense officials had clearly defined rights and
obligations. Experience has shewn that in questions cf
supreme importance, the smallest ambiguity is
intolerable. Each official should know his place and
the limits cf his responsibility. The war caught us
without a properly prepared organization of the highest
military leadership. Only with the start of the war was
it hastily organized. Undoubtedly this should have been
done long before, in peacetime.
The disorganization at the top had the most
severe consequences for the commanders in the field,
especially during the first weeks of the war. Improving the
organization took time and attention, which was purchased
literally with millions of lives and hundreds of kilometers
cf territory. Local commanders, ordered net tc act without
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specific orders from the top, were prevented from taking
effective independent action while they waited.
The decapitation was most crippling to the navy.
Basically a coastal defense force, it was designed to
support the fronts by defending their seaward flanks. It
was subordinate to the army, not only at the center, but
alsc in the field. Kuznetsov recalled in despair [Ref. 46:
p. 3c0] : "We were perplexed by the question: To which Arrry
Group [front] would one fleet or another be subordinate in
tine of war? How would the coordination be arranged?"
b. Lack of Command Facilities
One of the most extraordinary oversights of the
Soviet command and control system as it existed on 22 June
1941 was the lack of command facilities. This was most
acute at the top, where no thought had been given to
establishing an operational command center.
Cn the morning of the invasion, Marshal
Vorcshilov, who was the senior Red Army officer, asked the
Commander of the Moscow Military District, General Tulienev,
"Where has the command pest for the Supreme Commander been
set up?" [Ref. 61]. Tulienev recovered his composure
enough to offer his own District Headquarters to the Supreme
Commander — whoever that might be. Eis headquarters was at
least guarded.
The situation grew worse when the bombing of
Moscow began in late July. Shtemenko described the use of
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the Eyelorusskaya Underground Station as the General Staff
command pest [Sef. 9: p. 38]:
All night the central ccrrrana post would be functioning
en cne half of the platform, wnile the other half,
separated from us by only a plywood partition, would at
dusk fill up with Muscovites... such conditions were
not, cf course, convenient for work..."
A permanent facility was eventually established
in the Kirov Underground Station, whicn was closed to the
public. Although trains still ran on the tracks through the
station, they no longer stopped there, and a plywood
partition was erected between the command center and the
tracks .
The three fronts fared somewhat better than the
center, as they had designated field locations prepared for
their headquarters. These did not include any command post
vehicles, however, and tents were the sole arrangements for
sheltering the commanders.
c. Inadequate Communications
At the outbreak of the war, the Red Army was
extremely poorly equipped with communications equipment.
'*hat signal equipment it did nave was not well suited to the
demands of contemporary warfare. In addition, there was an
unwillingness on the part of commanders to use radio. Basic
inadequacies existed in doctrine, equipment, and training.
For carrying operational traffic the Soviets
relied exclusively upon the civil telephone and telegraph
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network operated by the People's Commissariat for
Communications . This was entirely a landline network,
primarily centered at Post Office facilities in cities and
towns. [Ref. 41: p. 73]
.
Marshal of Signal Troops Peresypkin [Ref. 62:
p. 9] explained the rationale for this approach:
Prior to the war it was assumed that in the course of
combat operations headquarters of operational formations
would be sited at relatively large distances from the
battle line and that they would displace at considerable
time intervals. It was assumed that they would
communicate with the 2-eneral Staff, adjacent units and
subordinate troops chiefly with the aid of wire
equipment. The war introduced substantial changes...
In the first days of the war, the front
headquarters were forced to move once or twice a day. The
field command post for the Southwestern Front had been
located in advance at Tarnopol', over 130 kilometers from
the border with the Third Reicn. Tarnopol' was captured in
the first week of the war. Luring the period 4-6 July
1941, this front headquarters displaced over 122 kilometers
per day. Relying almost entirely on the wire integration
with the civilian telephone plant, with no mobile
communications centers, and with personnel who were net
familiar with the concept of maintaining continuous
communications during displacement, it is not surprising




It was not until the fall cf 1941 that the Pain
Signal Directorate cf the Red Army issued a directive
outlining the necessary considerations for maintaining
continuous communications during a mcve of the ccnmand
center. [Ref. 62: p. 10]. (The substance of the method was
simply to move half of the communications equipment and
personnel to the new lccaticn and get set up before moving
the commander) .
The extreme reluctance of Soviet commanders to
use radio even when they had them is revealed in the special
order issued by Stavke in Pay 1942. By this time the need
for radio communications had become evident and some sets
had been distributed. Peresypkin notes that army end
division commanders were not insuring they had radios with
them at all times, and that "Many army and division
commanders prohibited the use of radios for fear of giving
away the position cf their headquarters." [Ref. 62: p. 12]
The measures taken that month are described:
[Stavkaj issued strict orders tc step neglecting radio
communications; it made the chiefs of staffs of the
fronts and armies personally responsible for
uninterrupted communications with higher headquarters
and regular communication of information by radio on
their operations; personal radio sets were assigned to
front, army, and division commanders, which were to be
with them at all times, during all movements; important
organizational measures were specified for ensuring
execution of this order (assignment cf personal radio
sets, assignment of top radio operators to this
equipment, assignment of [Operations Directorate
personnel] and cryptographic sections to radio sets,
provision of means of transportation, etc).
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Of all the fronts, only the Northwestern was
equipped with functional radio equipmeEt. It was scanty tut
useable. LtGen (Signals) Kargopolov wrote despairingly
about the refusal of seme of the staff officers to use
radio, when the landlines had already been cut. [Ref. 41:
p. 143] In the Western front, tnere were net even radios.
[Ref. 41: p. 117]. Massive German dive bomber raids had
attacked signal points, along with ammunition and fuel
dumps, as the opening strikes in the war.
The disruption in communications on 22 June was
practically total. Boldin recalls sending his only two
remaining planes as couriers, from his location at the 10th
Army Eeadquarters to Front EQ in Minsk. [Ref. 42: p. 154].
He needed gasoline desperately but could not communicate any
other way.
The communications disruption left the General
Staff in ignorance of the attacks; it was mid day before
Timoshenko was dissuaded from his conviction that the attack
was merely a provocation. Because of the lack of
information, the orders issued from the Defense Commissariat
bore no relation to reality. Some commanders, like Pavlov,
participated as willing pretenders in a fantastic charade,
ordering non-existent formation of troops about the Western
front . [Ref. 42: p. 154]
.
Shtemenko's description of the General Staff
activities in the first weeks of war is illustrative of the

desperate lack of information at the strategic levels.
Members of the staff assigned to specific sectors, where
communications had been completely lost were for several
weeks sent out in reconnaissance aircraft to personally
... verify the actual position of the front lines of our
defenses, or to ascertain whether the enemy had captured
this or that populated area... Such flights were frequent
to the Western Front, where tne position was becoming
increasingly difficult and communications could not be
stabilized. [Ref. 9: p. 34]
This was not the only method which was used
by the General Staff to obtain information. Shtemenko
also related the use of the civilian telephone system to
simply call the executive committees or village Soviets of
the towns in the path of the advance. Ee recalled [Ref. 9:
p. 36] that this was quite a reliable expedient in the early
days of the war. Officials usually could tell him which
nearby localities had been captured, and which were still
free
.
General Staff ignorance of even the location of
the front and army headquarters locations persisted in some
cases into July. [Ref. 9: p. 140] Marshal Zhukov related a
sad incident when he visited the headquarters of the Reserve
Front in search of its commander, Marshal Rudenney. Ee was
not there, and the Commissar (the hated Mekhlis) had moved
the command pest since he left. Zhukcv went out locking for
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him, finally locating him in Maloiaroslavets . Zhukov
recalled [Ref. 63: p. 40]:
When I tcld him about my visit to Western Front
Headquarters, Budenniy said he had been out of touch
with Kcnev for the last two days. While he was visiting
the 43rd Army, his own headquarters had moved and he did
not know where it was. I told him that it was beyond
the railroad bridge across the Prctva River, seventy
miles from Moscow, and that they were looking for him.
Marshal Zhukov was at that time the Chief of the General
Staff.
B. WARTIME COMMAND AND CONTROL
The confusion and disorder which characterized the first
period of the war was overcome gradually. Ey the close of
1942, the Soviet command and control system had developed
into a workable one. By the end of the war, it represented
en. effective solution to the problems of contemporary
warfare. Many of the peculiarities of the present day
approach derive from wartime experience.
1 . Strategic Leadership
The confused strategic organization which had so
debilitated Soviet responsiveness in the initial weeks of
the war was corrected in increments during July and August
1941. In peacetime, Stalin had drawn all channels of
information directly to himself; all channels of decision
end control emanated from him as well. After an unexplained
period of withdrawal which lasted until 3 July, Stalin

sys tematically institutionalized his de facte rele as the
absolute decision making authority in the USSR.
a. The Control Structure
Before the war, Stalin had nominally occupied
only a single position — Secretary General of the Party.
In April 1941 he took: over from Molotov the Chairmanship of
the Council of People's Commissars. This was a prophetic
shift from party tc government. By the mid- August 1941,
the final arrangement of control entities had been
established. These were the State Defense Committee, the
Headquarters of the Supreme Commander, and the General Staff
cf the Armed Forces.
The State Defense Committee (Gosudart svennyi
Kcmitet Obcrcny: GKO ) was established 30 June with Stalin as
Chairman. [Ref. £5] The GKO legalized the centralization of
the nation's economic, political, and military leadersnip
into a single body. Its membership of five (later eight)
was drawn exclusively from Stalin's closest and most
faithful associates on the Politburo. With the exception of
the political marshal, Voroshilov, the GKO was a civilian
entity. During the war the GKO preempted the role of the
party Central Committee, which met only once, in 1944 [Ref.
47: p. 569]. While the GKC functioned as a collective
body, the decision authority was all Stalin's. Soviet
sources frequently mention the high number cf decisions made
by the GKO — 9971 — approximately two-thirds of which
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pertained to military production and logistics. 'A great
number" of the remainder addressed organizational structure
and the command and coutrol of the Armed Forces [Ref. 64].
The Eeadquarters of the Supreme Commander in
Chief (Stavka Verkhovnovo Glavnokomandovaniya - 'Stavka')
included the top military leaders as well as the members of
the GKC [Ref. 41: p. 138]. The Stavka was charged with
"directing the Armed Force, planning the combat work of the
army and navy, and distributing personnel and means among
the fronts." [Ref. 55: p. 5]. Basically, this body
directed strategy and allocated military resources. Stalin,
named Supreme Commander in Chief on 6 August, used the
Stavka as a collective, consultative body. The Stavka met
every evening to receive the day's reports and issue
directives to the General Staff. The Stavka frequently
called in commanders and military councils of fronts and of
branches of Armed Forces, the commanders and staffs of the
main directorates of the Defense Commissariat, and members
of the General Staff. As Romanov stated [Ref . 55]:
The work of the Headquarters [Stavka] was based on a
combination of collective decision making and one- man
command. The authority to make a final decision,
however, remained with the Supreme Commander in Chief at
all times.
The General Staff of the Armed Forces was
created on 10 August. This combined the staffs of the arms
£7





While Stalin had teen atsclute in pcwer before
the war, his authority had teen discretely masked ty his
deceptively modest role as Party General Secretary. With
the war, he created multiple state organizations, all
chaired ty himself, and decision- making shifted from the
party to the government.
Stalin's authority within each of the state
control organs was complete. He was Chairman of the Council
of People's Commissars, he was Defense Commissar (as of 19
July), he was Chairman of the GKC, head of the Stavka, and
Supreme Commander of all Forces. Aspaturian noted [Ref. 65]
that the membership of the various organizations was
overlapping, the delineation cf respcnsitilities and
authority deliberately tlurred. These various entities all
came to function as staffs for Stalin. He encouraged
rivalry and intrigue among them, so that their interaction
would be disjoint. All decisions were thus forced to the
top for his resolution. As Bialer ctserved [Ref. 4?:
p. 341]
:
Scviet military memoirs leave nc dcutt that all
information on military operations and internal affairs
flcwed into Stalin's office... and all decision en tcth
military and civilian matters of even secondary and
tertiary importance flowed from there.
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Stalin nad a near-pathclcgical inability to
allow subordinates, no ratter how little distrusted, to make
a decision of substance. The consequences were both
positive and adverse.
Resolution of primary questions was swift,
literally single-minded, and unquestionably authoritative.
Stalin relied heavily en the judgement and advice of
subordinates, but all decisions, ence made, were final.
There was no appeal. The negative consequences arose from
the imposition of a single individual's prejudices and
judgemental quirks on all decisions, the stifling of
subordinates' initiative, and substantial delays in solving
problems of secondary importance.
2. The General Staff
The General Staff was exclusively occupied with
strategic and operational matters. It was relieved of
duties related to the marshalling of resources for the war,
which were provided by two other organizations also
reporting directly to the Stavka. These were the Main
Eirectcrate of Rear Services, which handled logistics, and
the Main Directorate of Unit Activation and Training, which
created manpower reserves. Tnese two directorates "stocked
the shelf" for the Stavka, which then released resources to




The functions of the General Staff are indicated by
Roman cv [Ref. 55: p. 6]:
It was charged with controlling and rendering assistance
tc front and army staffs in the planning and supervision
of operations, preparing requisitions submitted to
industry for the production of military goods, studying
and summarizing the operational and tactical experience
of the war and disseminating it in the forces, and
preparing directives and orders issued by the [Stavka] .
a. The Operations Directorate
Operational control over the forces of the USSR
was exercised by the General Staff through its Operations
Directorate, the Chief of which was also simultaneously the
leputy Chief of the General Staff. This arrangement had
developed before the war to satisfy specific shortcomings
which prevented the staff from exercising continuous troop
control, even under peacetime conditions (Maneuvers and
exercises). The Operations Department then had had no
direct influence en communications elements and was net
participating in the intelligence cycle. To correct these
deficiencies, the Operations Department had been elevated in
importance (becoming a Directorate). Henceforth, as Danilov
wrote [Ref. 59: p. 96]: "Questions of the organizational
service of communications , the information and intelligence
service, and troop reconnaissance were concentrated in the
Operations Directorate of the [Army] General Staff." These
measures significantly enhanced staff control over
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operations, and were retained when the combined General
Staff of the Arrred Forces was created in 1941.
The memoirs cf Shteir.enko , who served as Chief of
the Operations Directorate during the war, are the most
valuable source cf detailed information on individuals,
procedures, and events within it [Ref. 9: Ch. 6]. The
directorate was divided into sectors or branches
corresponding to each front. The sectors performed the bulk
of planning end operational staff functions for the fronts
and also for the armies assigned to the fronts. Personnel
in the sectors were called "directors."
Specific directions for the conduct cf
operations would be given to the General Staff by the
Stavka. The Operations Directorate would then pass the
missions to the various fronts, by way cf the directors.
Then the front military councils would, "within the limits
cf their authority," make detailed plans for the objectives,
missions, and coordination of their armies [Ref. 55: p. 9].
Cnce fully elaborated for the armies, the front's plans were
submitted to the Operations Directorate for approval.
Disagreements between front commanders and their "directors"
were referred to the Stavka for resolution. Commanders and
ether members of the military council would take the final
front plan, as approved, and work with the commanders and
councils of the armies in developing detailed plans for the
divisions. Shtemenkc recalled that [Ref. 9: p. 139]
91

"Differences of opinion usually arose not over the concept
cf an operation or how it should be conducted, but over the
strength cf forces required and their logistics." Reserves
cf ren and material were controlled by the Stavka.
b. Reporting tc the Stavka
The detail and frequency of the tactical and
operational reports demanded by Stalin are significant.
They illustrate net enly the extent to which centralization
was enforced but also the redundancy and independence in
reporting which characterized Soviet command and control
during the war.
Shtemenko [Ref. 9: Ch. 6] gave detailed
accounts of the daily routine of the General Staff in
preparing reports for Stalin and the Stavka. During the
night, the officers assigned with the forces would report to
the Operations Directorate by telephone. While these
reports were being analyzed and compiled in the morning, the
Chief of Operations would personally call the front Chiefs
of Staff to verify, cross-check, and amplify the reports.
Situations at the regimental level and above were reported.
The sector chiefs and the Chief of Operations kept personal
maps, updated constantly, for each front. These were cf
scale 1:200,000, or about c kilometers per inch.
Around 1020 each morning Stalin would call the
Chief cf Operations by telephone and receive a detailed
report on the activity in each of the fronts. Only after he

had reported to Stalin would the Chief of Operations give
the same report to the Chief cf the General Staff. This was
around 1200. It is interesting to note that Stalin
specified a rotating rest schedule fcr all key personnel cf
the General Staff. It was specifically arranged so that the
first report of the day — 1020 — was submitted during the
rest period of the Chief of Staff. The second report of the
day — at 15ee — vvas submitted while the Chief of
Operations (who was simultaneously Deputy Chief of Staff)
v»as having his rest. This procedure allowed Stalin to
cross-check his two key military advisers, to insure by
independent reports that nothing was consistently being
misrepresented to him or hidden from him. At 2320, both the
Chief of Staff and the Chief of Operations would report to
Stalin in person, presenting the Stavka with a 24 hour
summary of activity from the front maps. Around 2420,
telegraphed activity summaries would be received from the
fronts and presented to the Stavka — these were signed by
the military councils of the fronts.
Thus, during each day of the war, Stalin
received four reports on the activities of each front. The
first was telephonic, from the Chief cf Operations. The
second, also telephonic, was from the Chief cf Staff. The
third was an in-perscn briefing from both cf these
individuals, given frcm their maps. The fourth report was
telegraphic, from the military councils. In addition, a
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fiftn report was given tc him independently cf the military
reports, and never in the presence of the Army leadership.
This report was frcm the Commissar cf Internal Affairs, whc
was a member of the GKO. It reflected the observations of
the NXVD regiments and the Special Sections, independently
reporting on the same fronts.
c. Officers of the General Staff
Because of the difficulties experienced by the
General Staff in obtaining accurate, current information on
the status of their cwn forces, a special body cf liaiscn
personnel was created especially to feed it information.
Stalin named these men the "Officers of the General Staff."
This was the first time the word "officer" had been used in
the entire history of the Red Army [Ref. 9: p. 141], an
indication of the special status they enjoyed. They were
assigned to a separate directorate of the General Staff
initially, but later came under Operations.
Three officers were allocated to serve with each
army headquarters, while twc were allocated tc each
division, corps, and front headquarters. [Ref. 66: p. 38].
They enjoyed their own chain cf ccmmand which was parallel
to, but independent of, the force's chain of command [Ref.
3: i. 141]. The number of officers used this way peaked at
240 in December 1942. [Ref. 67: p. 45]
The officers of the General Staff served to
"continuously provide General Staff presence for information
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and control purposes... These officers were the 'eyes and
ears' cf the General Staff in the operating forces." [Ref.
66: p. 38]. The need for accurate reporting, direct to the
General Staff, was filled by these officers independently cf
the force command structure. They checked up on the
condition and position cf the troops, and the logistic
support provided the forces. Shtemenko stressed that an
officer cf the General Staff "had the right to report only
what he had seen with his own eyes; he was not allowed to
quote other people or headquarters documents." [Ref. 9:
p. 141].
It seems clear that the 'Officers of the General
Staff had been required because the strategic leadership
did not trust the commanders and military councils of the
higher echelons to report accurately and often. Golubcvich
wrote [Ref. 67: p. 47] that one of their most important
missions was "...to check en the execution of orders and
directives." These were specifically combat missions, r"uch
"identification cf deficiencies" in the conduct cf
operations was uncovered, as well. By mid-1943, the need
for constant supervision of the forces had somewhat abated,
as headquarters and commanders had by then learned "to
analyze the situation properly." [Ref. 9: p. 141] They
were used extensively with the 'liberated' armies — Polish,




Shtemenko indicates that the officers sometimes
encountered obvious hostility at the front. Seme commanders
and chiefs of staff referred to them scornfully as
overseers. " [Ref. 9] This reaction would net seem to "be an
unexpected one. Cn at least one occasion, the The presence
of these officers reflected the lack of trust and confidence
in the commanders. The commanders' confidence, initiative,
and efficiency were severely affected by this arrangement.
3 . Organizational Flexibility
The organizational force structure of the Red Army
was in a continual state of flux throughout the war years.
In the first years of the war, changes were made in a
desperate effort to compensate for shortcomings. There was
inadequate material and supply, there were too few reserves,
and there were not enough highly qualified commanders. Ir
seemingly arbitrary fashion extraordinary experiments were
made in an attempt to optimize the use of limited resources.
What had earlier been tried in desperation was later
applied to good effect during the massive offensives that
carried the Red Army from the Volga to Berlin. Stalin found
that a studied and purposeful flexibility in organization
could do much to overcome the uneven abilities of his
commanders and the shortfalls in materiel.
a. Representatives of the Stavka
Aside from the brief existence of 'theater'
level commands during the early phase of the war, there was
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no forral command echelon between the fronts and the Stavka.
Wner the need for such a command presence was indicated,
Stalin relied on a smajl circle of trusted officers to
provide it. These individuals were dispatched to critical
sectors with or without supporting staffs and with ill-
defined but implicitly troad powers.
Chief among the men used by Stalin as his
representatives were Marshals Znukov, Vasilevskiy, and
Vorcnov, and General Antcncv. After the removal of the
aging and ineffective 'First Cavalry' marshals who had
served with Stalin during the Civil War — Voroshilcv,
fudenney, Kulik, and Timoshenkc — these younger men took
their places as Stalin's personal military advisers. They
had all been majors and colonels in 1937. Each was to
divide his time between some position of high authority in
the strategic organizations end serving as Stalin's
representative in the field.
Marshal Zhukov was a very special case. Ee had
demonstrated his ability in battle as a division commander
fighting the Japanese in 1939. Eis military talent plus his
service in the First Cavalry Army insured his rapid
advancement. At the start of the war he had already become
Chief of the General Staff. As the situation deteriorated
in the second week of the war, Stalin sent Zhukov to command
the Reserve Front in the Smolensk area. There he was
responsible for a successful Soviet countercf f ensive in the
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Zl'nic salient (August 1941). Henceforth Zhukov became
Stalin's personal representative to which ever sector was
the most critical. He supervised the key defensive battles
before the cities of Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad. In
the later phase of the war, he was sent to oversee ell of
the major offensives. From August 1942 he was appointed
First Deputy Supreme Commander in Chief — second only tc
Stalin [Ref . 47: p. 343]
.
Marshal Vasilevskiy, who was Chief of Operations
until June 1942 when he became Chief of Staff, was also used
extensively in the field to personally supervise and
coordinate fronts and armies. Morozov noted [Ref. 66: p.
46] that he often worked jointly with Zhukov, being sent to
the field as representatives of the Stavka some fifteen
times. Unfortunately, his absence had an undesireable
effect in Moscow [Ref. 9: p. 56]
:
On the instructions of the Supreme Commander,
Vasilevskiy had to spend a great part of his time at the
fronts and in his absence the General Staff was left in
the charge of Commissar F.Y. Eokov, a wonderful person
and a good party worker, but not trained for purely
operational functions.
The actual functions and powers of the
representatives of the Stavka varied. Some of them were
used as general area "supervisors," like Zhukov only with
more restricted authority. Marshal Meretskcv served this
function in the northern sector, for example. Seme of the
9£

representatives had service cr branch related functions,
like Marshal Voronov for artillery. According to Mcrozov
[Ref . 66: p. 43] they had v.o set complement cf support or
staff personnel, but assembled what they felt necessary:
The Hq SHC [Stavka] representatives had assigned to therr
operational groups which functioned as their working
apparatus. They consisted of members of the General
Staff, the staffs cf commanders cf the arms and
services, the chief of Rear Services, and other central
organs of command and control.
The actual responsibilities and authority cf the
representatives of the Stavka were never formalized, since
the positions were entirely arbitrary. They were net
integrated into the force structure until late in 1944, but
functioned purely upon the personal authority of Stalin.
Shtemenko [Ref. 9: p. 55] and Morozov [Ref. 66: p. 43]
agree that the first document describing the duties of a
representative was a telegram Stalin sent to Deputy Defense
Commissar Mekhlis on 6 May 194H:
... you are not a mere onlooker but the responsible
representative cf [Stavka], who answers for all the
successes and failures of the Iront and is duty bound to
put right on the spot the mistakes made by the command.
Icu and the command together are responsible...
Writing thirty years later, Marshal Zhukov
himself recalled that the representatives [Ref. 66]:
... did not command the front. This function remained in
the hands of the commander. But, having been delegated
great authority, they could influence the ccurse cf
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battles in their sector? could correct in a timely
manner mistakes made by the front or army commander; and
cculd render them concrete assistance in receiving
material- technical resources from the center.
The confused command relationship is not so
ambiguous as it mi&ht appear. The commander and military
councils in the field were well aware that the
"representatives of the Stavka" were Stalin's personal
emmissaries, answering directly to him. Shtemenko briefly
mentions, then dismisses, criticism by 'seme front
commanders' that the continued presence of the
representatives at their headquarters 'interfered with their
command of the trocps." [Ref. 9: p. 117] Occasionally
conflicting orders were issued by the representatives and
the General Staff. The representatives invariably won.
[Ref. 69], Part of the resentment could have been mollified
by the preferential logistic treatment given to these
sectors where representatives were present [Ref. 9: p.
117]. These representatives were successful in getting
better support for their sectors for several reasons.
First, their presence alone indicated that the sector was
considered critical. Second, they had personal access to
Stalin, who jealously retained reserves for his own personal
allocation. Third, many of the representatives held
authoritative positions in their own right by which they
could divert resources to their sector.
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While the representatives of the Stavka clearly
had broad powers, the;/ were not insensitive to their own
vulnerabilities. '*hile they were making certain that the
instructions of the Stavka were understood clearly and
without rrisinterpretation by the Front commands, they were
observed by the officers of the General Staff. Shterrenko
recalled the difficulty he experienced getting Marshal
Timoshenko to accept him as his 'assistant' during the
Baltic campaign late in 1944 [Ref. 9: p. 266]. After
Timoshenko came to trust him, he told Shtemenko "i thought
you had been set to watch over me specially by Stalin. It
was the fact he himself mentioned your name, when the
question of a chief of staff was raised..."
In addition tc the representatives sent cut to
exercise general commend supervision, there were also
specialized representatives. Korozov offered a partial
listing [Hef. 66: p. 42]. These men were strictly
concerned with special branches cr services, whetner ccmbat
arms or support. Commanders and other ranking officers from
the different directorates were dispatched to personally
observe the combat effectiveness of their doctrine and
equipment, and to marshal their specific resources for large
operations. Marshal Vcrcnov, Ccmmander of Red Army
Artillery, described [Ref. 66] how he was sent out by Stalin
to Stalingrad in order tc develop the concepts fcr
employment of artillery in the battle:
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tfe were also very concerned with questions of organizing
coordination of artillery fires with infantry, tanks,
cavalry and aviation. The success of the operation
would depend to a great degree en the precision of
coordination. We also worried atcut questions of
commend and control. Eow should we create the offensive
groupments, particularly artillery, and how should they
"be controlled?
Officers of the specialized services and
directorates who were sent into the field as Stavka
representatives had great operational and doctrinal powers
within their specialties. Combat experience could
immediately be used to develop new tactics, doctrine, and
equipment modifications.
The use of "representatives of the Stavka" was
probably a very effective means for Stalin to keep tight,
centralized control ever operations in the field while at
the same time allowing many critical decisions to be rade on
the spot. Given tne uneven competence of many of the front
and army commanders, he was able to use the same few trusted
and talented leaders wherever the situation was most
critical. Towards the end of the war, the representatives
were no longer used as such but were formally integrated
into the force structure. This started to develop in mid-
1944:. Morczov [Hef. 66] attributes this to the shortening
of the strategic front, which allowed the Stavka to control
all cf the Fronts directly.
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b . High Corrrrands
Simultaneously with the creation of the Stavka
of the Supreme High Commend in July 1941, three subordinate
Eigh Commands (GK) were created to oversee and control
6 roupings of fronts, fleets, and flotillas. These were the
Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern, and were commanded
initially by Marshals Voroshiiov, Timoshenko, end 3udenney
respectively. These vvere established because the Stavka and
the General Steff could not maintain continuous
communications with, or control over, the fronts directly.
Lines of communication proved tec long and tec easily
disrupted .
The difficulties faced by the commanders and
staffs of the High Commands were not limited to shortages of
personnel and equipment, which in themselves v*ere
significant enough to prevent efficient operation. As
Pokrovskiy described [Ref. 59], the decisions and orders of
the Eigh Commanders were not accepted by the Stavka;
composition of subordinate fronts, their operations, and
even their command elements continued to be dictated from
Moscow .
Clearly, the Eigh Commands for 'strategic axes'
within a theater had not worked. [Ref. 9: p. 41]:
They had turned cut to be superfluous intermediate
stages between the GEO and the fronts. Since they had
nc proper staffs, means of communication, or control of
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reserves, these Eigh Commands could not exercise any
real influence on the course and outcome of oreraticns.
The High Commands were individually abolished by
September 1941, reappeared sporadically, then were discarded
completely ty mid 1942. Vyrcdcv [Ref. 19: p. 21] attributes
the failure to their hasty implementation and the lack of
skilled cadres to staff them. The Stavka was reluctant tc
delegate the authority it had originally intended:
The High Commands did net nave sufficiently bread
authority to make decisions on employing personnel and
weapons of axes or to direct troop combat activities,
since the Hq SEC usually reserved last word en these
matters ... [they] were used chiefly to collect and
generalize situational information at the fronts of
their axes and tc report it tc the Hq SHC.
The representatives of the Stavka assumed the
functions intended for the Eign Commands. These
representatives cane to travel with a rather large staff of
their own, as indicated by Eatov [Ref. ?0] : "...the
operations group of the Supreme Headquarter 's representative
[Zhukov] settled down in the area of the 55th Army's command
post. We provided them with twenty-nine of our dugout
shelters." It seems that the concept of High Commands was
not completely rejected, but was simply implemented in a
less structured and more flexible form.
The role of representative cf the Stavka cane tc
include operational control of groups cf fronts. In 1944,
for example, Zhukov coordinated the 1st and 2nd Baltic
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Fronts, Vasilevskiy coordinated the 1st and 2nd Eelorussisn
fronts, and Timoshenko did the sare for the 2nd and 3rd
Ukrainian Fronts. [Ref. 19]. The functions cf Zhukcv and
Vasilevskiy evolved very gradually into true and titular
command cf groups cf fronts, although their ether positions
— Deputy Supreme Commander and Chief of the General Staff,
respectively — clouded the exact scurce of their authority.
A distinction must he made between the High
Commands that existed sporadically for control cf strategic
axes and the High Command created for the Panchurian
campaign, 1 August - 1 October 1945. While nominally
fulfilling like functions, the Far Zastern Command was
substantially more developed tnan its shcrt-lived
predecessors. It was carefully organized well in advance of
use, and included comprehensive staffs and directorates
provided for that express purpose from the General Staff.
It was "relatively autonomous" while being continuously
monitored by the Stavka [Ref. 19: p. 22].
c. Adaptable Combined Arms Echelons
As the war progressed, a great many organ-
izational changes were made within the force structure,
specifically in the composition and disposition of the
larger elerents — armies and above. These constant
shufflings were directed by Stalin for various reasens, only
some of which were operational.
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For the majority of the war years, the fronts
were controlled directly by the Stavka with no formal
intermediate echelon. Initially there were/ five fronts in
the west, but these scon proved to be unmanageably large
given the limited communications capabilities of the Red
Army in 1941. By Lecember, these had been troken up into
eight fronts. In Eecember 1944 the number of active fronts
in the west reached a peak of thirteen [Ref. 71: p. 46].
The front was an extremely flexible
organizational concept which varied tremendously in size and
combat power. The smallest fronts commanded three or four
armies, comprising twelve or so divisions in total. Typical
cf these were the 4th Ukrainian in 1944 or the Volkhov in
1943. The largest fronts contained up to ten or more
armies, consisting of as many as 55 divisions. The 1st
Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts reached this size in
1945. In 1944 the 1st Ukrainian had swollen to include 74
divisions, including 13 armies [Ref. 72: pp. 161-179]. The
size of the front was directly related to Stalin's
estimation of the capabilities of its command element — the
ccmrrander and his military council.
Stalin moved his front commanders about, from
one command to another, to insure that the best commanders
were present in the most critical sectors. [Ref. 73:
Appendix C] . Front commanders like Konev, Rckcsscvskiy , or
106

Lhukov himself would displace lesser lights end those fronts
would grow dramatically.
Fronts alsc shrank in strength as their sectors
became quieter or as the front commander began to lose
favor. Sandalcv [Ref. 74] described the liquidation of the
Bryansk Front in the fall of 1943, most of its armies being
transferred to the neighboring Central Front under
Rokossovskiy . The command group of the front and one army
were moved some 50£ kilometers north, there to draw several
armies from the neighboring Northwestern Front to become the
Baltic Front. Three months later, the Nortnwestern Front
did tne converse — it was liquidated, and its command and
staff element sent to establish a new front (2nd
Eelorussian) being created exactly where the old Bryansk had
been located. It even took command of those same troops
which had been given to the Central Front (by now, renamed
the 1st Eelorussian). Sandalov and others witnessing the
rotation could not determine the utility of it.
Fronts were also established for political
purposes, usually relating to the national boundaries which
had existed before the war. Thus, Stalin thought it
"advisable" to have a separate front for each of the Baltic
Republics in the summer of 1944 [Ref. 74].
Just as Stalin continually rearranged the
number, size, and command elements of the fronts to achieve
what he felt would be an optimum mix, so did his
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representatives exercise a similar freedom with the
composition of armies attached to the fronts.
One of tne early efforts to reduce span of
control with combined- arms units was the elimination of the
corps echelon on 15 oT uly 1941. The previously existing
armies of 9 - 15 divisions had proven unmanageable for their
commanders, so they were reduced in size tc 5 cr 6
divisions. The divisions were tnen controlled directly by
the army, without any intermediate echelon [Ref . 75]:
This measure, which was absolutely correct for that
period, permitted making army formations mere
controlled, using personnel and communications
facilities of corps administrations for forming the
headquarters of new combined- arms army and divisional
headquarters .
Not unexpectedly, command relationships which
changed so frequently caused conflict ever command
authority. When the corps formation returned to active use,
it was often not treated as a permanent entity by the army
commanders. They tended to override the corps commander and
control the activities of the division directly. Stalin was
obliged to issue a special order in ray 1943 to delineate
for the commanders in the army- corps- division chain
precisely what the scope of their authority world be [Ref.
76] :
Frequently army commanders, in spite of having corps
commanders available, strive personaly to direct the
actions of the division and brigades making up the
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corps, essentially dismissing the corps commander from
planning the battle and controlling his combined units
in it .
After the initial period of the war in which
commanders who failed were executed, the Soviets began to
recycle commanders who had done poorly. They were simply
reduced in grade one or two steps and given a new command
commensurate with the new rank. Several individuals
experienced several rounds of this cycle. Army General
Petrcv, for example, seems to have held the rank of Colonel
General on three separate occasions [Ref. 47: n.
€6, p.
6£4] . Marshal Kulik suffered a similar fate. This approach
seems to be a rational one, especially when experienced
commanders for all of the levels were in short supply.
4. Centralization
In addition to ideological and practical political
reasons for strictly centralizing ccntrol, there were ether
advantages for the Soviet leadership in doing so.
Especially during the early phases of the war,
centralization compensated for lack of experienced
commanders at all field echelons. It also compensated for a
shortage of all kinds of weapons systems, allowing the
strategic leadership to optimize placement of offensive and
defensive assets. In achieving this centralization, which
was loosened considerably by war's end, composition of
forces and organizational diversity were changed frequently.
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The Soviet Infantry division, for example, was substantially
reorganized six tires in 1941 - 1942 alone,
a. Inexperienced commanders
Strict centralization of all possible planning
functions and of many operational functions as well served
to extract the maximum use of the relatively small numbers
of experienced and proficient commanders and staff officers.
The incredible losses of the first three months cf the war
required huge reserve armies to be raised in extremely short
periods of time. In the threatened cities, regiments were
raised and marched to the battle lines with practically no
training, often with no staffs and commanded by reservists
with scanty military talent. The situation was somewhat
better in the formally structured reserve armies which were
raised in the interior. Marshal Gclikov, himself a military
intelligence officer, described the situation in the newly
forming 10th Army, when he was placed in command [Ref . 77]:
Alrost all the regimental commanders were just recently
promoted. Only isolated individuals had teen graduated
from military academies. The majority had merely
completed an ordinary advanced training school for
officers. Unfortunately, many cf them were simply
lacking in education.
Great numbers of conscripts and reserves were
assembled and formations created in the shortest possible
time. Golikov's 10th Army was created literally from
scratch and committed to battle in less than one month. His
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division commanders and his staff had barely had time to
learn their jots and had net coordinated any working
procedures nor exercised their battle functions prior to
deployment. During this period (November 1941) nine such
amies were created [Ref. 47: p. 594].
With the inexperience and lack of formal
military training, elevation of planning and operational
functions was a practical necessity. As the war progressed,
the General Staff was able to withdraw from current tactical
and operational matters and devote more of its efforts to
developing long term plans. Zhukov mentions that by the end
cf 1943, the field commanders were becoming more self-
sufficient in directing operations, and the officers of the
General Staff were reduced in number and withdrawn from the
division level almost entirely. This reflects practical
experience gained during the war and the increased trust in
the field commanders, as well as the mere favorable
strategic situation.
b. Reserves and Functionally Homogeneous Formations
The average strength of a Soviet division fell
fron the pre-war level of 10,000 - 12,000 men to an average
of 6,000 during the summer of 1941. The decision was made
to retain a small division, and to strip it of the various
specialized weapons systems and technical support personnel.
Elements such as the light tank, engineer, and anti-
aircraft battalions were withdrawn from the division, and
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rifle recipients and battalions also lost most of their
organic signal and engineer elements. The Soviet rifle
division came to consist of very little mere than rifles,
nachineguns, and a few heavier weapons. This accomplished
two things for the Soviets. First, each commander below the
army level usually had only a few different weapons types
under his control — only one type if it was a larger
weapons system. Second, the buli of the special weapons and
technical support materiel and the trained technical
personnel required to operate them were placed in larger and
more functionally homogeneous reserves [Ref. 72: p. 88].
Limiting the organic weapons of the rifle
division greatly simplified its internal command and control
requirements. The small amount of artillery which was
retained in the division was used exclusively in direct
fire, and hence required no complex target acquisition
capabilities. There were no rear echelon support elements
of any size, the 'non-combatant' share of the division
manpower being on the order of four percent [Ref. 72: p.
69] . It was thus a very simplified organization which could
be effectively commanded by an officer with little combined-
arms experience. When additional capabilities were needed,
they were provided by specialized elements whose activities




Even at the army echelon, it wes difficult to
manage diverse force elements. Eokov noted [Ref. 78]
The commanders had shown themselves to he unable to
efficiently control the forces of an army and to
organize continuous interaction between units with
different degrees of mobility and maneuverability.
Because of the losses in the mechanized and tank
corps, these organizations were dissolved end independent
tank brigades and battalions established from the remnants.
[Ref. 17: p. 161]. These smaller formations were used
purely for support of the infantry, and were spread so that
no frcnt was completely bare of armor. [Ref. 71: p. 47].
Aviation was treated the same way, each front and army being
allocated a tiny share of the scarce air assets. Tanks and
aircraft were so limited in number that their distribution
in this way barely provided more than token combat support
during the retrograde maneuvers of 1941 - 42.
Artillery and engineer elements were treated
differently than the armor and air assets, because they were
at least adequate in numbers. Sckclovskiy stated [Ref. 17:
p. 161]
:
It was decided to form artillery reserves of the Supreme
Command, using artillery from the dissolved infantry
corps and at the expense of temporarily weakening
artillery in the infantry divisions; these reserves
could be used to strengthen the most important
directions or sectors of the front.
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The Soviet Union was unique in its use of
extrerrely large single arm formations [Ref. 47: n. 115, p.
511]. Seme of tnese, like the artillery, were created from
the very beginning of the war, while others, like tactical
air, were not created until industry reached full production
after evacuation from the west. Large single weapon
formations included independent tank, artillery, and air
corps, mcrtar and anti-tank regiments, and anti-aircraft
regiments and divisions [Ref. 71: p. 47]. During the
perioi when fortified zones were being constructed (until
1942), there were ten engineer armies reporting directly to
the Stavka. These large units containing tne bulk of the
entire Red Army's resources could then be employed in mass
in the most critical sectors. As Marshal Kulikov noted
[Ref. 71: p. 52]
:
The principal means by which the Supreme High Command
and the General Staff actively influenced the
development of operations and the overall progress of
the war consisted of strategic reserves.
These reserves even came to include entire fronts, such as
the Reserve Front in 1941, the Steppe Front in 1943, and the
4th Ukrainian and iarelian Fronts in 1944.
The large single weapon formations remained the
private resources of the Stavka. They were given tc the
frorts for the period of critical action, whether offensive
or defensive, then withdrawn again to the reserve. At the
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beginning of the counterof f ensive in front of Moscow in
December 1941, for example, there were three fronts actively
participating in the operation. The critical sector was
held by the Western Front and was allocated 613 tanks. The
Kalinin and Southwestern Fronts, flanking the Western, had
only 60 tanks between therr [Kef. 47: n. 73, p. 595].
Shterrenkc mentions [Ref. b: p. 69] the reinforcement of the
56th Army with "Guards mortars taken from passive sectors of
the front."
Allocation of permanent reinforcing formations
was also controlled centrally, by Stalin himself. Voronov
[Ref. 51], Bokov [Ref. 76] and others confirm that Stalin
kept as a closely guarded secret the quantity of equipment,
ammunition, and replacement formations available in the
Stavka reserves. His chiefs of war production would report
to him personally en the accumulation of stocks or creation
of formations. Bokov ana Shtemenko mention a small notebook
Stalin kept, which was the 'resupply data base' of the Red
Army. Bialer wrote [Ref. 47: n. 116, p. 611]:
At that time [August 1941] almost every piece of
equipment and every round of ammunition at Moscow's
disposal could be issued to field units only on Stalin's
signature. It seems that this procedure persisted even
after the crucial shortages of 1941 and 1942 were






With tne separation of tne specialty arms from
the normal organization of the armies end fronts, a system
of dual subordination v*as created by which these homogeneous
formations could be controlled. Within the Defense
Commissariat, which was otherwise a non-operational
management body fcr war production and doctrine, were fortied
a number of Directorates and Main Directorates with
cognizance over the specialty formations [Ref . 55: p. 9]:
New positions, commanders of service arms, were
introduced: airborne, mortar, air defense, and engineer,
and the corresponding military control agencies were
created under them.
When the specialized formations in the Stavka
reserve were allocated to a front, they were subordinate to
the front commander in all ways net pertaining to the
technical execution of their specialty. Conflicts over the
employment of mortars, for example, could be appealed to the
Stavka via the directorate, rather than via the operational
chain of command through the General Staff.
Rear services for the Red Army were provided at
the front and army level by a separate support organization
with its own headquarters well to the rear of the zone. The
Chief of the F ron t Rear (!) was a deputy of the Front
Commander and "...simultaneously subordinate to the Chief of
the Red Army Rear. A similar structure was also adopted in
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the armies..." [Hef. 79: p. 273]. The Chief cf the Red
Army Rear held the post of Deputy People's Commissar of
Tefense. Bialer noted [Hef. 47: n. 41, p. 600] that after
the abolition of the commissars, one of the main duties of
the 'member of the military council' was supervision of the
rear. Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Brezhnev held such pests
during the war.
d. Subordination of tne Air Force
Frontal aviation performed functions for the
front commander which were quite similar to the way
artillery was utilized. They were both subordinated tc the
front or army commander at the beginning of the war, with
aviation assets initially being distributed among tne fronts
and control of them decentralized. This shortened
communications lines and facilitated command and control of
air support. As the lines stabilized and communications
became more reliable, an increasing proportion of combat
aircraft were controlled centrally. This allowed the Stavka
to mass the bulk of Soviet air power rather quickly. [Ref.
80]. By the 1943 - 1945 period, from 46 to 63 percent of
the fighting strength of tactical aviation was in the Stavka
reserve [Ref. SI: p. 16], in air armies and corps.
lach front and army included a certain minimum
amount of crganic air power — usually a two regiment
division for each front, with thirty planes per regiment
[Ref. 47: p. 174]. For large offensive operations which
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were supported with additional air power from tne Stavka
reserve, a Stavka aviation representative would be assigned
to the front to coordinate all air assets.
Because of the scarcity of communications
equipment, the aviation representative was collocated with
the front command post and utilized the common
communications center, until 1944. After that time, as
Silant'yev reported [Ref . 60: p. 24]:
Subsequently the commander of the V7S [Air Force of the
Soviet Army], going out to the fronts as an air
representative of the Stavka, had along with him a
command post which was small in composition (a group of
officer operators, HAT radio, cipher officer, HF
communications) which provided him with direct
communication with the command of the front, the Stavka,
the General Staff, the VVS staff, the air armies, and
long range aviation.
These operations groups were freed from many documentary
reporting requirements and usually coordinated orally.
When long range aviation (ADD) was used for
support of ground operations, it was subordinated to the VVS
command. When it operated independently against military-
industrial objectives, it was subordinated directly to the
Stavka [Ref. 80: p. 24] . Evidently the primary employment
cf ADD was in ground support, as seme 93% of bomber sorties
during the war were within 50 kilometers of the front [Ref.
47: n. 42, p. 620] .
Commanders of air armies assigned to the fronts
were members of the military councils (after 1942) and
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deputy front commanders. Subordination was duel —
operationally subordinate tc the front corrrrander, but
doctrinally, administratively, and functionally subordinate
to the VVS chain of command. This ambiguity was especially
debilitating when additional Stavka assets had been
allocated to the front, as the aviation representative, the
air army commander, the front commander, and the overall
Stavka representative ell had some operational authority.
It became necessary to limit the trend to centralization, as
reflected in a VVS special directive issued in 1942 [Ref.
60: p. 26]
:
The decisive concentration of aviation at the sector of
the main effort and, besides for the accomplishment of a
limited number of missions... is possible only with
centralized control which should not be brought to
extremes and become a goal in itself. The tendency of
some senior commanders to control the sorties of even
separate flights and airplanes, with the complete
exclusion of initiative on the part of the lower
commander, can in no way be justified. As a result of
such 'centralization' subordinates develop inactivity
and irresponsibility and air operations are late.
Decentralization of control occurred only during
specific types of maneuver, however. Silant'yev [Sef. 80:
p. 31] mentions that when aviation units were supporting;
mechanized and tank units during pursuit operations, the
tank army (or corps) commander could assign specific
missions to the aircraft. More often, the air commander
would himself direct air activity from the headquarters or
command post cf the supported ground unit. Kczhevnikov noted
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During the time of combat operations by mobile groups in
the operational depth of an ener/'s defense the
commanders of aviation units were in especially equipped
tanks or vehicles and had radj.0 equipment to control
aviation in the air and for communication with their air
fields. [Ref. 82: p. 24]
Stationing the aviation commander far forward
was evidently necessary to insure effective coordination
with the ground unit commanders. It was a measure ordered
in .January 1944, specifically to avoid less of joint
interaction between ground and air. Previously,
difficulties had been experienced with identification of
friendly troops on the ground, suppression of friendly AAA
against friendly air, and with target identification.
Once the quantity of aircraft increased to a
level where tight centralized control was no longer a
necessity, each front was given a mere or less stable
allocation of air assets. The Stavka ceased operational
maneuvering of reserves in the final year of the war [Ref.
81: p. 19]. The forces which had composed the Stavka
reserve were integrated into the air armies of the fronts.
At the same time, subordination of the air elements tc the
ground commander was replaced by a more independent air arr
which acted in support of, rather than subordination tc,
the front commander [Ref. 82: p. 24].
During the first three years of war, the various
naval fleets and flotillas had, like the air force, been
subordinated to the ercund force front commander.
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Compounding the difficulty for the navy was the leek of true
joint staffing within the General Staff. With the possible
exception of the Northern Fleet, which had convoy protection
duties, the Soviet navy functioned primarily as an auxiliary
of tne fronts. Because of this arrangement, naval aviation
and naval infantry were primarily used to perform missions
en the mainland. The Navy Commissariat had practically nc
operational control over the missions assigned naval forces.
It was not until 31 March 1944 that the navy was
substantially freed from this subordination and, by a
directive of the Stavka, given missions of a more
traditional naval character [Ref. £3].
5. Wartime Communications
The Soviet communications capability, both fixed and
mobile, strategic and tactical, continued to improve
throughout the war years. The severe shortages cf all types
of communications equipment for the armies in the field was
largely overcome by 1944. New doctrine and and technical
advances were swiftly developed. Zlectronic warfare was
practiced by both sides, and relatively effective deception
measures were used by the Soviets. The unreliable and
easily disrupted communications ana command post functions





Stalin and the other members of the Stavka used
three "basic means for communi eating with their represent-
atives and with front and army commanders. These were
wireline teletype, liaison aviation, and high frequency
'.scrambled) voice telephone.
The difficulties experienced early in the war
have teen previously described. The national network of
telephone and telegraph communications consisted entirely of
overhead wirelines. These were laid out in a radial pattern
around various centers, not a network. fRef. 84: p. 7]
As a result, all wire communications of the nation
consisted of a number of autonomous, and as a rule, not
interconnected, systems of the republics, krays,
oblasts, and rayons... For this reason, users in
different oblasts could be connected only through the
central long distance telephone exchange in Moscow.
The raaial layout for telephone and telegraph
was extremely vulnerable. Loss of any one link could sever
all communications with a large portion of the country,
since there were no alternate routes available and
neighboring rayons or oblasts had no direct connections.
Interconnecting always was performed at the next higher
level common to both ends. All the wire lines were overhead
en poles which paralleled the main roads and railways
interconnecting the exchanges. Boads and railways were
under constant attack by enemy air and artillery, with

repeated destruction of wire lines as a consequence. This
practice was changed immediately [Ref. 85: p. 32]:
Another feature of organization of communications in the
armies was the construction of new permanent lines
bypassing major towns, rail lines, highways, and graded
unpaved roads, in order tc lessen vulnerability to
hostile aircraft, which were attacking these rail lines
and reads .
Since front and army headquarters had counted en
using the civilian network of communications, they lacked
adequate means of communicating with the Stavka and the
General Staff. In a directive dated 23 July 1941, Stalin
ordered TRef . 96: p. 63]
:
Chief of the Communications Directorate of the Bed Army
Comrade Peresypkin and the military councils cf the
fronts are to provide for equipping the headquarters of
fronts and armies with Baudot apparatuses [i.e., tele-
types] within a ~-dey period by stripping apparatuses
from areas in the vicinity of the fronts and also by
using equipment delivered from industry.
Stalin relied heavily on teletype for his
frequent conversations with front and army commanders. He
did not feel that these communications could be intercepted
by the Germans, apparently because they were all by wire
line. Ee insisted that Baudot be used and forbade the use
of Korse code in transmitting his own telegrams [Eef. £5:
p. 55]. "Thus, in the first months of the war, the basic
means of communication of the Headquarters of the Supreme
High Command was telegraph by Eaudot."
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Throughout the war years the Stavka and the
General Staff relied heavily en liaison aviation for
communicating with fronts and armies. At first a squadron
was dedicated to this purpose, "but scon proved to be
insufficient for the need. An entire air liaison division
was established and subordinated to the Main Communications
directorate of the Red Army. It carried couriers with
operational documents, representatives of the Stavka, and
officers of the General Staff to the front and army command
posts.
Luring the war a special governmental - military
telephone network was extended into the field to serve the
major fronts, and occasionally tc army level. Referred tc
as the 'High Frequency Telephone,' or VCh (Vysoko
chastotnyi), this system enabled Stalin to conduct secure
communications with his key commanders and representatives
[Ref. 86: p. 65]. The VCh was serviced and operated by
special detachments of N'KVI signal troops. It was evidently
a cable system, but was rabidly deployed with the forces
even beyond the borders of the Soviet Union [Ref. 47: n.
52, p. 621]. Zhukov, Konev, and Shtemenko all mention it as
the means by which they spoke tc Stalin personally from the
battlefield. [Ref. 37: p. 526]. A technical description
cf the VCh is not available, but it probably resembled the
frequency inversion and scrambling system used for secrecy
in contemporary transoceanic radiotelephony [Ref. 56]
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In addition to the three be sic means used by the
Stavfca for communi cation
, the General Staff also used radio
when available. It was not uniformly supplied at first,
some fronts and armies having nc sets. In the period 1941 -
1942, some HF voice radio was used for front- to- General
Staff communications. After this period, when vehicle
mounted radio teletype equipment came into the field, it was
used instead of voice [Ref. 66: p. 66].
Luring the war in Eastern Europe, relay stations
were established on the border of the Soviet Union to permit
direct radio contact from Moscow down to the army level.
Similar relay stations were required for contact with the
Far Eastern Eigh Command and its subordinate fronts in 1945.
The communications center serving the General
Staff was located with its underground element in the
Kirovskaya Subway Station. It was connected via teletype
and ring- down telephone to Stalin's office in the Kremlin.
A second communications center served the Defense
Commissariat, directorates, and the rear services
administration .
A vehicular mounted communications center and a
specially equipped command train were later assembled for
contingency purposes. This train was used by Stalin during
the Teheran conference. Shtemenkc mentioned [Ref. 9: p.
137] that the train had to be stopped three times a day to
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receive reports ever the VCh. The train was alsr equipped
with convert ional radio and telephone equipment.
b. Civilian- Military Integration
The rrost striking characteristic of Soviet
military communi cations during World War II was the extent
to which it was integrated with the "civil" resources of the
USSE. Control over all state and Red Army communications
was exercised by one individual — Marshal of Signal Troops
Peresypkir. At the start of the war, three separate
organizations had existed with distinct authority and
responsibility . These were the Directorate for
Communications of the Red Army, the Communications
Department of the Operational Directorate of the General
Staff, and the USSR People's Commissariat for
Communications. Just one month into the war — on 23 July
1941 — they were combined into a single agency under common
management. The army entities were merged into a single
Main Directorate (GUSKA) and its functions blended with
these of the Commissariat. [Ref. 64: p. 32].
In order to maximize the use of the existing
communications infrastructure for the "benefit of the field
forces, the Central Administration of Field Communications
was established within the Commissariat fcr Ccmmunicat iens .
Zach army and front staff received a field communications
inspectorate (army) or directorate (front), which was
simultaneously subordinate to the field commander and to the
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central administration. These entities were designed to
integrate military needs in t'ne field with existing state
communications facilities located in the operational areas
The chiefs of these elements were also deputy chiefs of
communications for the front or army [Ref. 64: p. 15]:
In operational terms, the military operations centers
were under the respective chief of communications of the
fronts and armies through the field communications
directorates and inspectorates, and in administrative
terms and for questions of material and technical
supply, under the chiefs of the oblast end kray
communications administrations.
Military line construction units were created to exteni or
repair the overhead lines, and special reconstruction
battalions were created to follow in the wake of offensives
and restore national communications. These were part of the
Commissariat hut responded to military tasking as well.
[Ref. £6: p. 62]
.
The extent to whicn civil networks served
tactical purposes is described by Peresypkin [Ref. 85]:
One important feature of organization of wire
communications in a defensive operation of the 16th
Army, as of other armies, was the extensive employment,
alongside T/E [organic] equipment, of stationary
civilian communications facilities.
Maximum use was achieved during battles in and around major
cities, such as Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk. When local
facilities were used for tactical (as well as operational)
purposes they were connected in a ring circuit, converting
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part of the radial layout into a network. This enhanced
the survivability of the wire links. [Kef. 62: p. 7]
The entire resources of the country were
available to the army at any tire. Regular radio
transmission stations for "ccmmerc ial" broadcast
applications were also pressed into use for military
purposes. During the war these powerful transmitters were
used to "strengthen communications centers." [Ref. 86:
p. 66] . Other state enterprises which had organic
communications means served the army as well. In July 1941
'Group Lukin' was created from three rifle divisions and a
mechanized corps, and controlled entirely by railway
telephone [Ref. 41: p. 166].
c. Skip Echelon Communications
The radial pattern of communication was
preserved by the GUSKA in order to insure centralization,
but it was slightly modified in order tc increase its
survivability. Six weeks after the fronts had been abruptly
ordered tc supply themselves with teletype equipment, the
Stavka directed that "all armies within a 2-day period be
equipped with Baudot duplex sets and that the General Staff
be in direct contact with all army staffs." [Ref. 84:
p. 36]. This was the first time that "skip echelon"
communications was employed by the Soviets.
The practice of maintaining sirrul taneous contact
with subordinates two levels down was extremely effective.
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In 1943, this architecture became obligatory fcr all
levels cf command.
Naramzin indicated [Ref. 69: p. 14] that many
army commanders received routine reports from corps,
division, and regimental commanders during offensive
operations. He lauds Army Comr.ander Batov (65th Army) for
maintaining communications "to three and sometimes even to
four echelons lower, right down to battalion commander."
Batcv's approach was ccntrasted with that cf ether army
commanders who maintained communications only with their
corps commander:
Although at first glance this granted the corps
commander Tiore initiative, at the same time it led tc a
certain delay in the employment of army means in the
course of the breakthrough, especially of artillery.
The main advantages of skip echelon
communications were considered to be the time saved in
reporting upwards, especially when requesting support, and
the added durability it gave to the command and control
structure .
d. Tactical and Operational Communications
The extreme shortages cf military communications
equipment led the Red Army to devise a variety of non-
electronic alternatives during the early days cf the war.
As the shortages were eliminated, much of the earlier non-




Because of the rapid expansion of the Red Army
just prior to the war, and because of the early heavy
losses, supplies of communications equipment were simply
not available for issue to the forces. Practically ail of
the related industries were located in the areas of European
Russia soon occupied by the Germans, and what had not been
captured had been uprooted and evacuated to the east. Thus
in, 1941, the supply schedules for forces had to be reduced
below the pre-war T/E. Divisions were issued 4 rather than
£4 telephone switchboards, 103 rather than 327 field
telephones, and 10 or 12 rather than 63 radios [Ref . £4: p.
£5] . Supply schedules did not revert to pre-war levels
until 1943, when production had been re-established east of
the Urals. By 1944, field formations enjoyed their own
reserves of communications equipment, generally 10 to 70
percent above T/E.
Perhaps because of the lack of other means, or
because of more comprehensive exposition of the details, the
most accepted method for delivering the operational plan to
subordinates was in person. Portugal'sky noted [Ref. 90]
that it was most expedient for the subordinate commanders tc
travel to the superior headquarters, there to receive combat
orders personally as a group from the army commander. This
procedure took about six hours (division-army levels). If
that was not possible, then the commander would visit his
subordinates consecutively, briefing each in turn. This
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took about twelve hours, but had an added benefit in that
the commander could personally observe the terrain and the
preparations in each subordinate unit. Missions were only
rarely assigned by telepncne or radio, even when they
existed and were reliable. This was recognized as being the
quickest, requiring a fraction of the tirre, but not nearly
as comprehensive as an in-perscn briefing. The favored
method was to assign missions from the map, then to check
the subordinate's map tc confirm his understanding of the
plan. When time was short, staff officers would be given
the operational plans and dispatched by air or vehicle to
the subordinate command. "On the whole, delivery of combat
missions by staff officers or the so-called liaison agents
service (liaison officers) was very widespread." [Ref . 90]
In addition to increased detail, to reater
security was possible if use of radio and telephone was
avoided. The Soviets were acutely aware of the German
talents for radic-electrcnic reconnaissance, and had
suffered greatly even in the first World War from lack of
radio security. German armies and divisions started the war
with organic radio reconnaissance companies end platoons,
and conducted effective radio location and exploitation
within the first 150 kilometers from the FE2A . [Ref. 91]
Alfercv described a major tactical maneuver wherein an
entire army (3rd Guards Tank) was withdrawn from one
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bridgehead and inserted into another in October 1943
[Ref . 92: p. 29] :
Twenty Pc-2 aircraft of a separate signal regiment and a
mobile facilities company of the army were used for
command end control during the march, and liaison
officers on motorcycles were used in the corrs and
brigades. Wire communications were laid only at the
[river] crossings by personnel of the army's signal
reeiment and front engineer units, and by corps
personnel in day halt areas and assembly areas. Radic
facilities operated only in the warning net and only on
receive. All this contributed to stable and secret
command and control.
In connection with the withdrawal, a deception
operation was conducted to avoid enemy detection of the
withdrawal. In addition to mock-ups of tanks and guns, army
comnand posts and radios were left behind at the original
bridgehead. The Germans were reported to have continued
bombing the abandoned positions for a week thereafter.
The only apparent difficulties with the march
occurred because the commandant's service had been
decentralized to brigade level, and passage through army and
corps phase lines were not maintained due to lack of
centralized management.
The Soviet concern for secrecy about forthcoming
operations overrode any procedure which threatened to
sacrifice security for mere expediency. Silant'yev [Kef.
£0: p. 28] noted that measures taken to insure secrecy
included limiting the number of persons working out
operational plans, transmitting plans only in document fcr^
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or face-to-face, and hiding the command post itself.
Alferov [Eef. 92: p. 30] added that secrecy is also
enhanced by "piecemeal assignment of the mission" — by the
army commander for each phase and by the corps commander for
each day of movement. Portugal 'sky noted [Ref 14c, p 36]
"To conceal the concept of the forthcoming operation from
the enemy, missions were delivered shortly before the attack
(to a division — two days; to a regiment — one day)."
C. POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS
There were substantial improvements made in the force
structure and its command and control functions in the
postwar years (1945 - 1953) . These were primarily
associated with the formation of true combined arms
divisions, with the mechanization of the Red Army, and with
technical advances in electronics and production.
Demands upon the responsiveness, flexibility, and scope
cf Soviet tactical ccmmand and control increased
dramatically during this period. The large homogeneous
formations began to give way to units which integrated
several diverse weapons systems into a permanent
organizational entity. In 1944 a rifle division had no
armored fighting vehicles at all (but was authorized 61£
horse drawn units). [Ref. ?2: p. 9e] . After the war, the
rifle division was given an organic tank and self- propelled
artillery regiment. Battalions and even companies were
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given greater operational self- sufficiency by routine
reinf crcenent with tanks, .mortars, engineer, and chemical
elerents [Ref. 93]. Mechanization of rifle corps was eight
times (in terms of number of vehicles) the wartime level.
Solovnin wrote of this period [Ref. 94: p. 8]:
It was new necessary tc possess mere data on tne
adversary, on one's own troops, neighboring units, the
terrain, and to perform a number of calculations
cennectei with the employment of weapons and ccmbat
equipment in larger quantities, greater diversity, and
greater combat characteristics... Greater detailing was
required in mission brief ing ... Increased trcop mobility
and more highly dynamic combat operations greatly
increased the difficulty of the work performed by the
commander and his staff...
While time available for exercising command and control
functions was decreasing, the amount of control required by
fully mechanized combined arms combat was increasing.
Increasing the size of the command staff was found to be an
unacceptable measure, as it made the staffs bulky,
unmanageable, and inflexible. The Soviet approach to these
problems thus [Ref. 94: p. 9]: "...proceeded primarily in
the direction of improving the work methods of commanders
and staffs as well as the structure and equipment of control
entities .
"
The mass of operational documentation which had been
required during the war was greatly reduced. Lengthy "pre-
decision'" conferences of the commander with all of his staff
members and his subordinate commanders were eliminated.
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During the war, each echelon had normally had several days
to prepare for an operation. This was reduced to hours due
to the increased mobility of rechanized forces. In place of
extensive documentation, corps and division command and
staff personnel would prepare simple operation orders and
timing coordination tables in just a few hours. Then, the
staff would disperse to the subordinate echelons to monitor
and assist their preparations.
during the transition period, when armored and
mechanized divisions were added to the rifle corps, a
specialized command and staff element was provided within
the corps headquarters to assume direct control over these
elerents. This was necessary, as Golovnin noted, due to the
inexperience of the rifle corps commanders with mechanized
and armored forces [Ref. 94: p. 11].
A tremendous increase in tae use of radio was
experienced in the latter war years, and developments
continued in this area after the war. This was due in part
to the greater mechanization of the army, which necessitated
use of radio, and the greater availability and technical
sophistication of the equipment itself. Portable UEF sets
with much greater range and with broader frequency selection
were deployed. Higher echelon command posts also received
more sophisticated equipment [Ref. 94: p. 15]:
Mobile communications centers for combined arms units
headquarters, which had not been available in the last
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war, were deployed... This equipment was carried cnfcoard
motor vehicles, which contained switching, channelizing
and communications terminal equipment adapted for rapid
deployment and takedown under field conditions.
Adoption of this equipment greatly increased the
motility of control facilities and the communications
system as a whole.
During this period the activities of the. staffs also
began to be mechanized, primarily "by the introduction of
various slide rules and mechanical nomographic devices.
Procedures were standardized, which had not been done during
the war.
There were certain changes in the organizational
structure of the Defense Commissariat after the war which
tended to compartmentalize the forces along weapons systems
lines. In 1946 a Commander in Chief of Ground Forces was
created, with a separate headquarters and his own system of
directorates. As Garder noted [Ref. 95: p. 132]:
The commander-in-chief of ground forces controlled only
the infantry, [horse] cavalry, sappers, signals and
chemical troops. Eenceforth artillery, tanks, anti-
aircraft defense and airborne troops each came under its
own General Directorate and its own commander who was
directly responsible to the minister.
The tactical air force, long range aviation, and the
navy each were headed by separate commanders- in- chief,
alsc reporting directly to the minister.
The territorial organization of the USSR into military
districts (Okrugs) was retained, and the occupation trccps
in Eastern Europe were organized into analogous groups.
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These districts and groups, 23 in number, all reported
directly tc the minister, except for the three Far Eastern
districts which were gathered under the High Command of
Marshal Malinovskiy.
It can be speculated that the formation of specialized
commands was in part an effort to prevent the growth of
cliques within the military. The postwar years saw a
reimposition of police and political control in the forces,
motivated perhaps by the exposure of the trccps tc Western
culture and by the large number of deserters experienced by
the army in Europe. Tissatisfacticn was high, even with
ranking officers. Most of the military elite were given
actual or de facte demotions after the war, to prevent a
military grab for power. [Ref. 95: p. 12S] . Zhukov, for
example, became an Okrug commander - hardly commensurate
with his wartime position as Deputy Supreme Commander.
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IV. SOVISI CCr<MAM AN? CONTROL TODAY
The Soviets view the rranifold problems confronting
effective command and control en the modern battlefield as
posing such new and untried questions that the past two
decades are seen as a period of revolution in military
affairs — one every bit as significant as the previous
revolutions occuring in the 1940s with the advent of nuclear
weapons and in the 1952s with the development of guided
missle delivery means. The new revolution is one involving
advanced communications technology, cybernetics, and
computers tc accomplish a new dimension in scientific
leadership and management of the armed forces. This third
revolution was in fact driven by the consequences of the
first two, and is made possible only by the scientific and
technological advances in electronics and the social
sciences. As Ealloway notes, [Ref . 1: p. 27]:
From the political point of view both trccp control and
military management ere different aspects of the general
problem of managing social processes. In cybernetic
terms, troop control systems and military management
systems may be seen as hierarchical decision making
systems, through which particular kinds of human
activity are optimized.
The approach to command and control taken by the Soviets
is quite different from that taken by the West, due in large
part to the ideological and political traditions which
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dominate military thought and also by the geopolitical
relationship enjoyed by the USSR regarding its European
client states and its other spheres of interest.
Id the past decade the USSR has increasingly turned its
attention to developing power projection capabilities which
give it, for the first time, the ability to contemplate
substantial military involvement in areas distant from its
own borders. At the same time, a perception has arisen that
theater nuclear warfare, especially if concluded rapidly end
successfully, need not inevitably lead to strategic nuclear
warfare. The possibility of conducting intense and rapid
conventional operations on a huge scale, pre-empting enemy
use of tactical nuclear weapons, has also been acknowledged.
Success of these operations is made possible only when
command and control systems have achieved a new order of
efficiency, speed, and accuracy. Current Soviet literature
is pre-occupied with the development of these attributes in
their command and control doctrine.
The extremely tight centralization of control used by
the Soviets is a consequence of their ideology, as is the
insistence upon absolute obedience to all orders. Under
conditions of modern warfare, when it is likely that nuclear
weapons will be used on the battlefield, the highly
centralized control system of the Soviets will be extremely
vulnerable. The Soviets are not blind to these
vulnerabilities, and have espoused certain measures to
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insure continuity cf control. Tne first cf these measures
is to do everything possible to insure continuity of
communications between ali elements through redundancy,
mobility, hardening camouflage, and technical
sophistication.
Another measure used to reduce vulnerability is to plan
for every possible contingency, so that no turn of events
will confront the commander with a situation for whicn he
does net already have a general solution. To reduce the
combinations of possible events, operations are precisely
planned and all movements and activities on the battlefield
carefully orchestrated in advance. Great precision is
required, but pre- planning greatly reduces the
communications requirements imposed en the commander.
According to doctrine, the offense is pursued by each
individual manuever element in accordance with a precise
time-table, adherence to which is of paramount importance.
Soviets expect subordinate commanders to adhere rigidly
to the plan of the superior whenever lines of control ere
cut, and to use whatever means possible to complete the
original mission exactly as specified. The subordinates
must not deviate in execution of the mission beyond the
scope of the original plan. Considering the expected
inability cf the higher headquarters to communicate to
advanced elements to warn of Soviet strikes at targets of
opportunity, the superior must knew exactly vhere each
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subordinate element is supposed tc be at any given instant.
The lack of real tire information can, to sore decree, be
compensated for by riajidly adhering tc a precise operational
time-table.
Since World War II tnere has been an order of magnitude
increase in the quantity of information flowing to the
commander, and a reciprocal decrease in the amount of time
available to him for processing and decision. Part of this
is due to the complete mechanization cf the army, which
enables the maneuvering elements tc move much more rapidly
than in previous wars. The availability of nuclear weapons
also adds immea sureably to the commander's burden. Nuclear
weapons — even so- called low yield ones of a tactical
nature — are net tc be used indiscriminately like some
large scale artillery round. The incredible reduction in
the number of rounds one needs to expend in order to insure
destruction of a given target is paid for by the
corresponding increase in the data which must be delivered
to the commander before he can rake the decisicn to employ
nuclear weapons. This drives the need for a target
acquisition data base, force effectiveness calculations,
warhead selection, weapons allocation, and effects
prediction. For these and other needs, the Soviets are
turning to the battlefield computer.
The turn to cybernetics is a profound and heevy
comrittment for the Soviets, serving first to automate the
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highly complex functions associated with advanced weapons
technology — guidance systems, automatic pilots, etc. —
and eventually to automate troop control itself. They
picture this as complete automation, and view the commander
as a part of the machine, sc intimately will their functions
be joined .
A. THE THIOPETICAL MODEL
Soviet military theorists must always start from general
principles, which ere couched in the dialectic of Leninism,
and then work: to the specific. In studying command and
control, it is useful to examine the model used by Iv?nov et
al [Ref. I?: p. 12] tc typify a military control system.
This is shown in Eigure 1. The model is the ideal, and the
actual command and control system must approximate the model
as closely as possible.
1. The Control System Ncdel
As can be seen in Figure 1, there are four entities
in the model: the object of the control system, or the
controlled object itselfj the control organ or agent J a
superior control organ or agent; and an automatic instrument
for control. The entire Tiodel is embedded in its
environment, which influences each of the entities in a
special way.
The entities are in communication with each other in
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direct communications channels carrying orders and
directives. From the lower elements to the higher there are
direct and indirect feedback channels. The communications
channels are degraded to varying decrees by interference.
Outside the immediate control system are ether,
parallel systems, to which lateral two- way communications
channels connect. Soviet theorists aim to improve the
efficiency and reliability of the control system as a whole
by developing and improving upon the individual component
parts as well as the entire system. That is, each entity
rust function in a certain way in order to optimize the
system. Each interaction must be optimized, and so forth.
The operation of the model consists of well defined
steps. First, the commander or controlling agent gathers
information. Second, a decision is n-ade. Third, that
decision is communicated to the controlled object. Fourth,
the controlled object responds with the directed activity.
Fifth, the activity of the controlled object is monitored
and its performance measured in various ways, and the state
of its performance is fed back to the controlling agent.
All of tnese steps taken in total, comprise one cycle of a
repetitive process. The final step of this cycle, the
feedback information, overlaps the next cycle and
contributes to the information gathering process.
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2 . The Military Hierarchical -v odel
Extending the scope of the model, Ivanov [Ref.10:
pp. 20-21] then describes the hierarchical structure cf the
military chain of command, which consists of overlapping
control systems conforming to the model. The controlled
object is, in every case, matched to the capabilities of the
controlling agent. The communications channels applicable
at eacn level are different, but perform the same functions.
At the lowest level the controlling agent is the soldier,
the controlled object is the weapon, and the communications
channels are the physical senses and actions of the soldier
and the weapon. It is significant that the entire hierarchy
cf control systems exists for the express purpose cf
controlling the weapon. In the Soviet view, the chain must
not be broken at any point, or control will be lest.
The actual links in the control chain are indicated
in Table 1. Higher echelons are after the regimental model,
except that military councils exist at front and fleet
levels .
With the exception of the very lowest level, the
control systems of the hierarchy share the commen attributes
of controlling men, not weapons, and of playing both a
controlled and a controlling role. That is, the controlled
object at any level is in turn the controlling agent for the
next lower level. Thus a battalion commander and his staff
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Links in Hierarchical Control Chain
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staff, while simultaneously controlling the commanders end
staffs of ccrpanies and attached units within another
control system.
One interesting feature of the model is the overlap
cf monitor and communications functions. As shown in
i'igure 1, the superior control organ has direct links to
the automatic device controlled by the subordinate echelon.
Thus, it can ccmmuricate down two levels simultaneously, as
well as monitor both of those levels. A regimental staff
would thus control directly the various battalion level
staffs while maintaining contact with the companies.
Companies can be allowed to monitor communications between
the regiment and the battalion, while the regiment can
monitor the responses cf the companies to the battalion.
It should be noted that until recently, Soviet
literature inferred that the higher headquarters always
assumes command of an echelon which has lost its control
point. Ivanov [Ref. 10: pp. 222-221] indicates that the
commander's operaticns order should detail the succession of
command authority in the event of his incapacitation, either
to one cf his subordinate commanders or to his deputy. The
higher echelon can also extend an element covin to the lower
level for this purpose. Designated successors snare in all
combat information and have similar communications means.
Thus, the overlapping nature cf the control system
model lends itself to the continuity of control from above
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in the event an echelon is incapacitated, and one hundred
percent redundancy is thus provided implicitly in the
hierarchy, aside from alternate control units.
3 . Measures of Ef f ect ivei.es s
The Soviets assume a holistic approach in measuring
the effectiveness of their troop control, "believing that the
results of the cattle are indicative of the quality of that
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.
The emphasis on success is typical, and in this case
can be traced to another tenet of the Soviet doctrine, that
the basis and essential element of troop control is the
commander's decisicn. Thus the success cf the combat
mission is the only legitimate measure of effectiveness of
the control system.
Other measures can, however, be applied to the
control system itself in quantizing or indexing the
efficiency of the control agent. Ivanov indicates [Ref. 10:
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p. 42] that each echelon and type of unit has a maximum
allowable time duration for one cycle of the control
process. That is, the time required to gather the necessary
information, make a 'substantiated' decision, and
disseminate it to the implementing unit, must be as short as
possible and can not exceed an. absolute value equal to the
'critical control time.' This critical control time will
differ among the various combat arms, being smallest for an
air defense unit and largest for some rear services units.
It is a concept that will be developed belov*.
In striving to improve the current state of troop
control, in order to satisfy what are perceived as existing
requirements upon it, the following measures are regarded as
essential: further development of troop control theory;
improving the organization and structure of the trccp
control organs (i.e., staffs); introducing new, automated
control equipment; and improving tne procedures of the
commanders and staffs when using the new equipment.
Significant is the relegation of new equipment to
third place, while theory ranks first and organization
second. In the Soviet manner, theory for employment rust





Scviet command and ccntrci doctrine and operational
characteristics are often not explicitly statPd in the
literature but rust "be deduced from tactics and strategy.
Thus it is necessary tc consider the Soviet view cf theater
warfare and address command and control within that context
The European theater is the area cf nest concern tc the
USSR, being the rrost likely future battleground between the
forces of the Warsaw Pact and those cf NATO. The type cf
battle for which tne Soviets are prepared in Europe is then
the environment within which their command and control
system will be stressed the most and hence, represents the
franework for the discussion below.
Scviet tactical and operational doctrine emphasizes the
importance of surpiise, speed of maneuver, and weapons of
mass destruction in deciding the cutccme cf modern war. As
Record noted [Ref. 96: p. 20], "The Group of Soviet Forces
in Germany [GSFG] is structured principally for a massive
blitzkrieg against Western Europe, regardless of the
circumstances attending the outbreak cf major
hostilities..." "The magnitude, disposition, and structure
of the Soviet Army clearly reflect willful preparation for
massive, rapid offensive operations at the theater level in
Zurcpe." [Ref. 95: p. 32]. Douglass concluded in his
analysis [Ref. 97: p. 4] that "The Soviet concept for war
against NATO stresses the importance of a preemptive,
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massive, in-depth, surprise, nuclear stride in conjunction
with en immediate, high speed ground and air exploitation."
Absolute priority will te giver to the targeting cf Western
r.u clear delivery units.
Massive concentrations of arrcr and mechanized infantny
will assemble in extremely precise order to advance through
the areas devastated by nuclear fires before the defense can
recover. Cnce through tne lines of defense, the fcrces will
spread out to attack the rear, consolidate holdings, and
encircle enemy fcrces so that they might be destroyed.
Their strikes and their attack will be at the very strongest
points en the defensive line, in order to achieve maximum
attrition of NATO forces with their nuclear fires. Thus the
tattle is intended to be very short and intense. Vertical
envelopment will be used to attack targets deep in the enemy
rear. The desired frontal attack will take place only after
the defenses have been cleared by nuclear fires, the attack
being launched from the march. Units will be time-phased
to avoid static concentrations of troops, which would make
lucrative targets for NATO fires. All cf the attacking
elements will adhere rigidly to the operations tine-table
established by the commander.
Subordinate commanders are expected to use every means
at their disposal to meet the superior's objectives to the
minute. Failure to move in accordance with the Taster plan
could olace the unit in the way of subseauent Soviet fires,
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which will be race with the assumption that all friendly
units are en schedule. a hen less cf contact occurs,
maneuver elements are expected to execute their missions,
tut net to change or add new ones.
The thrust of Soviet doctrine end development can be
characterized by the following measures:
(1) Flans for all possible contingencies are prepared in
advance, so that subordinate units may have their
missions completely mapped cut ir. preparation for
"triggering" either upon the command of higher
headquarters or upon the occurrence of a predetermined
pattern cf events .
(2) The reporting, decision- making, and order
disseminating processes are expedited to the greatest
extent possible, so that they might occur before a
breakdown in communications occurs and before the
enemy has time to organize an effective strike against
the Soviet force.
(3) Algorithmic methods and automatic devices are
incorporated into all control organizations so that
decisions may be made mere quickly, may conform more
closely to the "optimum", may be made uniformly and
predictably, and may be made reliably even in the
absence cf fir"1* control by higher authority.
(4) Control points and the communications means which
support them are made as survivable as possible, by
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hardening, making them mobile, redundant, and as small




Soviet literature stresses the paramount importance
cf precision in the execution of the unit mission. The plan
for the battle must be precise and unambiguous, and the
subcrainates must conform to the plan exactly as it is
written. The Soviet thoroughness in planning for every
possible contingency in the most consuming detail is one of
the rrost striking aspects of tneir command and control
system. As Reznichenko wrote [Ref . 98: p. 16]:
Much depends on the ability of the commander to
formulate the battle mission clearly to his
subordinates, to determine precisely the order cf
execution by position and by tirre, so that the content
cf tnese missions permits nc variation in
interpretation. . .
The ideal plan is one which addresses all possible
variations cf events, so that even should total disruption
of communications occur, the subordinate is still able to
perform according to the plan cf the superior. Such a plan
is characterized by timetables, precision, and total
adherence by the subordinates.
The benefits are several. Radio communications are
considerably reduced, since much of the coordinating
information has been decided ahead of time. Pre-cperat ional
radio traffic is reduced, since the plan is generally
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transmitted by written of other hard copy means. Surprise
is thus facilitated, although at the cost of real- tire
control. The precise plans obviate the need for many of the
warning signals necessary prior to use of nuclear weapons,
as the subordinates are all aware of the expected times of
detonation. Since the exact expected location of all
friendly forces is known at any tire, fires on targets of
opportunity are facilitated. Douglass quotes General
Pavlovskiy [Ref. 97: p. Si]: "in a corbat situation it is
important not to be late, but also net to arrive in the
indicated region ahead of time."
Among the authors that stress the importance of
precision is Gcrbatenkc [Ref. 99: p. S3]. It is essential
that the subordinate units execute the
efficient implementation of the operational plan, with
the principal emphasis placed on an accurate observance
of the established schedules... a battle, regardless of
its scale, must be subordinated tc a definite
organizational principle. The coordination of
operations in term of place, time, and gcal is an
indispensable condition for successful fulfillment of
combat tasks . .
.
Jacobsen reported that the Soviet operation
against Jigjiga, Ethiopia, commanded by First Deputy of
Soviet Forces General Fetrov, was notable for its
'clockwork-like precision" which until that time had not
been seen anywhere except '...on paper in staff colleges.
[Ref. 120: p. 124]
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The vulnerabili ties attendant upon this rigid
approach tc operational planning were identified by Douglass
[Ref. 97: p. 55]
This notion of precise tiring, preplanning, and
adherence to schedules projects the picture of a highly
structured, very inflexible operation; and one that
would appear very suspect when compared with the
environment, which is considered to be ore involving
extreme destruction and gross uncertainties.
One of the solutions to the control problem will
thus be the rigid adherence to the operational plan, which
will be detailed enough to be definitive under ail possible
circumstances in the course of the battle. Such a plan will
be massive and difficult to prepare as well as difficult to
reference quickly. Thus, the Soviets are stressing the
automation of the decision- making process.
2. The Time Factor
Soviet writing about modern command and control
repeatedly stresses the critical importance of reducing the
amount of time spent on the control cycle. As mentioned
above, the duration of the cycle car. be used as a measure of
the performance of the command and control system. As Lomov
declared [Ref. 35: p. 164], "To control proficiently means
each time to spend as little time as possible on the control
processes in order that the maximum possible time is
available to the troops (for execution)." The need for
gaining time is symptomatic of the new weapons, the speed of
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rraneuver (due to the mecnani zation of the forces), the
ability tc maneuver by fires alcne (due to the mass
destructive capaoilities of nuclear weapons), the high rate
of data flowing into the headquarters tc allow it to manage
the battle, and other factors which place excessive demands
upon the commander and his ability to react decisively and
without error. Indeed, the Soviets consistently write cf
achieving optimum solutions in battle, not merely
satisfactory ones.
Technology has compressed the time available for
command and control functions to an incredible degree.
Technology has also provided the commander with the
potential automation of these functions, which is in the
Soviet view the only way he will be able tc keep pace.
Lomov [Ref. 55] and Ivanov [Ref. 10] assert that
given the dynamic nature cf the mcdern battlefield, the
command and control process must be assessed in a
quantitative way. Lomcv defines critical time as tne time
elapsed from the gathering of a piece of combat intelligence
to the time when it is no longer pertinent. Within that
time period, the information must be processed into
intelligence; a decision must be made by the commander based
upon the intelligence and upon his own combat capabilities,
while considering the factors cf weather, logistics, morale,
etc; the decision must be converted into plans and orders;
and the orders must be disseminated down the chain of
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comrand to the troop units which will implement the plan.
This period represents T(Ccntrol), tne time expended upon
the control cycle. If T(Action) represents the amount of
time available to the troops for the execution cf the plan
after receipt, the relationship
T(Control) + T(Action) < T(Critical)
must hold if the combat unit is to perform its mission at
all. Every minute spent on the control cycle thus reduces
by one minute the amount of time available to the combat
element. If one assumes that the maneuver elements have
been extensively trained for their mission capabilities, an:
that they will have viable strength, the only way to reduce
the total response time is to reduce the time spent on the
indirect combat activity which we call command and control.
At the same time tnat T(Critical) is snrinking due
to the realities of the modern battlefield, the amount of
data which the commander and his staff must digest is
increasing — tnree to four fold, according to Eondarenko
[fief. 121] over the volume of similar data required by a
commander in World War II. The answer, according to the
Soviets, is twofold. First, the functions and procedures
used luring the control cycle must be refined and developed
to the utmost degree of efficiency. Second, as many
functions as possible must be automated.
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An additional consideration was raised by Andersen,
Iruzhzhin, and Lozik [Eef. 22: p. 15]. They noted that for
a hierarchical command and control system, the total control
time is the sum of the control tines at each echelon. Thus,
efficiency can also be increased ty reducing the number of
levels which must exercise a given commend and control role
/
in the operation. The hignly centralized structure of
control is not efficient in terms of timely operational
control of forces. "The less time air defense has at its
disposal, the greater the independence required by lower
echelons." [Ref. 22: p. 20]. Thus, two modes of operation
are prescribed for air defense forces, depending on the
situation :
It is anticipated that, when timely warning is not
provided for active air defense assets, autonomous
operations will be required net only for fi^nter
interceptor formations and crews but also for individual
AEiv and ALa units. [Ref. 22: p. 20].
Reznichenko [Ref. 9£ : p. 16-17] suggested that the
shortening of control time could best be achieved by
reorganizing the work of the headquarters so that work
proceeds in a parallel, rather than serial, fashion. In
order to achieve this contraction, work which was previously
considered to be 'independent' must now be lone in
combination with other tasks, permitting "a substantial
reduction in the amount of time recuired for the control
its

function. A later article developed the theme further:
[Hef . 122: p. 53] :
The blending of such previously independent processes as
definition of the assignment, asessment of the
situation, adoption and formulation of solutions,
allocation of com tat asignnents, and organization of
mutual support represent the second feature of the
modern approach to the work of the commander and the
staff.
By combining all of these activities into one
homogeneous process, the commander — who now works
simultaneously with his assistants — accomplishes a
parallel processing of the combat assignment. Lorov
develops the idea further when addressing the need to
aisseminate the commander's operational goals as soon as
they are determined, without waiting for a complete
operational plan. Although couched in general terms, the
process described corresponds roughly to the fragmentary or
warning order used by the US Army. The parts of the
Operations Order are disseminated in bits and pieces as they
become available. The advantage gained by this procedure is
that T(Control) is allowed to overlap T(Action), and hence,
allow both the commander and the troops more time.
Ivanov devotes much discussion to the means of
accelerating the staff activity involved in the preparation
of plans, asserting that time and motion studies are
necessary in determining which activities are effective,
which must be eliminated, and so forth. It can be assumed
159

that much analysis has already been done on these functions,
as Ivancv offers tine lines with precise arounts of tine
allocated to specific staff sections for the development of
operations plans in an expedited manner. [Kef. 12: pp.
116-118]. He develops norms for the various actions which
must be performed — expressed in minutes.
Experience shows that scientific organization of labor
is unthinkable without the presence of normative,
admissable indexes (sic; for the expenditure cf time on
performance of an operation.
The norms are the maximum amount of tire an indiv-
idual nay take to perform the task — it is asserted that
experienced staffers will greatly exceed the norms.
Ivanov, Svgn'ev [Ref. 103] and others describe the
use cf ?ZRT charts in accomplishing not only physical work
but also in tne command and control process itself. In the
Soviet view, monitoring ana directing staff work in real
time is possible through the use cf tnese charts. A
prerequisite to PERT application is the formal structuring
cf each possible task, the assignment cf norms to each task,
and the identification of the critical path. The commander
is to Tcve personnel from task to task in order to avoid
delay on the critical path.
Reduction in physical preparation time is essential
in the rapid dissemination cf warning and alert orders.
Ivanov [Ref. 12: p. 125] advocated dissemination by the
16£

simplest neans available which yet retain the required
degree of accuracy. The officer's working map is the usual
means, although both Ivanov anc. Reznichenko [P.ef. 122: p.
52] describe use of tapes for this purpose:
The bringing of assignments to those v-ho carry them out,
using magnetic tapes containing ail the necessary
instructions, including preliminary combat orders which
insure sirilar approaches to organizing a battle at
various levels, is widely used. This guarantees a
considerable savings in time.
It should be noted that tapes are easily aat rapidly
created end duplicated, and can be transmitted securely by
courier or staff officer.
Lcmov considers information theory tc held ?reat
potential for significantly decreasing the amount of time
spent in communicating. Information must be condensed by
removing redundancies and by, packing the greatest amount of
meaning into the fewest possible symbols, not only to reduce
transmission times but also to allow for the transmission
of partially digested intelligence. The need for a new
military language, governed by its oi*n conventions and
tailored tc its own requirements, is implied.
Use of graphics, especially the officer's working
map, is viewed as an expedient means of communicating.
Ivanov indicates [lief. 10: p. 53] that every staff officer
must be equipped net only with his own maps but also with a
rather substantial inventory of colored pens, protractors,
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and ether aics to graphic work. Ee also builds or* lomcv's
espousal of forms and formatted messages as a means to
eliminate redundancy and speed preparation, transmission,
a;id assimilation. The position of the data ma/ convey as
rmch or more information than the data itself. Consider the
familiar 'Call for Jire' used in the JS Army. Terse,
accurate, and totally non-redundant, it could serve as a
model for a possible future 'military' language. The
^essa^e co^es to mean much more than the sum of its parts.
The Soviets stress perfection in training as an
absolute imperative in the reduction of control times.
Kirov [Ref. 104] describes the necessity to shorten
reaction times by drilling on procedures until they are
automatic. Ee distinguishes between two possible
uncertainties. In the first, or simple form, an impending
action or event is known except for the exact time of its
occurence. In this case the decision maker can review in
his mind the steps he rust take after the triggering action
occurs, and can respond without cognitive process based on
reflex alone. The second, or complex form, of uncertainty
involves an unknown action or event and an unknown time of
occurence. This type of uncertainty will cause delay,
because
Here the soldier can no longer count on a reaay action
prceram... elements of confusion are mere likely in such
situations, and the guarantee of reliable action
requires different measures from those employed in the
ie;

first version of suddenness Isic). The for^aticr. cf a
specific personality quality which couli figuratively be
termed familiarization with the unfar.iliar is irrortant
for insuring emotional- volitional stability in such a
situation. The casis of this quality is compounded of a
system of knowledge of all the theoretically conceivable
situations which, although of slight probability, are,
all the same, possible.
In order to prevent time loss, then, the second type
cf uncertainty must be reduced to a minimum. This can only
be done qj exhausting the entire range of possiblities in
preparation for the battle. Planning for every conceivable
contingency will thus, in the Soviet view, reduce reaction
time and eliminate the need for cognitive activity during
the reaction cycle.
3 . Algorithmic Control
The Soviets have written since the 1962's about the
need to automate command and control functions. This need,
they feel, has arisen due to the introduction cf nuclear
rrissle weapons and the mechanization of the forces. Time
available to prepare for offensive operations has beer-
reduced, for example, from the several weeks available
during World War II to the few nours available under present
conditions. Time for making critical decisions while under
fire has been reduced to mere minutes.
As Eondarenkc wrote [Ref. 121], "A fundamentally new
way to resolve the most complex problems of control had to
be sought. Such a way was found — it was full automation
of control." The Soviets appear to have embarked en a
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massive program tc accomplish this automation. In crder tc
achieve automation, command and control activities rust
first be described in a mathematical way, as rust the entire
phenomena cf ccmbat. From the mathematical model,
algorithms must be developed which will present the user
with an optimum decision.
Modelling of the combat situation and combat
decision raking are the critical first steps in the Soviet
shift into automation. As described by Eabich,
Dubovittskiy , and Lavrent'yev [Ref. 105], and also by
others, modelling can consist at the most elemental level of
the thought process followed by the commander before the
battle. This is a purely theoretical mcdel. Formulas which
describe the behaviour of the combatants or their weapons
can be used to enlarge on this model and make it into a
mathematical one. In the Soviet view, there is a model
v-hicn describes each variant of combat activity, each nuance
cf tactics. Even without automatic devices, the commander
must rely upon the models with which he is already familiar
to select the proper course of action in combat. As Babich
et al note [Ref. 125: p. 32] in the case of aerial comtat:
...the pilot will [not] be performing complex calculations.
He snould skillfully utilize available reference material in
order to select the optimal combat maneuver type and
conditions." Thus, the array of models with which the
commander is familiar determines the choices he nas tc call
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upon in making his iecision. Anashechev nctei that at fore a
rrodel could be accepted, it had to be tested physically.
[Ref. 126: p. 9]
It is essential to resort to 'full scale' modelling and
to the training cf the personnel. In ether words, 'tc
play through' the future situation ahead of time. And
net merely to play through, but rather to do this under
different situations and with various unannounced
changes
.
The scentif i c-technical revolution, as Volkov noted,
has made it possible to build quantitative models of troop
control and combat activities. [Ref. 127: p. 34]
This has made available new opportunities for conducting
a quantitative analysis and comparison of the variants
for a decision, for formalizing the conditions cf a
task, etc. and for expressing its content in the form of
numbers, tables, formulae ana functional dependencies
which could serve as the basis for creatine formal
models of combat operations. These models are studied
with the aid of logical- mathematical methods, which
enable one to compare the various variants for a
decision and to select the best one.
The description of combat activity in a mathematical
way and the application of algorithmic methods tc the
decision making process is ongoing. The set of rules for
working out solutions to basic military situations are
formulated in peace time so that they will already be
incorporated when war begins. Lomov wrote [Ref. 35]
"Mathematicians are at work on algorithms. Eefcre tnis ,
military specialists describe in detail both orally and in
writing how a commander and his staff act in a similar
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situation. The difficulty facing the ratnemati clans is
acknowledged end accepted. It is a necessity if the desired
decree of ccntrcl is tc be achieved. Ecndarenkc asserted
[Ref. IZh: p. 220] "Any formalized and algori thmized area
of huran mental activity can be turned over to a machine.'
In another work, he noted fRef. 121] "Full automation of
control over troops should be considered, in the plan for the
feasibility of formulating and establishing algorithms for
human intellectual activity."
Once the model has been built and the requisite
algorithms developed to use it, it is ready tc function in
either a manual or an automated mode. Use of the algorithm
with any given combat situation will inevitably result in
one answer, the 'correct' answer, in the Soviet view.
Soviets have traditionally relied upon specific
doctrinal solutions to every possible problem. They use
extensive tables and nomograms to determine the quantitative
values of many operational parameters. As Weiner noted
[Hef . 25: p. 114] :
An excellent example of this is the concept of
'density'. It is computed for all types of fire
(artillery, aerial, etc.) as well as for the initial
employment of weapons (tanks, anitaircraft guns, etc),
reducing all conceivable circumstances to mathematical
formulae. As a result of this rigidity, leadership
training courses discourage initiative in problem
solving and allow for only one correct solution.
iee

With the view that tnere is indeed one correct and
optimum solution for any given combat situation, end that
the algorithm will provide the test answer, the Soviets have
thus expanded their scope of positive control. The
doctrinally proper solution will te arrived at in every case
if the algorithm is used. The commander need only identify
which of the previously generated models of possible
solutions corresponds most closely to the present situation
end respond in accordance with that model. As the range of
variations is infinite, it is clear that automation of the
model library is necessary. Automation also insures that
the algorithm will be applied properly, as it is then a
machine function over which the commander has little or no
control .
Under certain circumstances the commander using the
algorithm may have been involved in its design. Frolov
wrote [?.ef. 129] 'The computer may issue an optimal
decision by retrieving an algorithm that was previously
written and stored in the machine... a solution that has
teen previously prepared by the commander under calmer
conditions for an analogous case." That the algorithm is
more accurate and successsful in deriving an operational
solution is espoused by Reznichenkc [Ref. 122] . In
describing the varying degrees of success achieved by
students at the Frunze Academy in determining the test
solution to a tactical problem, he noted that the solutions
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were net all optimum. But, he says, 'The automation of
control will result in the elimination of these
shortcomings .
"
Soviet writers are careful to retain the man in the
loop in writing about future control systems. There is a
dichotomy of apprehensions apparent in how the control
systems will be used. Numerous articles have appeared in
the 1970's addressing the psychological barrier which
reliance en automatic systems poses tc some commanders.
These conservative officers are directed to place more faith
in the machines and to accept the accuracy and speed with
which they work, far in excess of the capabilities of an
individual. Yet at the same time, it is clear that the
capabilities of the machines are rather limited and that the
users must know the algorithms and the limitations of the
programs in order to use them effectively. Frolov [Ref.
109] and Voronin [Ref. 110] both carefully note that the
decision produced by the machine must be adapted to the
specific circumstances facing the commander at the moment of
decision. In this regard, the solutions ere more a basis
for the commander's solution than a replacement of it.
Kalashnikov asserted that the use of algorithmic
methods repeatedly in training had an exceptionally
beneficial result on tne officers assigned to command posts,
even wnen manual methods were used [Ref. Ill: p. 50]:
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In this regard Kaleshnikov notes that it is
imperative before using the algorithms that tne commander be
familiar with their limitations. This is so because the
algorithm will produce a solution, even to a problem with
which it is not familiar, by default to the closest
previously recorded solution.
In addition to the obvious advantage in speed of
operation and increase in scale and accuracy cf
computations, the use of computers and other automated
devices offers a significant advantage in reliability.
Ivanov et al noted [Ref. 10: p. S7] that automated
information gathering is "more reliable" than manual
methods, and thus many reports to higher headquarters would
not be required. Cf course, computerized systems can report
automatically, updating every echelon's data base
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simultaneously so long as communicat ions links are
functioning. The automated systems can also be relied upcn
to produce repeatable results, based on the accepted
doctrine and the approved tactics. Certain safeguards, such
as for weapons control, can be built into programmed
operation. In many ways, the use of machinery in control is
rcre positive than the use cf numans because the automata
are more trustworthy. How much more reliable, predictable,
pliant and responsive are machines. Bcndarenkc and
Lruzhinin [Ref. 112] look forward to the day when human
thought can be synthesized. The human commander will still
be required, but his function will be much more of a
psychological one rather than an intellectual one.
There is one final benefit from the use cf
automation in command ana control. With their extreme
thoroughness in preparation for operations and preplanning:
all possible actions for the battle, the Soviets seem to be
striving for a battle plan so complete, so decisive in all
its contingency branches, that a subordinate unit equipped
with this plan will have no requirement for referencing the
superior commander during the battle. Thus, when
communications are cut off, the algorithmic processes may
continue unabated so long as the control point itself
retains its computers. In this way, positive control ever
the forces can be effectively retained even when
communications are net. As Ecndarenko wrote [Ref. 101]:
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Nothing should be allowed tc prevent the troops from
fulfilling; their assigned tasks. Not even a break in
coordinated actions or being cut off from a superior
officer's control...
In tne Soviet view, less cf communications dees net
mean loss of control so long as the subordinate unit adheres
to tne operational plan of the superior. This continuity
vtfill be provided by automation of command end control.
4. Stability cf Control
The Soviets continually stress the importance of
maintaining stability of control, by which is meant the
continuous, viable functioning cf command and control. Tc
accomplish this stability, eacn part of the control system
must be protected against interference cr destruction.
Vulnerable points must be safeguarded or made redundant in
such a way that prcbability of total less is low. As
Reznichenko wrote [fief. 102]:
Improving the viability of systems for controlling
troops, as well as the reliability and stability of
their operation, is the vital issue of our day. The
task is net an easy one, if ycu consider the revealing
indication of communications equipment —
electromagnetic emissions, and also the growing ability
tc neutralize and destroy our points and means of
control... As practice has shown, achieving the
interchangeabili ty of various control points, the
organization of control tnrough the echelon cf command,
the systematic jamming of the enemy's radic sets, and
the dependable protection of control points and
communications equipment enhance the possibilities fcr
carrying out this task.
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In achieving the goal of stability of control, three
distinct kinds of measures are employed. First, control
points are preserved. Second, communications are preserved.
Tiiird, none of the elements of the control system are
indispensable. These measures are discussed below.
a. Survivability of Control Points
In order to insure the survivability of control
points, they must be made difficult to detect. If detected,
they must be difficult to hit. If hit, they must be
difficult to destroy. In an earlier work Reznichenko
asserted [Ref. 98: p. 16], "Periodic changes in location,
the use of various tyjes of communication, reliable
camouflage and defense are very effective in raising the
survivability of control points.
The Soviets have always stressed the importance
of good camouflage and deception, especially of control
points. Current doctrine calls for establishing dummy
command posts as well as hiding the actual one. Combat
engineers are provided to control elements for that purpose
[Ref. 10: p. 97] . The electronic signature of control
points will also be disguised, both by placement of high
power emitters at dummy locations, and by the utmost control
cf radiation from the actual control point. Alternate means
of communication, such as courier and land line, are used to
a very great degree. Radio communication is kept to a
minimum, usually restricted to brief codewords, signals, or
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bursts. Antennas and transmitters will be remoted using
land lines. Mobile control points must te carried in the
same type of vehicle common to the combat formation, in
order to make discrimination of the command vehicle more
difficult .
In order to minimize the probability of a hit on
a control point, the Soviets move them frequently. Mobile
posts must be able to function fully while on the move,
although as Ivanov notes, efficiency is always reduced when
this is required, even if brief pauses are made in order to
control. It is better to displace as rapidly as possible
from one point to the next, moving at maximum speed, and
then deploying the complete facilities of the control point.
In addition to and contributing to a high degree of control
point mobility is the reduction of the control element in
size. It is important to station on them "only the
responsible personnel who are directly participating in the
control of subdivisions." [Ref. SS : p. 16]. High speed and
rraneuverab ility are essential in the control point. Soviet
writings assert that the helicopter is the most effective
vehicle on the modern battlefield, because it allows the
commander both to see the battle and to fellow it
physically, never leaving the vehicle. Semenov [Ref. 113]
admonished commanders never to leave their command and staff
vehicles and transfer to lighter vehicles for convenience in
observing the battle. That practice leads to separation
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frcm c ommuni cat ions and thus tc less of control —
"irreparable consequences in a combat situation."
Control points oust be difficult to destroy.
Thus, fixed control points are extensively hardened, buried
at great depths in the case of the strategic command posts.
Even in the field, command posts must be hardened by
accompanying engineer troops. Mines, ravines, and other
natural features are desire able locations for command posts
[Ref [Ref. 12: p. 94]. Command vehicles must have the sare
iegree cf protection as the combat elements. Point air
defense is always provided, as is an adequate defensive
combat element to protect the control point against ground
or airborne attack, "in modern combat it is impossible to
insure continuity of troop control if the necessary concern
is not shown for the defense of the personnel of the control
units against the means of destruction." [Ref. 1?: p. 9?]
It can be imagined that control vehicles will be provided
entrenchments scooped out by the engineers accompanying the
command pest. Pests snculd never be lecated so close tc
one another that a single medium sized nuclear detonation
wculd destrcy them both.
b. Continuity of Communications
While recognizing that communications will be
exceedingly difficult to maintain during modern combat,
Soviet military theoreticians insist that they are
essential. Numerous articles assert that, despite all
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interference, jamming, EMP, and electronic warfare, it will
still be possible tc communicate. "Communication is the
rraterial foundation of troop control in combat. To lose
communication means tc lose everything..." [Ref. 114: p.
£3]. In describing a field exercise, a lapse in
communications is noted [Ref. 115: p. 20]: "less of
control and communications with attached and supporting
subunits even for a short time weakened the force of the
attack and had an effect on precision of execution."
Maintaining constant comnunica ticn with
superiors is a responsibility of the subordinate commander.
Cn Soviet ships, the commander is the only one authorized to
use the communications means, and he is prohibited from
delegating that authority. He must also specify the exact
means and method of transmitting a message. "The commanders
nust not fail to maintain uninterrupted and stable
communications with higher command levels." [Ref. 116]
Semenov also indicated that commanders must be
much mere qualified in technical matters than one would
expect [Ref. 113]
:
All officers passed examinations on knowledge of the
radios and the ability to work on them. On the
exercise, each commander hac a diagram of radio nets or
communications lines, call signs, and special digital
data on a prearranged coordinate grid. All this helped
the officers to initiate communications quickly, to
control subordinates reliably, and to assign them new
missions in time without violating the rules of
deception and discipline in radio traffic in so doing.
175

All cf tne ^cdern techniques for ICC!\, such as
brevity in transmission, frequency hopping, and internetting
are practiced. [Ref. 117] Superior commanders are advised
to have their radio operators monitor the traffic on
subordinates' radio networks, which both decreases the
number cf transmissions required in reporting upward and
decreases the time delay attendant on reporting through
channels serially.
When mere sophisticated techniques fail or are
not advisable for reasons of secrecy of intentions, non-
technical means of communication should be used. These
include signal lamps, semaphore, flares, flags, rockets, and
most especially, couriers [Ref. 10: p. 86]
.
In case the worst happens, and a unit is cut off
fror all control by a higher echelon, it will continue to
function in the performance of tne mission. It may function
based upon algoritnms previously disseminated. This is not
the desired mode cf operation, but one which will allow
maximum predictability of subordinates and ensure that they
are not rendered totally ineffective by loss of
communications .
c. Hecoverabili ty of Control
Soviet practice is to insure that the less of
any one control point, or of any one means of communication,
should not interrupt the continuity cf control. It is
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inevitable that control points will be destroyed or rendered
ineffective during the course of battle. This will not
disrupt command and centre! if adequate planning and
preparation has been made.
A whole series of fall-back control points is
arranged prior tc operations, so that should the main
control point be destroyeo. or lose its communications means,
its functions can be immediately assumed by another. In
lower level units, like the battalion, one of the
subordinate companies will be designated in advance as the
successor control point to the battalion. In that case, it
will be provided with all of the communications means used
by the battalion point and will be required to monitor all
of the activities of the higher element. Assumption of a
lower control point's functions is also possible by the
higher element, although this is not currently preferred.
Special contingency staff sections are designated within the
higher headquarters element tc restore control lost at a
lower level if necessary. All headquarters above battalion
have at least an alternate, and higher levels also have
control points specialized for particular combat and support
arms. These will also be designated as successor control
points.
Regardless of which element takes ever, Soviet
doctrine is to replace a control point immediately after a
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nuclear strike, if ccmmuni cat icns have teen lest with it
[Ref . 12 : p. 95]
.
The possibility cf realizing this type of control is
ensured by the fact that the superior unit must have
communications with the control unit a step lower than
nis direct subordinate, and therefore rearrangement of
the communications system is not required.
The picture that develops is one of an inter-
locking command network, each element of which must be
prepared to assume the duties of the next higher or lower
element. The skip echelon structure ensures continuity ar.d
redundancy. Loss of one control point has little effect.
5. Commander's Representatives
Cne of the most striking characteristics of the
Soviet practice of command and control is the use of staff
officers tc oversee the activity cf subordinate
headquarters. Logvin calls staff officers [Ref. 114: p.
23], "the basic means with which the commander controls his
subunits on the field of battle." Just as the
representatives of the High Command were sent cut tc the
fronts and operational groups during World War II, so are
staff officers usee, by the Scviet commander of today.
Staff officers have duties which extend well beyond
the normal ones of collecting information, organizing it for
trie commander's decision, and coordinating the details cf
operational matters. Perhaps because the commander has more
trust in the members of nis personal staff, and because they
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ere rrore likely to be ewere of the complete operational
situation of the superior headquarters, staff mercers are
used both to transmit the commander's decisions to the
subordinates and also, as Sokolov says [Ref. 115], "firmly
ani persistently oversee its execution."
Use of staff officers as personal representatives
allows the commander's plan to be communicated in a detailed
and comprehensive way. The staffer can fully study the
commander's own map and question him to eliminate any
ambiguity prior to departing for the mission. Ey remaining
in the subordinate's command post after delivering the plan,
the staffer is in a position to observe and monitor the
operational performance of the unit. He also serves as a
ready reference to eliminate any misinterpretation of the
plan which might otherwise occur. Much more detail can be
conveyed, and in a secure manner, by relaying the plan in
this way. Grebenets notes [Eef. 117: p. 2] "The ideal way
to assign combat missions is the personal contact of the
commander and staff with subordinates."
The role of the staffer is not always limited to one
of passive observation. Although the staff representative
is invariably junior in rank to the subordinate commander,
he exercises some authority over him. He is an
"authoritative representative" of the superior, according to
Ivanov [Ref. 12: p. 2&3] , and is personally responsible for
the "accurate execution of all the planned measures by the
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suborciaa te contender or staff.' Potential conflicts are
net addressed in tne literature, although this practice is
seer, to infringe upon the authority of 'one men command.'
The Soviet commander at division and atove has an
additional asset used to control his subordinate elements
during movement and when dispersed over an area. This is
the commandant's service cf regulators, sometimes translated
as controllers. According to Ivanov [Ref. 10: p. 255-
262], this service was organized to facilitate "timely and
secret" movements of forces atout the battlefield. They act
as messengers, couriers, and guides. They provide traffic
regulating posts, equipped with their own radio network,
which can be used by the commander during the march to
direct and monitor the movements of his forces. They are
considered essential in coordinating the momentarily massed
forces envisioned Vj the Soviets as the key to the
offensive. This service also allows tne strictest radio
discipline prior to an offensive, when no other means of




Contemporary Soviet command and control doctrine is
principally derived frorr the Soviet experience during World
War II. The concerns which are addressed explicitly in the
literature and Implicitly in the design of their system
reflect the lessons learned in that conflict. Together with
the ideological factors, which aave persisted with less
change, the historical evolution of command and control
patterns is the key to understanding present-day philosophy,
doctrine, and practice.
Wartime experience has influenced modern command and
control in two distinct ways. First, there were a number of
experimental or ad hoc features adopted during the war which
worked extremely well. These features, which have teen
retained in doctrine or in practice, are summarized briefly
in Table 2.
Current Soviet doctrinal literature exhibits an acute
sensitivity to the critical failings of Soviet command and
control in World War II. The lessons of the past are
strikingly reflected in contemporary practice. These
features are contrasted in Table 3.
Soviet systems and procedures are generally dominated by
strict centralization and close supervision. The advantages
of centralization can be a rore optimal allocation of
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Feature * Original purpose
+ New or added purpose
Skip-echelon
communicat ions
* Increase the survivability of
the radial communications
structure
+ Allow deeper monitoring of
subordinate activity





* Compensate for lack of radios
* Fear of enemy exploitation of
radio comruni cations
+ Enhance operational security
+ Decrease possibility of garble





* Civil comnunications were the
only resources available
+ Utilize every possible resource
Dual subordination * Provide operational support tc
field commander while retaining
centralized control over resource






* Consolidated all national
authority
Table 2
Successful World War II
Features Retained in S'oviet System Today
ia;

Feature * Original purpose




* Facilitate Stavka control ever
allocation of specific classes
of weapons systems
* Reduce the diversity of tasks
required of any given command
* Optimize use of small number
of technical experts
* Allow field staffs to shrink
+ Allow tailoring of forces
to fit any scenario
+ Allow special trenches of





* Compensate for inexperienced
comrranders in the field
* Allow field staffs to concentrate
on immediate operations
* Reduce size of field staffs
* Insure coordinated action
by all forces
Military councils * Collective leadership as the
ideology required
* Consolidate all local military
and civil authority
* Prevent military conspiracy
+ Reduce requirements for real-
time communications
Table 2 (Continued)
Successful World War II C3
Features Retained in Soviet System Today
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Feature * Original purpose




* Extension of central authority
without decentralizing
* Provide instant, unbiased
feedback to the center
* Insure exact compliance with
orders




* Promote conflict, forcing
issues upward for
resolut ion
* Hinders growth of subordinate's
personal authority







* Forces accurate reporting
* Resolves ambiguities at the
highest levels
Table 2 (Concluded)
Successful World War II C3
Features Retained in Soviet System Today
1£4

F ea ture Current Posture





doctrine, and a preference
for survivability over


































One-man command at most levels
Table Z
Critical Failings of Soviet Wartime C3
to Which Sensitivity Fersists
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defense resources and more comprehensive, coordinated action
by diverse force elerents. Centralization also serves the
regime's purpose by reducing local autonomy and reserving to
the top leadership exclusive rights to substantive
decis icn-making.
Centralization to a large degree represents a lack of
trust in the loyalty or lack of faith in the ability of
subordinates. A consequence is the existence of multiple
monitoring channels, independently reporting to their own
higher echelons.
The tendency to blur organizational and individual
responsibility encourages the reliance on collective
decision-making, which is also an ideological precept.
Eifferences of opinion are provoked by the very structure of
the organization, forcing issues upward for resolution.
Turing periods of national stress, the distinction between
authoritative bodies can. be expected to disintegrate; this
disintegration fosters more effective responsive action
within the Soviet system than would be possible were roles
more clearly delineated. Individual initiative, suspect in
the Soviet Union, is functionally replaced by collective
action .
The organizational structure and force divisions found
today in the Soviet Armed lorces are the end product of
several years cf experimentation under true wartime
conditions. The vertical compartmenta tion of special
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veapcr.s systems, the ccr.trcl cf a disproportionately large
percentage of the force directly by the strategic leaders,
the organization of national command authorities and the way
they relate, and the architecture of the communications
syster were all developed during World War II.
Tenets of contemporary Soviet doctrine reflect the harsh
lessons of the war. The importance of achieving surprise,
the vulnerability cf radio- electronic communications to
exploitation, and the devastating effects of a coordinated
counter- command and control strategy are all dominant
themes in current Soviet military writings. The
proliferation of command posts, including hardened, mobile,
end airborne facilities, contrast sharply with the
Kircvskaya Subway Station cf 1941-1944. The multiplicity of
communications media provided at all echelons today is in
contrast to the total lack of military communications means
at seme echelons at the start cf the war. Even the
turbulence in the pre- and early war command assignments has
been rectified* today, the key military pesitiers are held
for years by the same officer.
Still trying to resolve the difficulties with trust,
much effort is being devoted tc alternation cf command and
control functions. This is not only a means of increasing
the efficiency cf the system, but alsc raises its
performance and reliability by orders of magnitude over the
manual system. Machines are more securely programmed, and
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eminently Tcre predictable. They respond tc the exact
dictates of the algorithm or norm which has beer, validated
and standardized. They nave no ulterior or seditious
motives and their performance is not degraded by fear.
Automation is a perfect solution to the peculiar
uncertainties cf Scviet command and control.
The Soviets claim that the armed forces are a social
entity, an extension cf the state. Tc serve the state, the
forces are controlled in uniquely Soviet ways. What they
demand cf the command and ccntrcl system, and hew they are
likely to use it in the future, ere test understood in the





Citations of translated material give the original
publication information first, followed by the Inglish
source. In many cases the Russian version has only been
translated in excerpts. Knowledge of the original Soviet
publication date is also necessary in evaluating the
material, as is the rank cf military authors. The following
abbreviations have been used:
JPRS - Joint Publications Research Service
KVS - Kommurist Vocruzhennykh Sil
(Communist of the Armed Forces)
KZ - Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star)
MA - Military Affairs Translations,
serially published by the JPRS
SMTS - Soviet Military Thought Series,
a series of translations published under
the auspices of the U.S. Air Force by
the U.S. Government Printing Cffice
VIZ - Voenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal
(Journal of Military History)
Vcyenizdat - Order cf Labcr Red Banner Voyennoye
Izdatel'stvo Ministertsva Cborony SSSR
(USSR Ministry of Defense Military
Publishers)
1. Adelphi Paper No. 76, Technology. Management, and the
Soviet Establishment
,
by David Eolloway, Institute for
Strategic Studies, London, April 1971.
2. Marxism-leninism on War and Army , Progress Publishers,
1972. Reprinted as No. 2, SMTS.






4. Scott, William ?., Soviet Sources of M i i i t a ry Doctrine
and Strategy
,
National Strategy Information Center,
Inc, Crane, Russek, and Company, Inc. 197b.
5. Scott, Villi am F., "Soviet military Doctrine and
Strategy: Realities and Misunderstandings," Strategic
Review , v. 3, n. 2, Summer 1975.
6. Zhilin, P. A. , Problems cf History , Vcyenizdat, 1975.
JPRS L/5674, 25 February 1976, MA GUO 6/76, p. 15 -
57.
7. Frickscn, John, "Soviet Theater Warfare Capability,"
in The Future of Soviet Military Power
,
Lawrence I.
Whetten, ed . Crane, Russak, and Company, 1976, p.
117-156.
£. Pavlovskiy, Army General I.G., "The Soviet Land
Forces," Soviet Military Review
,
n. 9, September 1976,
p. 2 - 7. JPRS L/6563, 29 October 1976, MA GUO 51/76,
p. 38 - 42.
9. Shterrenko, General cf the Army S.M., The Soviet
General Staff at War: 1941 - 1945 , Progress
Publishers, 1970. (Note: The pagination of the
second printing, which is used here, differs from that
of the first printing.)
10. Ivanov, D.A., Savel'yev, V.P., and Shemanskiy, P.V.,
Fundamentals of Troop Control in Combat
,
Vcyenizdat,
1977. JPRS L/8362, 6 April 1979.
11. United States Strategic Institute Report 73-3, The
Soviet Military, Soviet Policy, and Soviet Politics
,
by John Erickson, 1973.
12. Gcrnyy, Colonel-General of Justice A., "The Legal
Basis for Life in the Armed Forces," KVS n. 7, April
1978, p. 9 - 16. JPRS 71395, 3 July 1978, MA 1360, p.
66-75.
13. Scott, William F. and Scott, Harriet F., The Armed
Forces of the USSR , Westview Press, 1980.
14. Zemskcv, Major General V., "Sorre Questions on the
Ccnduct cf War," KVS . n. 22, November 1972, p. 15 -
21. JPRS 56110, 31 January 1973, MA 684.
15. Fedchenko, Colonel F., "For Political Study-Group
Leaders: V.I. Lenin and the CPSU — Creator cf the
Soviet Armed Forces," KVS , n. 14, July 1976, p. 69 -
190

77. J?RS 72024, 11 October 1976, MA 1385, p. 43 - 55.
16. Rend Corporation Report R-1742-PR, Relations Pet we en
the Soviet Union ana its Eastern juroj^ean Allies: A
Survey
,
by J .F . Erown, November 1975.
17. Sokolovskiy, V.D., Military Strategy
,
Voyenizdat,
1961. Trans, and ed




18. to" off, R.A., 'The Ground Forces," in Soviet Armed
Forces Review Annual
,
ed . by David R. Jones, v. 4,
1960, p. 76 - 107.
19. Vyrodov, Colonel I., "Strategy and Operational Art:
On the Leadership of Military Operations of Strategic
Groupings in World !Aar II," VIZ , n. 4, Arril 1979, p.
18 - 23. JFRS £73677, 13 June 1979, MA 1446,
p. 19 - 26.
20. Zav'yalcv, Lieutenant I.G., "The New Weapon and
Military Art," KZ, 30 October 1970, p. 2 - 3. Trans.
in Selected Soviet Military Writings 19 7 - 1975
,
ed.
by W.F. Scctt, No. 11, SMTS
,
p. 206 - 213.
21. Polmar, Norman, ed
. , Soviet Naval Developments ,
Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America,
1979.
22. Andersen, Yu.A., Drczhzhin, A.I., and Lozik, P.M., Air
Defense of Ground Trccps
,
Voyenizdat, 1979. JPRS
L/9337, 6 October 1960.
23. Gcrdiyenko, Colonel G.X., and Khcroshcho, Ccicnel
V.V., Initiative and Self-Reliance in Settle
,
Voyenizdat, 1970. JPRS 53674, 23 August 1971, rA 730.
24. Sukhorvkov, Colonel-General D., "initiative, Self
Reliance," _KZ_, 26 March 1978, p. 2. JPRS 70975, 19
April 1976, MA 1347, p. 50 - 54.
25. Weiner, Fried rich, and Lewis, William J., The Warsaw
Pact Armies: Organization - Concert cf Operations -
Weapons and Equipment
,
Carl Ueberueter Verla &', 1977.
26. Shcherbakov, Colonel A., ^A Commander's Development:
Execution and Initiative," KZ_, 6 September 1979, d .
2. JPRS 75129, 14 February I960, MA 1496, p. 41 -44.
191

27. Rand Corporation Report RM-5171-PR, The Sino-Soviet
Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the
March 1969 Clashes
,
by Thomas W. Robinson, August
1970.
28. Skirdo, Colonel M.P., "Leadership in Modern War," from
The People, the Army, and the Commander
. Voyenizdat,
1970, p. 96 - 150. Trans, in Selected Soviet Military
Writings 1970 - 1975
, ea. "by tf.y. Scott, No. 11, SMTS,
p. 146 - 164.
29. Kozlov, Lieutenant-general R.A., and Slavin, M.M.,
Problems of State and Law . Moscow, 1975, p. 65 - 81.
JPRS L/7262, 13 July 1977, MA GUO 31/77, p. 14 - 29.
30. Mashkov, Colonel Ye., "When the Decision Has Been
Adopted: Workstyle in the Party Committee," _KZ_, 2?
May 1977, p. 2. JPRS 69551, 10 August 1977, MA 1291,
p. 37 - 4?.
31. Belyayev, Captain 1st Rank A., "Control and
Verification of Execution as a Method of Scientific
Management," KVS, n. 16, August 1973, p. 18 - 25.
JPRS 62249, 10 October 1973, MA 968, p. 20 - 29.
32. Malinovskiy, Ma jor-General of Aviation N. , "The
Commander and the Party Organization," SYS , n. 19,
October 1974, p. 47 - 54. JPRS 63556, 29 November
1974, MA 1097, p. 25 - 31.
33. Timcf eyechev , M.N., "Strengthening Cne-Man Command --
A Most Important Condition of High Combat Readiness,"
KVS, n. 5, March 1976, p. 56 - 64. JPRS L/5960, 13
May 1976, MA GUO 21/76, p. 14 - 23.
34. Timof eyechev , M.N., One-han Command in the Arrei
Forces , Voyenizdat, 1976. JPRS L/6106, 16 November
1973, MA 70U0 17/76, p . 49 - 65.
35. Lcmcv, Lieutenant-General N.A., ed
.
, Scientific
Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military
Affairs
,
Voyenizdat, 1972. Trans, as No. 3, SMTS
.
36. Izgarshev, Colonel V., and Pr-ndyur, Colonel V., "On a
Level With the Standards of the Party," K7_, 6 July




37. Armed Forces Management
.
"How Soviet Command and
Control Works, July 1966, p. 119 - 120.
192

35. Cdorr, W.E., The Soviet Military: Party Ties,"
Problems of Ccmmr.r.ism
. September - Octcter 1973,
p. 12 - 24.
Z9. Grigorenko, Arrry General Piotr G., "There Will Ee War
Before the End of 1960," interview by I/Eurorec
(Milan), 13 ^ay I960, p. 122 - 132. JPES 1/9222, 25
July 1980, MA FCUC 14/60, p. 1 - 8.
40. Popel, N.N., Savel'yev, V.P., and Shemanskiy, P.V.,
Trcco Control During the Great Patriotic War
.
Voyenizdat, 1974. JPFS 64920, 4 June 1975.
41. Irickson, John, Poad to Stalingrad: Stalin's War
with Germany
, Volume I , Harper and Pew, 1975.
42. Werth, Alexander, Russia at War 1941 - 1945 . Earrie
and Rcckliff, 1964.
43. Eremenko, Marshal A. I., V nachale voiny , Moscow, 1965,
p. 45 - 54. Trans, in Eiaier (Ref: 47),
p. 146 - 151 .
44. Eiriuzov, Marshal S.S., Sovetskii so Ida t na balkanakh
.
Moscow, 1963, p. 137 - 143. Trans, in Bialer (Ref:
47) , p. 84 - Se.
45. Starinov, Colonel I.T., Miny zhdut svoegc chasa.
Moscow, 1964, p. 149 - 166, 210 - 212. Trans, in
Eiaier (Ref: 47), p. 65 - 79, 236 - 238.
46. Kuznetzov, Admiral N.G., "Vcennc-morskc i flct nakanune
Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny," VIZ . n. 9, September
1966, p. 65 - 67. Trans, in Bialer (Ref: 47),
p. 347 - 350.
47. Bialer, Sweryn, ed., Stalin and His Generals: Soviet
Military Memoirs of World War II , Pegasus, 1969.
46. Shtemenko, Colonel-General S.M., "Vydaiushchiisia
Sovetskii voenachal 'nik," VIZ . n. 8, August 1966, p.
42 - 46. Trans, in Eiaier (Ref: 47), p. 355 - 360.
49. Kelley, Walter, "Pogo," New York Tires Syndicate.
50. Berezhkcv, 7.M., S diplomat icheskci misslel v Berlin.
1940 - 1941 , Moscow, 1966. Trans, in Bialer (Ref:
47)
,
p. 212 - 218.
193

51. Vcrcncv, Chief Marshall cf Artillery N.N., Na sluzhce
voer.noi
.
Moscow, 1963. Trans, in Eialer (Ref: 47), p.
131 - 133, 227 - 212, 302 - 304.
52. Telesin, Lieutenant-General K.F., "Moskva - frcntcvci
gorad," Voprossy Istorii KFSS , n. 9 1966, p. 101 -
104. Trans, in Bialer (Ref: 47), p. 272 - 276.
53. Kazakov, General of the Army R . I
.
, Nad kartoi bylykh
srazhenii
,
Moscow, 1965. Trans, in Eialer fief. 47 J
,
p. 1S7 - 169, 421 - 422.
54. Kozlov, Lieutenant-General M.A., and Slavin, N,
;
M.,
"Military Councils in the Soviet Armed Forces," in
Problems of State and Law
,
Moscow, 1975, p. 65 - 81.
JPRS L/7262, 13 July 1977, MA QUO 31/77, p. 14-30.
55. Romanov, P. I., and Pavlov, N.I., "System of Control of
USSR Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War," in
Problems cf State and Law , Moscow, 1975, p. 53 - 64.
JPRS L/7262, 13 July 1977, MA GUO 31/77, p. 1 - 13.
c 6. Atkinson, Littleton E., "Conflict in Command in the
Red Army," Military Review
,
May 1952, p. 18-31.
57. U.S. Army, department of the Army Pamphlet 2£-230,
Russian Combat Methods in World War II: A Historical
Study
,
U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1950.
58. Eagramian, Marshal I.Xh., "Zapiski nachel 'nika
onerativnozo," VIZ
,
n. 3, March 1967, p. 52 - 69.
Trans, in BialerTRef: 47), p. 244 - 254.
59. Danilov, Colcnel V., "The General Staff cf the
Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) in the Pre-War
Years (1936- June 1941)," V_I_Z_, n. 3 March 1960, p. 68
- 73. JPRS 75992, 7 July 1960, MA 1522, p. 95 - 103.
60. Kuznetsov, Admiral N.G., "Pered voinoi," Cktiabr ' , n.
9 1965, p. 174 - 192, 196 - 159. Trans, in Bialer
(Ref: 47'), p. 90 - 96, 135 - 136.
61. Tiulenev, General of the Army I.V., Cherez tri veiny ,
Moscow, 1960. Trans, in Bialer (Ref . 47) , p. 137 -
142.
62. Peresypkin, Marshal of Signal Troops
,
/'Communications
Centers in Front and Army Operations," VI 7 , n. 1,
January 1978, p. 26-36. JPRS 79715, 2 March 1978,
MA 1334, p. 1 - li
194

63. Zhukcv, Marshal Georgi K., Marshal Zhukov's Greatest
Battles
.
ed. by H.I. Salisbury
, Earner an* Rcw, 1959.
(Note: This volume is a collection of articles
appearing originally in VIZ
.




, "Closing Cut the Column," KZ , 5 May
1975, p. 4. '^Concluding article of twc-vear series' or
the SKO). JFRS 65089, 26 June 1975, MA 1156, p. 1-3.
65. Aspaturian, Vernon, Evolution of Soviet National
Decision- Making
,
paper presented at the Conference en
Soviet Decision- Making for National Security, Navel
Postgraduate Scnccl
,
Monterey, California, 14 - 16
August I960.
66. Morozov, V.P., "Some Questions on the Organization of
Strategic Leadership in the Great Patriotic T#ar,"
Istoriya SSS5 , n. 3, May - June 1975, p. 12 -29.
JPRS 65273, 21 June 1975, MA 1164, p. 31 - 5?.
67. Gclubcvich, Colonel V., "On the Corps of Officers —
Representatives of the General Staff," VIZ , q. 12,
December 1975, p . 67 - 71. JPRS 66636, 21 January
1976, MA 1216, p. 44 - 52.
68. Rokossovskiy , Marshal K.K., "Na vokolamskom
napravlenii , " VIZ , n. 11, November 1966, p. 46 - 54.




Southwest Sector (July - September 1941)," VIZ . n. 4,
Aoril 1976, p. 64 - 72. JPRS 71395, 3 July 1979, MA
1360, p. 39 - 51.
70. Batov, General of the Army P.I., V pokhodakh i boiakh
,
Moscow, 1962. Trans, in Bialer (Ref. 47 j,
p. 417 - 420;
.
71. Kulikov, General of the Army V., "strategic Leadership
of the Armed Forces," VIZ., n. 6, June 19?5, o . 12 -
24. JPRS 65167, 6 July 1975, MA 1160, p. 40 - 55.
72. Dunnigan, James F., The Russian Front: Germany 's War
in the East, 1941 - 45 , Arms and Armor Press, 1976.




74. Sandalov, Colonel-General L.M., Trudnye rubezhi
,
Moscow, 1965, o. 3 - 10. Trans, in Bialer (?.ef: 4?),
p. 423 - 42c
.
75. Altukhov, Lieutenant General P., "Sore Questions en
Controlling Trccps in an Army Offensive," VIZ , n. 9,
Septerrber 1976, p. 11 - 19. JPRS L/6602, 10 November
1976, MA GUO 55/76, p. 26 - 26.
76. Stavka Order # 3013a , 18 May 1943, signed by I.V.
Stalin and A.I. Antoncv. JPRS L/6602, 10 Noverber
1976, MA GUC 55/76, p. 24 - 25.
77. Golikov, Marshal F.I., "Peservnaia arrriia gotvitsia k
zashenite stclitsy," VIZ, n. 5, May 1966, r . 65 - 76.
Trans, in Bialer (Ref. 47), p. 311 - 318.
78. Eokov, Lieutenant-General F.
, "A Conference at
Headquarters on the Reorganization of the Tank Army,"
VIZ
. n. 3, March 1979, p. 3S -47. JPRS 73533, 24 May
1979, MA 1441, p. 37 - 44.
79. Khrulev, General of the Army A.V., "Stanovlenie
stratego- icheskogo tyla v Velikoi techestvennoi ,"
VIZ . n. 6, June 1961, n . 64 - 80. Trans, in Bialer
(Ref. 47), p. 368 - 377.
£0. Silant'y ev » Marshal of Aviation A., "Directing
Aviation in Troop Offensive Operations," VIZ . n. 4,
April 1976, p. 29-36. JPRS L/5066, 9 June 1976, MA
GUO 25/76, p. 22 - 33.
£1. Pervcv, Major A., "Maneuvers cf Aviation Reserves by
Head- cuarters, Supreme High Command," VI Z; . n. 2,
February 1977, p. 94 - 100. JPRS L/7133, 18 May 1977,
MA GUO 23/77, p. 16 - 26.
Eozhevnikov, Major General of Aviation M., "The
Interaction of the Air Force and the Infantry During
the Third Period of the War," VJ_Z, n. 3, March 1979,
p. 16 - 21. JPRS 73533, 24 May 1979, MA 1441,
p. 21 - 28.
83. Ammcn, Captain 1st Rank, "Direction cf Headquarters,
Supreme High Command, on Improving Operational
Direction cf Fleets and Flotillas," VIZ . n. 11,
November 1976, p. 66 - 69. JPRS 1/6755, 3 January
1977, MA GUO 1/77, p. 73 - 80.
196

84. Peresypkin, Marshal cf Signal Trcops I.T.,
Communications in the Great Patriotic War .
Izdatel 'stvo nauka, 1973. JPRS 64919, 4 June 1975.
85. Peresypkin, Marshal of Signal Troops I.T.,
"Organization and Execution of Communication in
Defensive Operations cf Combined Arms Armies," VIZ
,
n. 7, July 1977, p. 56 - 62. JPRS 69736, 2 September
1977, MA 1296, p. 31 - 38.
£6. Peresypkin, Marshal of Signal Trcops I.T.,
"Communications cf the General Staff," VIZ , n. 4,
April 1971, p. 19 - 25. JPRS 53121, 13 May 1971, MA
701, p. 59 -68.
67. Konev, Marshal I.S., Sorok piatyi , Moscow, 1966, p.
187 - £04. Trans, in Eialer (Ref. 47), p. 516 - 532.
68. Standard Eandbook for Electrical Engineering: , 7th Ed.,
McGrav Hill Eook Company, 1941.
89. Maramzin, Colonel V., "Operating Methods of the Army
Commander in the Course of the Offensive Operation,"
VIZ
. n. 4, April 1976, p. 22 - 26. JPPS L/5065 , 9
June 1976, MA GUO 25/76, p. 13 - 21.
90. Pcrtugal 'skiy , R., "Command Procedures in the Great
Patriotic War," VIZ, n. 12, December 1975 JFRS 66626,
21 January 1976, MA 1216, p. 34 - 43.
91. Faliy, Ma jor-General cf Engineers A.
, M
"?.adic-
Electronic Activities During the War," VIZ . n. 5, May
1977, p. 10 - 19. JPRS 69454, 2e July 1977, MA 1285,
p. 12 - 17.
92. Alferov, Colonel S., "Regrouping of the Third Guards
Tank Army in the Battle for the Dnepr (October 1943),"
VIZ , n. 3, March I960, p. 16 - 24. JPRS 75992, 7 July
1960, MA 1522, p. 19 -33.
93. Tsygankov, Colonel P., "Development of the Tactics for
an Offensive Night Eattle in the Postwar Years," VIZ ,
n. 10, October 1978. JPRS 72469, 21 December 1976, MA
1404, p. 71 - 81.
94. Golovnin, Lieutenant General M., "On Some Problems^cf
Control in the Offensive Engagement (1945 - 1953),"
VIZ , n. 1, January 1978, p. 46 - 55. JPRS 71047, 2
May 1978, MA 1349, p. 7 - 15.
197





96. Record, Jeffrey, Sizing Up trie Soviet Ar^y , Brookings
Institute, 1975.
97. Douglas, Joseph D. , Jr., The Soviet Theater Nuclear
Offensive
,
Volume 1 in the USAF Studies in Communist
Affairs, U.S. Government Printing Office.
98. Reznichenko, Lieutenant-Genera 1 V., "Decision and
Control," _KZ, 11 December 1974, p. 2. JPPS 63874, 14
January 1975, MA 1107, p. 12 - 16.
99. Gorbatenko, Colonel D.D., The Time Factor in Modern
War , Voyenizaat, 1972. Trans, in Strategic Review , v.
2, n. 1, p. 92 - 94, Winter 1974.




101. Bondarenko, Colonel Y.M., "Scientific-Technical
Progress and Troop Control," KVS
.
n. 12, May 1973.
Trans, in Selected Soviet Military Writings 1970 -
1975, ed. by tf.F. Scott, No. 11, SMTS.
102. Reznichenko, Lieutenant-General V., "The Art cf
Control," KZ, 13 December 1977, p. 2. JPRS 70625, 10
February 1978, MA 1329, p. 51 - 5f.
103. Evgn'ev, Lieutenant Cclonel B., "According to a
Network Diagram," KZ, 21 January 1971, p. l. Trans,
in Soviet Cybernetics Review, July 1971, p. 49 - 50.
104. Kirov, Colonel A., "The Time Factor and the Soldier's
Mentality," KVS. &• 2 » January 1976, p. 52 - 56.
JPRS L/5764, 22 March 1977, MA GUO 10/76
105. Eabich, Colonel E., Dubovitskiy, Colonel A.,
Lavrent'yev, Colonel Ye., "Modelling in the Military,"
Aviatslya I Ko smonautika , serialized, starting with n.
3, March 1977, running tnrough n. 8, August 1977.
JPRS 70154, 14 November 1977, MA 1315, p. 1 - 34.
106. Anashechev, Zneineer-Colonel A., "An Engineering
Decision," KZ, 3 April 1980, p. 2. JPRS 76467, 22
September I960, MA 1535, p. 7 - 10.
107. Vclkov, Ingineer-Lieutenant Colonel A., "Mathematics
and Troop Control," KZ, 9 August 1973, p. 2 - 3.
JPRS 59945, 31 August~T973, MA 953, p. 33 - 36.
196

108. Scndarenkc, Colonel V.M., ed . , Automation cf Tree id
Control
,
Toyenizdat, 1977. JPRS L/8199, 4 January
1979.
109. Frclcv, V.S., Ccmnuter Technology in Military Affairs .
DCSAAF, 1972. Trans, in Soviet Cybernetics Review
,
hay 1973, p. 47-48.
112. Voron.in, Lieutenant-Genera 1 A., "By the Complex
Variant," LZ t 8 August 1978, p. 2." JPRS 72413, 12
December 1978, MA 1400, p. 5 - 8.
111. Kalashnikov, Engineer-Colonel V., "Who Has Control
Over the Automatic System — Has Control in Battle,"
KZ, 17 June 1980. JPRS 76624, 15 October 1960, MA
1539, p. 49 - 51.
112. Druzhinin, D.D., and Kcntorov, D.S., Concept
,
Algorithm, and Decision: Decision-Making and
Automation
,
Voyenizdat, 1970. Trans, as No. 6, SMTS.
113. Semenov, Major-General of Signal Troops S.,
"Reliability in Communications," KZ , 5 September
1978, p. 2. (Note: This article opened a new column
in KZ headed 'Control in Battle') JPRS 72427, 13
December 1978, MA 1402, p. 9 - 13.
114. Logvin, Lieutenant Colonel A., "The Reliability of
Control — the Commander and Modern Battle," K_Z, 18
September 1976, p. 2. JPRS 68372, 16 December 1976,
MA 1257, p. 22 - 24.
115. Krasnaya zvezda, "Emphasizing Importance of Field
Exercises," KZ, 14 September 1976, p. 1. JPRS 66372,
16 December 1976, MA 1257, p. 13 - 21.
116. Sigal, Captain J.st Rank D., "The Commander and
Communications,' KZ, 19 May 1971, p. 2. JPRS 53424,
22 June 1971, MA 71
3
117. Grebenets, Major-General G., "Stability of
Communications," KZ, 15 February 1977, p. 2. JPRS
69092, 13 May 1977, MA 1275, p. 1 - 4.
118. Sokolov, Major-General A., "The Staff in the Dynamics
cf Combat," KZ, 3 October 1973, p. 2. JPRS 60466, 6





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Professor John M. Wozencraft, Code 74 3
Chairman, C3 Academic Group
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. Professor William Reese, Code 61Ro 10
Department of Physics and Chemistry
Naval Postgraduate Schccl
Monterey, California 93940
5. Professor Paul H. Moose, Code 62Me 1
Department cf Electrical Engineering
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
6. Captain Wayne P. Eughes, Code 55Ei 1
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940




B. Captain Jeffrey A. Kern 2
165 Londonderry Drive
San Matec, California 94402
9. EQ, SAC/INXY 1
Attn: CPT Jay
Offutt AJB, Nebraska SS113
12. Director, NSA/CSS 1
Attn: A213, Miller







Ft. Monroe, Virginia 2Zbtl
12. Office of the Secretary of Defense







US Army Intelligence Center and School
ATTN: Library


















control in an histor-
ical context.
PfC ii 85







control in an histor-
ical context.

